Social norms, economic incentives and environmental policies by Alló Pazos, María
  
    TESE DE DOUTORAMENTO 
 
 
 
 
SOCIAL NORMS, ECONOMIC 
INCENTIVES AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 
 
 
 
 
María Alló Pazos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTAMENTO DE FUNDAMENTOS DA ANÁLISE 
ECONÓMICA 
PROGRAMA DE DOUTORAMENTO EN ECONOMÍA 
FACULTADE DE C. ECONÓMICAS E EMPRESARIAIS 
 
 
SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA 
2015
  
AUTORIZACIÓN DO DIRECTOR / TUTOR DA TESE 
 
 
Dna. María Luz Loureiro García 
Profesora do Departamento de Fundamentos da Análise Económica 
Como Directora da Tese de Doutoramento titulada 
«Social norms, economic incentives and environmental policies» 
 
 
 
Presentada por Dna. María Alló Pazos 
Alumna do Programa de Doutoramento en Economía 
 
 
Autoriza a presentación da tese indicada, considerando que reúne os requisitos 
esixidos no artigo 34 do regulamento de Estudos de Doutoramento, e que como 
Director da mesma non incurre nas causas de abstención establecidas na lei 30/1992. 
 
 
 
 
 
Asdo.  
 
  
AGRADECEMENTOS 
 
A elaboración desta tese foi posible grazas a un gran número de persoas. Así, gustaríame 
agradecer en primeiro lugar á miña titora María Loureiro. A súa confianza, o seu apoio e os 
seus ánimos foron fundamentais para min. Dende o meu último ano de licenciatura confiou e 
apostou por min, brindándome a oportunidade de traballar con ela en diversos proxectos de 
investigación que me permitiron acadar unha gran formación académica pero tamén unha 
mellora a nivel persoal.  
 
Seguidamente, é dado que a realización de enquisas nesta tese foi un piar básico, gustaríame 
destacar a axuda recibida por todos aqueles que me facilitaron este traballo. Así, á profesora 
Eva Iglesias da Universidade Politécnica de Madrid, que me permitiu analizar os datos 
obtidos do estudo encadrado no proxecto Ganga-SEO/Birdlife (2011-2012) e así, poder levar 
a cabo o capitulo dous desta tese. Por outra banda, o terceiro capitulo centrado na análise do 
sector do marisqueo foi posible grazas á colaboración de AGAMAR, en especial, de Natalia 
Laiño e de varios dos seus membros. Pero tamén teño que agradecer a colaboración recibida 
por parte das diferentes confrarías de Galicia como son, a de Arcade (grazas a Alicia!), Boiro 
(grazas Sonia!), Cambados (en especial María Xosé Cacabelos e ao resto de mulleres de 
GUIMATUR), Camariñas (Dolores), Muros (Juana), Noia, Pobra do Caramiñal, Poio, 
Pontedeume, Pontevedra, Rianxo e Vigo. Non me quero esquecer tampouco, da Reserva 
Mariña de Cedeira, que coa axuda e amabilidade da bióloga puiden levar a cabo a recolleita 
dos datos. Finalmente, para levar a cabo o capitulo catro, baseado no estudo dos montes en 
man común, foi de gran axuda a colaboración do profesor da Universidade de Vigo, Juan 
Picos, así como tamén das comunidades de montes en man común que colaboraron de forma 
desinteresada; así teño que dar as grazas á CMVMC de Boa (en especial a Jacob del Rio), á 
CMVMC de A Golada, A Gudiña, Abadín, Begonte, Cangas, Capela, Cariño, Castrelo de 
Miño, Castrove, Salcedo, Navallo-Mente (grazas Melina!), Parada da Serra, Portela da Fraga, 
Monte Maior, San Roque e Penedo do Galo de Viveiro, San Pedro de Muro, Cotobade, 
Culleredo, Dozón, Gondomar, Lobios, Mazaricos, Mondariz, Celas de Peiro, Filgueira, 
Moraña, Morrazo, Mos, Navia, Noia, Ourol, Ponteareas, Pontevedra, Porto do Son, 
Redondela, Rois, Tomiño, Tui, Val Miñor, Valladares, Viana, Vicedo e Vigo. 
 
  
Nestes anos nos que estiven realizando os meus estudos de doutoramento, os meus 
compañeiros de despacho, cos cales compartín moitas horas, foron sen dúbida persoas 
importantes; así que tamén teño que dar as grazas a Melina, Rocio, Jesús e Djamal, posto que 
todos eles contribuíron de certo xeito na miña evolución, tanto a nivel persoal como 
profesional. 
 
Tamén agradezo o financiamento recibido a través dos diversos proxectos de investigación 
nos que fun contratada, en concreto, a Biodiversa Research Programme (FIREMAN) pola 
financiación recibida a través do proxecto “Gestión de incendios para el mantenimiento de la 
biodiversidad y mitigación” e á Consellería de Economía e Industria pola financiación 
recibida a través do proxecto “Modelos de xestión sostible da propiedade común en Galicia: 
Unha perspectiva xurídico-económica” PGIDT-Sociedade e cultura”. 
 
Agradezo tamén a todos os membros do tribunal desta tese a súa dedicación á lectura do 
traballo presentado e os consellos tan útiles que me han permitir mellorar de maneira 
considerable esta achega.  
 
Por último, quero acordarme da miña familia, posto que eles sempre foron un piar básico para 
min. En especial, a meus avós, Mercedes e Domingos, moi especialmente a meu avó que fai 
un ano que non está con nós, pero que o teño tódolos días presente. Tamén a meus pais (Juan 
e Lola) e a miña irmá (Adriana) e finalmente a Roberto, por sempre estar aí.  
  
Social norms, economic incentives and 
environmental policies 
 
SUMMARY 
Human activities are the major causes of the biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation. 
Despite the considerable budget invested to conserve ecosystems, these are far from their 
conservation objectives (Chen et al. 2009). Therefore, it seems clear that an understanding of 
human behavior is crucial in order to improve general environmental policies. Pretty and 
Smith (2004) state that economic incentives are important but sometimes they are not 
powerful enough to achieve certain objectives. Sethi and Somanathan (1996) indicate that 
social norms can be largely influential in a social setting. Thus, the objective of this thesis is 
to focus on the analysis of these factors on the fulfillment of certain environmental objectives. 
Different case studies will be analyzed from both, a global and more local perspective. At a 
global level, it is analyze a current serious problem such as the climate change. At a more 
local level, three case studies are presented in order to understand: a) the degree of acceptance 
of agri-environmental schemes by farmers in Aragon; b) the role of poaching in conservation 
objectives in shellfish extraction; and c) the impact of common management in conservation 
outcomes in forest lands of Galicia. This thesis concludes with a summary of conclusions and 
future orientations.    
KEYWORDS 
social norms, economic incentives, natural resources, environmental resources. 
 
RESUMO 
As actividades dos seres humanos son as principais causas da perda de biodiversidade e 
da degradación dos ecosistemas. A pesar do importante presuposto investido para conservar 
os ecosistemas, o obxectivo de conservación está lonxe (Chen et al. 2009). Polo tanto, parece 
claro que o entendemento do comportamento humano é fundamental, á fin de mellorar as 
políticas ambientais. Pretty e Smith (2004) destacan como os incentivos económicos son 
importantes, pero ás veces, non son o suficientemente poderosos para acadar certos 
obxectivos. Neste senso, Sethi e Somanathan (1996) comentan que as normas sociais poden 
ser tremendamente influentes nunha contorna social. Así, o obxectivo desta tese é analizar o 
papel destes factores sobre o cumprimento de determinados obxectivos ambientais a través de 
  
diferentes casos de estudo; tanto dende unha perspectiva global como unha máis local. A nivel 
global, estudase un grave problema actual, como é o cambio climático. A un nivel máis local, 
preséntanse tres casos de estudio co fin de entender: a) o grado de aceptación dos programas 
agroambientais por parte dos agricultores en Aragón; b) o papel do furtivismo nos obxectivos 
de conservación do marisqueo; e c) o impacto da xestión común nos resultados de 
conservación nos montes de Galicia. Esta tese conclúe cun breve resumo de conclusións e 
futuras orientacións.  
PALABRAS CHAVE 
normas sociais, incentivos económicos,  recursos naturais, recursos ambientais. 
 
RESUMEN 
Las actividades de los seres humanos son las principales causas de la pérdida de 
biodiversidad y de la degradación de los ecosistemas. A a pesar del importante presupuesto 
invertido para conservar los ecosistemas, el objetivo de conservación está lejos (Chen et al. 
2009). Por lo tanto, parece claro que la comprensión de la conducta humana es crucial para 
mejorar las políticas ambientales. Pretty y Smith (2004) afirman que los incentivos 
económicos son importantes pero a veces, no son lo suficientemente poderosos para lograr 
ciertos objetivos. En este sentido, Sethi y Somanathan (1996) comentan que las normas 
sociales pueden ser tremendamente influyentes en un entorno social. Así, el objetivo de esta 
tesis es analizar el papel de estos factores sobre el cumplimiento de determinados objetivos 
ambientales a través de diferentes casos de estudio; tanto desde una perspectiva global como 
una más local. A nivel global, se analizará un grave problema actual, como es el cambio 
climático. A un nivel más local, se presentan tres casos de estudio con el fin de entender: a) el 
grado de aceptación de los programas agroambientales por parte de los agricultores de 
Aragón; b) el papel del furtivismo en los objetivos de conservación del marisqueo; y c) el 
impacto de la gestión común en los resultados de conservación de los montes de Galicia. Esta 
tesis concluye con un breve resumen de conclusiones y futuras orientaciones. 
PALABRAS CLAVE 
normas sociales, incentivos económicos, recursos naturales, recursos ambientales
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RESUMO 
INTRODUCIÓN 
 
A Comisión Europea (2014), amosa que o uso non sostible dos recursos naturais e a 
sobrexplotación seguen sendo unha gran ameaza para a biodiversidade. Este feito é recalcado 
tamén polo United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2013), afirmando que "a 
biodiversidade global segue a diminuír a un ritmo alarmante". Esta situación é preocupante 
dado que segundo o World Wildlife Fund (WWF, 2014)  "sostén a saúde do planeta e ten un 
impacto directo sobre as nosas vidas." Neste senso, Chen et al. (2009) comentan que a 
actividade humana é a principal causa da perda de biodiversidade e da degradación dos 
ecosistemas; indicando que, a pesar de todo o presuposto investido para conservar os 
ecosistemas, o obxectivo de conservación está lexos. Polo tanto, parece claro que unha mellor 
comprensión do comportamento humano podería ser fundamental no deseño de políticas 
ambientais máis eficaces. A pregunta é ¿qué factores inflúen no comportamento dos seres 
humanos? 
 
A teoría económica tradicional sostén que os individuos somos racionais e egoístas; 
buscando maximizar a nosa propia utilidade. Ademais, en relación aos recursos naturais e 
ambientais, é importante ter en conta que estes son bens públicos ou recursos de uso común. 
Neste senso, Hardin (1968) propuxo a "traxedia dos comúns", como o fin dos recursos. 
Segundo a literatura económica tradicional, cando os seres humanos afrontan un ben público, 
o resultado máis común é a falta de cooperación e o comportamento free-rider. A vía que se 
propón para evitar esta situación, é o establecemento de leis e a existencia dunha autoridade 
que impoña regras aos usuarios dado que, en teoría, estes non son capaces de se auto-limitar. 
Con todo, na práctica, a pesar da existencia de leis que impoñen incentivos económicos, tales 
como impostos, subvencións, multas e a existencia de entidades reguladoras, o éxito na 
xestión dos recursos naturais e do medio ambiente foi limitada. Nesta liña, varios estudos 
demostraron que as conclusións dos modelos económicos tradicionais non sempre son certas e 
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que, ademais de incentivos económicos, factores como as normas e influencias sociais tamén 
importan cando os individuos toman decisións. 
 
Lindbeck (1997) suxire que "os individuos actúan segundo recompensas ou castigos 
previstos, aínda que estes toman unha forma que difire substancialmente nos dous casos." 
Castigos e recompensas son incentivos económicos; polo tanto, implican recompensas 
materiais ou sancións. Sen embargo, é importante ter en conta que tamén son incentivos 
sociais, que implican recompensas ou castigos sociais. Polo tanto, ambos factores deben ser 
analizados. Nesta liña, Levitt e Dubner (2006) indican que os economistas cren que os 
incentivos poden resolver calquer problema. Así, os incentivos poden ser definidas como "un 
pequeno obxecto con incrible poder para cambiar unha situación", "un medio de fomentar a 
alguén a facer algo mellor, e menos algo mal". Ademais, estes autores fan fincapé en tres 
tipos de incentivos: económicos, sociais e morais; subliñando que todos deben ser 
considerados, xa que poderían ser a chave para mellorar a eficacia das políticas. Neste senso e 
en relación ás cuestións ambientais, Hovi et al. (2011) salientan que a economía do medio 
ambiente está cambiando e un dos feitos que axudou a progresar foi a incorporación da 
psicoloxía nos modelos económicos posto que se crean mellores previsións e políticas 
(Camerer e Loewenstein, 2004). A idea de que os factores sociais importan foi un tema moi 
analizado; por exemplo, Fehr e Falk (2002) comentan que hai aspectos non pecuniarios 
poderosos para ser tidos en conta, xa que, do contrario, os economistas poden estar fallando 
ao tratar de entender o comportamento humano. Esta idea tamén foi enfatizada por Fehr e 
Fischbacher (2002), salientando que as preferencias sociais son exhibidas por un gran número 
de persoas. Aínda mais, Fehr e Gächter (2002) explican que, nalgúns casos, os contratos de 
incentivos poden reducir a cooperación voluntaria; inclusive unha multa pode diminuír a 
cooperación voluntaria, ademais da eficiencia. Nesta liña, Levitt e Dubner (2006) explican co 
seguinte exemplo o efecto contrario que se pode alcanzar considerando unicamente o aspecto 
económico. Trátase do caso dunha gardaría onde os pais recollen os fillos tarde e na que como 
medio para evitar esta situación introducen unha multa co fin de incentivalos a ser puntuais. O 
resultado obtido foi, sen embargo, o contrario cun aumento na frecuencia en que os pais 
chegaban atrasados. 
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Por tanto, o obxectivo desta tese é estudar o papel que as normas sociais xunto cos 
incentivos económicos xogan na toma de decisións dos individuos. Os primeiros xa foron 
brevemente comentados pero, ¿qué son as normas sociais? As normas sociais son definidas 
como comportamentos, actitudes e opinións de terceiros que poden ser tremendamente 
influentes nunha contorna social (Sethi e Somanathan, 1996). Ademais, Baron e Byrne (2004) 
tamén apuntan a, cómo espera un individuo que sexa o comportamento doutros en situacións 
específicas. É máis, a maioría das persoas obedéceas a maior parte do tempo. Elster (1989) 
define as normas sociais como "propensións emocionais e de comportamento dos individuos" 
que non implican o rexeitamento da elección racional. Elster (1989) tamén sinala que "as 
accións normalmente son influenciadas tanto pola racionalidade como polas normas." 
 
Así neste traballo, estes factores van ser estudados a través de diferentes casos de estudo 
sobre os recursos medioambientais e naturais. A razón é que, a pesar da importancia dos 
factores sociais, pouco se sabe sobre o seu papel na xestión dos recursos. Neste senso, 
Goldstein et al. (2008) argumentan que hai pouco traballo empírico na literatura sobre o 
comportamento do consumidor e acerca dos factores que inflúen nun comportamento pro-
social ou pro-ambiental. Así, o obxectivo desta tese é analizar o papel destes factores sobre o 
cumprimento de determinados obxectivos ambientais a través de diferentes casos de estudo; 
tanto dende unha perspectiva global como unha máis local. A nivel global, estudase un grave 
problema actual, como é o cambio climático. A un nivel máis local, preséntanse tres casos de 
estudio co fin de entender: a) o grado de aceptación dos programas agroambientais por parte 
dos agricultores en Aragón; b) o papel do furtivismo nos obxectivos de conservación do 
marisqueo; e c) o impacto da xestión común nos resultados de conservación nos montes de 
Galicia. 
 
CASOS DE ESTUDO 
 
O primeiro caso de estudo ofrece unha revisión das avaliacións existentes de preferencias 
cara as políticas de mitigación e adaptación ao cambio climático a través dunha meta-análise a 
nivel internacional. En concreto, analizase o impacto que os valores e normas sociais teñen 
nas preferencias de cara as políticas de loita contra o cambio climático; empregando unha 
mostra de 58 estudos internacionais. 
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Os seguintes tres capítulos da tese están relacionadas coa xestión dos recursos naturais. 
En concreto, no segundo capítulo, analízanse as decisións que toman os agricultores de 
Aragón (España), unha área na que o descenso das aves que viven nas estepas de cereal 
tornouse nunha situación moi preocupante. A preocupación é de tal orde que, a Política 
Agraria Común (PAC) está intentando resolver esta situación a través da implantación de 
contratos agroambientais. Así, o obxectivo deste capítulo é avaliar as preferencias dos 
agricultores en relación a estes contratos, esixindo unha serie de requisitos ambientais, coa fin 
de protexer ás aves e a biodiversidade. En particular, realizase unha enquisa ás comunidades 
rurais e a través da estimación dun modelo logit ordenado, clasificándose as diferentes 
características do contrato, e obténdose a súa valoración económica dacordo coas preferencias 
dos agricultores. 
 
O terceiro capítulo desta tese está relacionado coa actividade marisqueira en Galicia 
(España). Este sector está sufrindo dous problemas serios: a explotación excesiva de 
determinadas especies, debido á escaseza doutras, e o furtivismo. O obxectivo é analizar a 
través dun experimento de elección as preferencias das mariscadoras con respecto a un 
programa de conservación proposto; ademais de avaliar, neste contexto, o papel das 
preferencias temporais, o efecto da co-xestión a través dunha Área Mariña Protexida, o efecto 
das normas sociais e o impacto do furtivismo. 
 
Finalmente, o último capítulo desta tese trata sobre os recursos forestais. Neste senso, 
unha das ferramentas empregadas para analizar as decisións individuais son os xogos de bens 
públicos. Neste capítulo realizase un xogo de ben público modificado cunha mostra de 
propietarios dun recurso de uso común como son, as comunidades de montes en man común 
de Galicia (España). Os propietarios teñen unha dotación de diñeiro e teñen que decidir qué 
importe destinan a un fondo común e qué importe gardan nos seus petos. Como punto de 
diferenza con estudos anteriores tamén se inclúe unha penalización que ten que ser repartida. 
O obxectivo é analizar os factores que motivan a repartición do diñeiro nun recurso de 
propiedade común, así como os factores que motivan a repartición dunha penalización. 
Ademais, próbanse os principios de acción colectiva propostos por Ostrom (1990) e estúdanse 
as súas implicacións no xogo do ben público.  
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PRINCIPAIS RESULTADOS 
 
Centrándose no primeiro capítulo desta tese, realizouse unha meta-análise das políticas de 
cambio climático. Así, arróxase luz sobre o tipo de políticas que son máis preferidas para os 
cidadáns. En concreto,os resultados indican que as accións de mitigación son preferibles ás de 
adaptación. Por outra banda, son máis preferibles as políticas que promoven a prevención de 
desastres e de ondas de calor. Ademais, o impacto dos valores e normas sociais tamén son 
tidos en conta; concluíndo que as preferencias cara as políticas de cambio climático están 
afectadas por actitudes en relación ao tempo e ás normas sociais. En particular, os países 
cunha orientación a longo prazo teñen unha disposición a pagar maior. Os resultados indican 
tamén que os aspectos morais debe ser empregados para entender as preferencias sociais cara 
políticas climáticas. 
 
O segundo capítulo céntrase na perda de biodiversidade en Aragón. A través da enquisa 
realizada aos propios agricultores atópase que os factores sociais son importantes na 
determinación das decisións dos agricultores. En particular, a importancia da confianza social 
e a expectativa de cumprimento por parte doutros veciños melloran a aceptación dos contratos 
por parte dos agricultores. En relación aos incentivos económicos, a creación dunha multa 
pode ser unha forma persuasiva para impulsar o cumprimento dos contratos. Ademais, as 
normas sociais son importantes en termos de preferencias cara o contrato. Así, os agricultores 
máis involucrados socialmente e máis visibles, están máis preocupados pola multa. Ademais, 
os que seguen unha norma social de cumprimento valoran positivamente a sanción. Isto pode 
estar relacionado co feito de que os agricultores queren garantir que os free-riders, poderán ser 
penalizados, podendo ser entendida a multa como un castigo xusto ou altruísta (Fehr e 
Gächter, 2002). En xeral, os resultados indican que a presión social e as redes sociais son 
factores importantes que poden axudar a controlar a actitude dos agricultores no senso de 
acadar resultados máis sostibles. Polo tanto, reforzase a idea de que as normas sociais son 
cruciais para a comprensión do comportamento dos individuos, dado que inflúen na 
valoración dos incentivos económicos (Fehr e Fischbacher, 2002). 
 
O terceiro capítulo refírese ao sector marisqueiro en Galicia. Como se comentou, nesta 
área de estudo, os usuarios afrontan dous problemas principais: a sobrexplotación (debido á 
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escaseza dalgunhas especies) e o furtivismo. Os resultados mostran respecto ás preferencias 
temporais, que os usuarios actuais son impacientes nos seus niveis de extracción. Isto pode ser 
resultado do ambiente de risco no que están envoltos (Ostrom, 1990). Ademais, verificouse 
que o furtivismo ten un dobre efecto negativo. En primeiro lugar, contribúe á explotación 
excesiva dos recursos e, doutra banda, esta actividade ilegal incrementa a impaciencia dos 
usuarios. Deste xeito, as autoridades teñen que xestionar o problema desta actividade ilegal, 
xa que podería ter peores consecuencias no futuro. No que se refire ás normas sociais, 
descubrimos que cando a aplicación da lei é a norma, os esforzos necesarios para o plan de 
xestión  non implican unha redución na utilidade das mariscadoras. Polo tanto, destacase que, 
ademais dos incentivos económicos, as normas sociais importan (Fehr e Falk, 2002). Outro 
aspecto importante a ter en conta no deseño de novas políticas eficaces é a eficacia da Área 
Mariña Protexida, onde os principios propostos por Ostrom (1990) están funcionando. Neste 
senso, os usuarios implicados nunha Área Mariña Protexida teñen un comportamento máis 
conservador en termos de preferencias de extracción. 
 
O último capítulo da tese centrase no sector forestal de Galicia. En concreto, realizase un 
xogo dun ben público cunha mostra de propietarios forestais. Os resultados mostran que, en 
consonancia  coa literatura anterior, os individuos comparten unha cantidade significativa da 
dotación cos seus veciños. Polo contrario, no caso da sanción, os usuarios prefiren que o 
fondo común pague a súa parte proporcional da multa. No que se refire aos principios de 
acción colectiva e atendendo ao papel que desempeñan na toma de decisións dos individuos, 
cando os propietarios están afrontando a repartición dunha recompensa estes non implican 
resultados máis cooperativos. Polo contrario, no caso da sanción, fan que os individuos 
asuman un maior importe da multa. Polo tanto, estes principios poden axudar a promover a 
cooperación cando os propietarios comúns afrontan incentivos económicos caros. 
 
CONCLUSIÓNS 
 
En xeral, a través da realización desta tese encontrase que as normas sociais son factores 
que deben ser considerados, xunto cos incentivos económicos. Ámbalas cuestións son cruciais 
para lograr políticas eficaces na xestión dos recursos naturais e ambientais. Así, na análise de 
políticas climáticas, as diferenzas culturais desempeñan un papel importante na comprensión 
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do comportamento das persoas. Por outra banda, tamén se manifesta a importancia das 
normas sociais. En concreto, pódese concluír que as accións custosas para as persoas poden 
ser percibidas de forma máis positiva se as normas sociais están presentes. Tamén é 
importante promover a participación dos usuarios nos problemas de conservación da natureza, 
xa que se demostra que os individuos poden tomar accións máis responsables cando se senten 
implicados no proceso de xestión. Polo tanto, unha mellor comprensión dos aspectos culturais 
e das normas sociais poderían mellorar as estratexias actuais que están a ser aplicadas. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
I.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Commission (2014) has highlighted that the unsustainable use of natural 
resources and their overexploitation continues to be a major threat to biodiversity. Recently 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2013) has remarked that “the world´s 
biodiversity continues to decline at alarming rates”. This is a worrying question and according 
to the World Wildlife Fund (WWF, 2014) “biodiversity underpins the health of the planet and 
has a direct impact on all our lives.” Chen et al. (2009) pointed out that the activities of 
humans are the major causes of the biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation; indicating 
that despite the considerable budget invested to conserve ecosystems they are far from their 
objective. Therefore, it seems clear that an understanding of human behavior is crucial in 
order to improve environmental policies. So, what factors affect human behavior?  
 
Traditional economic theory argues that individuals are rational and selfish; seeking to 
maximize their own utility. In addition, and with regards to natural and environmental 
resources, it is important to take into account that these are public goods or common pool 
resources. Therefore, they have two main properties; a) they are non-excludable and b) non-
rival. Thereupon, Hardin (1968) proposed the “tragedy of the commons” as the most common 
output resulting from their economic exploitation. According to traditional economic 
literature when humans face a public good, the more typical results found will be non-
cooperation and free-rider behavior. In this sense, traditional economic literature proposes as 
a mean to avoid this situation, the establishment of laws and the existence of an authority 
which imposes rules to users in order to self-limit their extraction or use. Nonetheless, 
although the existence of laws which imposes economic incentives, such as taxes, subsidies, 
fines and authorities that regulate resources exists, the success achieved in the management of 
natural and environmental resources has been limited so far, as it is evident. Several studies 
have shown that the conclusions of traditional economic models are not always true and in 
addition to economic incentives, factors such as social norms or social influences also matter 
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when individuals make decisions.  
 
I.2 BEYOND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NORMS 
 
Lindbeck (1997) suggests that “individuals act in accordance with expected rewards 
or punishment, even though the form these take differs substantially in the two cases.” 
But punishment and rewards are both economic incentives; therefore they imply material 
rewards or penalties but also social rewards or sanctions. Therefore, not only economic 
incentives but also social factors should be analyzed. Levitt and Dubner (2006) indicate 
that economists believe that incentives can solve any problem. Thus, they indicate that 
incentives can be defined as “a minuscule object with an amazing power to change a 
situation”, “a mean to exhort someone to do something better, and less something bad.” 
However, Levitt and Dubner (2006) classify three types of incentives: economics, socials 
and morals; highlighting that all should be considered, because they could improve the 
effectiveness of policies. In this sense, Hovi et al. (2011) stand out that environmental 
economics is changing and one of the facts is the progress of behavioral economics which 
is based on the conviction that is important to incorporate psychology in the economic 
models because they can create better predictions and improving policies advices 
(Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). The idea of that social factors matter has been also 
analyzed by several studies, for example, Fehr and Falk (2002) comment that there are 
powerful non-pecuniary aspects that should be taking into account by economists. On the 
contrary, they can fail to understand behavior. Moreover, they show as reciprocity, the 
desire for social approval and the desire to work on interesting tasks “may backfire the 
agents’ performance or compliance with rules”. Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) stress the 
idea that economists fail whether they do not consider social preferences, which are 
exhibited by an important number of people. Furthermore, Fehr and Gächter (2002) 
explain that in some cases, incentive contracts can decrease voluntary cooperation, even a 
fine can decrease voluntary cooperation but also efficiency. In this line, Levitt and 
Dubner (2006) explain as in a kindergarten where parents pick up children later 
introduced a fine and the consequence was the increase of the frequency of parents 
coming later. 
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Therefore, through this dissertation the analysis of social norms besides economic 
incentives in the individuals’ decisions will be taken into account in order to improve 
environmental policies. In spite of the importance of social factors, little is known about the 
role they play in the management of environmental and natural resource. 
 
What are the social norms? Social norms are defined as behaviors, attitudes and opinions 
of third parties that they can be largely influential in a social setting (Sethi and Somanathan, 
1996). Moreover, Baron and Byrne (2004) also indicate that indicate how you hope that the 
behavior of others is in specific situations. Thereupon, greater part of people obeys them most 
of the time. Elster (1989) defined social norms as “emotional and behavioral propensities of 
individuals”, which do not imply the rejection of rational choice. Elster (1989) also highlights 
that “actions typically are influenced by both rationality and by norms.”  
 
It seems clear that social factors, such as social norms could be important to explain 
individuals’ behavior while taking into account the lack of success of the current management 
strategies of natural and environmental resources. Maybe considering these aspects can give 
us some insights of how to improve present management conditions. Therefore, how can we 
measure social norms? Goldstein et al. (2008) employed two field experiments to analyze the 
effectiveness of signs requesting hotel guest participation in an environmental conservation 
program. They find that descriptive norms influence the behavior of people. In addition, 
Cameron and Fehr (2002) highlight some games that can be useful to measure social norms 
and preferences; thus, the Prisoner’s dilemma Game (PG), Public Goods Game (PGG), 
Ultimatum Game (UG), Dictator Game (DG), Trust Game (TG), Gift Exchange Game (GEG) 
and Third Party Punishment Game (TPPG) are candidates to be used. The analysis of the 
results obtained in these games indicates that not all individuals are selfish and that social 
norms are important. Ostrom (2000) concludes through the analysis of PGG that not 
everybody acts as a “rational egoist”, on the opposite contributions are on average about 40-
60% of their endowments. Moreover, when the PGG is conducted with several rounds 
individuals learn to cooperate. Furthermore, when the game leads communication also makes 
cooperation increase. Even, it has been found that individuals who are willing to make 
personal expenses to punish those who are offering amounts below the average contribution. 
At this regard, Chaudhuri (2011) conducted a survey on the literature of PGG and social 
16 
 
norms finding that the majority of participants are conditional cooperators. More 
evidence of the power of social norms can be found in other games as DG or UG. With 
regards to the DG, Engel (2011) conducted a meta-analysis, finding that 129 
contributions have been published between 1992 and 2009 with a total of 616 treatments. 
He found that dictators gave on average 28.35% of their pie; therefore, this is another 
example against the homo-economicus. List (2007) highlights previous literature finding 
that on average the offer is around 20% of the endowment. In UG, players offer on 
average around 40 to 50% of the pie, showing that respondents take care of their 
monetary payoff but also take care of the proposer (Güth and Kocher, 2013). 
 
Therefore, traditional economic literature can show limitations in terms of results, 
because not all individuals behave in the same way when they face the same objective. 
Ostrom (2000) remarks that as in terms of evolutionary theory, which supports the 
assumption that modern humans have inherited propensity to learn social norms, similar 
to inherited propensity to learn grammatical rules (Pinker, 1994). 
 
Several studies support that the addition of social norms over economic incentives in 
the design of policies is an important step. Fehr and Fischbacher (2004a) conclude that 
economic incentives, such as sanctions are important to assure the norm enforcement. 
However, they are driven by non-selfish motives and one factor that can explain this 
aspect is the reciprocity (Fehr and Gachter, 2000). Another example is the study 
elaborated by Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) who analyze the impact of penalties, 
concluding that when penalties reveal a selfish or greedy behavior can destroy the 
altruistic cooperation and sanctions perceived as fair leave altruism intact. Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2004b) also highlight that a third party that can punish in these experiments 
is important and as they are powerful tools to analyze how important are social norms in 
this context. Even, Young (1998) states that social norms are so important that can be 
seen as a property right. Manksi (2000) emphasizes that we are social individuals, so the 
preferences of individuals “may depend on the actions of others.” Specifically, this author 
finds that the efficiency of conservation investments can be improved by integrating 
social norms at the neighborhood level with demographic trends, economic conditions, 
and biological values. Kinzig et al. (2013) has argued that effective policies should 
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include short terms changes in behavior, but also longer term changes in social norms. 
Therefore, through this short literature review it seems clear that the study of social norms is 
crucial to understand people’s behavior.  
 
I.3 OBJECTIVES AND MAIN RESULTS 
 
The aim of this Dissertation is to analyze through different case studies the role that 
social factors besides economic incentives have; specifically, what role can social norms play 
when individuals have to make decisions with regards to the environmental and natural 
resources without forgetting economic incentives. Goldstein et al. (2008) discuss that there is 
little empirical work in the consumer behavior literature about the factors that influence a pro-
social or pro-environmental behaviors. Therefore, the goal will be to shed light on how social 
norms and economic incentives can influence the behavior of current users of natural and 
environmental resources. To carry out this analysis, this thesis is composed by four chapters 
that deal with different environmental problems; including climate change, the loss of 
biodiversity, and the management of shellfish fisheries and common forests. 
 
As a brief summary, the first case study provides a review of existing assessments of 
preferences for climate change mitigation and adaptation policies through a worldwide meta-
analysis. In this study, we analyze the impact of social values and norms on preferences 
towards climate change adaptation and mitigation policies. In a sample of 58 international 
studies, we find that mitigation actions are preferred over adaptation actions, and that 
preferences towards climate change policies are affected by attitudes towards time and social 
norms. In particular, societies with a long-term orientation display greater support towards 
climate change policies. These results therefore reveal the role of social factors as being 
crucial in order to understand the acceptability of climate change policies at a worldwide 
level.  
 
The next three chapters of the thesis are related to the management of natural resources. 
Specifically, the second chapter analyzes farmers’ decisions. The steady decline of birds 
living in cereal steppe lands is a worrying situation that the European Common Agricultural 
Policy is attempting to remedy through the application of agri-environmental schemes (AES). 
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The aim of this chapter is to assess farmers’ preferences towards these AES, which call 
for a number of environmental requirements in order to protect birds. A face-to-face 
survey in farming communities in Aragón (Spain) was carried out, and through the 
estimation of an Ordered Logit model (OL), different contract attributes were ranked, 
obtaining their economic valuation according to the farmers’ preferences. We find that 
social factors are also important in determining farmers’ decisions; in particular the 
importance of social trust and expectation of compliance by other neighbors encourage 
farmers to fulfil their contracts and cooperate with AES. These and other results may be 
used to design more effective AES and help to solve this important biodiversity problem.  
 
The third chapter of this thesis is related to shellfish fisheries. This sector suffers 
worldwide overexploitation of many species. In this chapter, the aim is to analyze 
through a choice experiment (CE) the preferences of the own shellfish gatherers with 
respect to a proposed conservation management program; assessing in this context, the 
role of time preferences, the effect of co-management through a MPA, the effect of social 
norms and the impact of poaching in shellfish fisheries. With regards to time preferences, 
we find that current users are quite impatient in their extraction levels, which can be 
consequence of the risky environment in which they are involved. Furthermore, we find 
that poaching has a double negative effect. First, it contributes to the overexploitation of 
the resource, and second, this illegal activity makes that shellfish gatherers become even 
more impatient in terms of time preferences of exploitation of the resource. With respect 
to social norms, we find that when the fulfillment of rules is the norm, the efforts required 
in the management plan are accepted without producing a reduction in fishers´ utility.  
 
Finally, the last chapter of this thesis deals with forest resources. One of the most 
used tools to analyze individuals’ decisions are the Public Good Games (PGG). In this 
study we conducted a modified PGG with a sample of users of a common pool resource 
(CPR). Individuals have an endowment of money and they have to decide the amount to 
be allocated into a common fund. As a point of difference with previous studies we also 
include a sanction to be shared out. Our goal is to analyze the factors that motivate the 
sharing of money in a CPR, but also factors that motivate the distribution of a sanction. In 
addition, we test the compliance of the principles of collective action proposed by Ostrom 
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(1990) and their implications in the PGG. We find that in line with previous literature, 
individuals share an important amount of the endowment with their neighbors. However, and 
on the contrary, in the case of the sanction, users prefer that the common fund pays their 
amounts of penalty.  
 
Overall it is found that social norms are factors that should be taking into account 
together with economic incentives. Both issues are crucial to achieve effective management 
policies of natural and environmental resources. Thus and with regards to environmental 
resources, we have found that in the analysis of climate change policies, cultural differences 
play an important role to understand the behavior of people. In addition, we have found the 
importance of social norms. Specifically, we can conclude that costly issues for people can be 
perceived more positively whether social norms are present. It is also important to promote 
the involvement of users in natural conservation problems because it is shown that individuals 
may take more responsible actions when they fell that are involved in the management 
process. Therefore, a better knowledge of cultural aspects and social norms could improve the 
current strategies that are being implemented.  
 
Currently, chapter 1 is published in Energy Policy, chapter 2 has been accepted to be 
published in the Journal of Agricultural Economics; chapter 3 has been presented in the 
BIOECON conference (2014) and chapter 4 has been submitted for presentation to 21
st
 
Annual Conference of the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 
(EAERE). 
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1. THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NORMS ON 
PREFERENCES TOWARDS CLIMATE 
CHANGE POLICIES: A META-
ANALYSIS  
 
Abstract 
This chapter provides a review of existing assessments of preferences for climate change 
mitigation and adaptation policies through a worldwide meta-analysis. In this study, we 
analyze the impact of social values and norms on preferences towards climate change 
adaptation and mitigation policies. In a sample of 58 international studies, we found that 
mitigation actions were preferred over adaptation actions, and that preferences towards 
climate change policies are affected by attitudes towards time and social norms. In particular, 
societies with a long-term orientation display greater support towards climate change policies. 
These results therefore reveal the role of social factors as being crucial in order to understand 
the acceptability of climate change policies at a worldwide level.  
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The consequences of climate change are numerous and wide-ranging. Changes in 
temperatures and climate variability impact the environment and human health
 
(United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCC, 2012)
1
 and have significant 
economic impacts around the world
 
(The Nature Conservancy, 2013). A number of recent, 
severe episodes related to climate change with clear economic implications were hurricane 
Sandy, which affected USA in 2012, and the typhoon Haiyan that caused more than 6,000 
deaths in 2013 in the Philippines, as well as the cold wave sweeping the USA in 2014, with 
temperatures below 50º. In general terms, the economic sectors that are most affected by this 
global climate change process are agriculture, forestry, energy and tourism (European 
Commission, 2012). Recent research has also shown that while no clear action is taken to 
curb global carbon emissions, climate change impacts could cost between 5 up to 20% of the 
                                                             
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (UNFCC) 
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/text/html/list_search.php?what=keywords&val=&valan=a&anf=0&id=10 
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annual global gross domestic product of many countries (Hallegatte and Corfee-Morlot, 
2011). 
 
Due to these important economic and social consequences of climate change, a large 
number of policies have been developed around the world aimed at reducing the impact of 
such an important phenomenon. The most significant international agreement was the Kyoto 
Protocol, which came into effect in 2005. This treaty encouraged industrialized countries to 
stabilize emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). However, and according to Schiermeier 
(2012), despite the existence of this protocol, global emissions have increased worldwide by 
50% since 1990, a trend that has mainly been driven by the economic growth of China and 
other parts of Asia, South America and Africa. One of the main criticisms is that the Kyoto 
Protocol has not controlled for the free-rider problem, at the same time as having very few 
enforcement mechanisms (Helm, 2012). 
 
Based on these considerations, climate change policies have become one of the major 
concerns and priorities around the world. However, and after many experimental policies and 
applications, one question remains unsolved: how should effective climate change policies be 
designed and articulated? This paper sheds light on the role of social norms on preferences 
(reflected by the willingness to pay [WTP]) for different types of climate control policies. 
These social factors are generally ignored in the architectural design of effective mitigation 
and adaptation strategies worldwide. In the following analysis, these factors have a strong 
explanatory power in terms of understanding acceptability and preferences towards climate 
change policies.  
 
It should be acknowledged that in order for most climate change policies to be effective, 
behavioral changes have to take place, including a reduction of energy consumption, 
awareness of the issues, and a willingness to adopt (and pay) for newer and cleaner 
technologies. These strategies would go hand in hand with other mechanisms suggested by 
the UNEP (2009), such as promoting the construction of energy efficient buildings, 
sustainable transport, renewable energies, and the re-use of industrial and household wastes, 
among others. Therefore, understanding the role of social norms and the preferences of 
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decision-makers and end-users is crucial in the process of promoting acceptability for control 
policies (Pollit and Shaorshadze, 2011). 
 
Given the need to articulate policies to combat the global climate change process, and 
based on the fact that most require a change in consumption or production technologies, our 
goal is to identify the type of actions that are most preferred and accepted by citizens, 
assessing how the public’s support for these policies (expressed by willingness to pay (WTP) 
estimates) is affected by multiple causing factors, including the country’s degree of 
development, the cultural importance of compliance with obligations and rules, time 
preferences and other social norms. The identification of these factors may allow us to 
provide policy recommendations to guide future actions in order to improve policy design and 
increase the public’s acceptability of climate control policies.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 provides background 
information on the relationship between behavioral economics and climate change. Section 
1.3 presents the data sources used to create the meta-data set; section 1.4 presents the 
econometric models and research hypotheses. Section 1.5 presents the results, and the paper 
concludes with the discussion and policy recommendations presented in Section 1.6. 
 
1.2 BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
Brekke and Johansson-Stenman (2008) highlighted the idea that climate change policies 
can be interpreted as a global public good, given that everyone can obtain benefits from them, 
while it is not possible to hinder or exclude others from enjoying their benefits. Traditional 
economic models consider that individuals are purely selfish in terms of consumption of 
public goods. However, Ostrom (2000) offered a theory against the selfishness hypothesis, 
concluding that there is a propensity to cooperate due to the growth of shared social norms. 
Bernheim and Rangel (2007) also support the idea of cooperation with the common goal, 
providing different views on human motivations. More recently, the field of behavioral 
economics has provided different explanations for specifically linking people’s attitudes to the 
provision of public goods, showing the cognitive limitations of the traditional economic 
theory. In summary, studies from behavioral economics have shown that environmental 
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justice and social norms also affect individual decisions, and therefore should be taken into 
account in traditional economic models. Furthermore, it is useful to understand that people act 
in a social context.  
 
In this sense, when dealing with an issue as important as climate change, individuals are 
influenced by values and beliefs shared in groups for which they feel a sense of belonging 
(Hoffman, 2011). Brekke and Johansson-Stenman (2008) suggested that what may be rational 
for a single country (or individual) in isolation is globally suboptimal. In this social setting, 
one of the problems that can appear is the free-rider problem, and based on this aspect, 
important concepts such as conditional cooperation, reciprocity, altruism and norms shared by 
groups come to the fore in the climate debate. 
 
Also, Grothman and Patt (2005) concluded that in the analysis of adaptation policies, 
issues such as vulnerability and indicators of the perceived adaptive capacity are crucial when 
making predictions in terms of climate. They also point out the importance of the perception 
of risk, giving special attention to whether policies solely communicate risks, without giving 
adaptation options. This can lead towards people simply denying the risk, instead of taking 
actions that lead towards change.  
 
Therefore, in order to improve the effectiveness of policies, it is very important to take 
into account social factors that can affect public opinion. Adger et al. (2009) indicate that 
some limits to adaptation policies are “endogenous to society” and that ethics, knowledge, 
risk and culture are important issues. More recently, Adger et al. (2013) highlighted that 
cultural dimensions are quite important, while it is likely that when cultural dimensions are 
ignored, policies will fail to be effective. For this reason, and due the importance of knowing 
how individuals assess the application of different programs and policies to combat climate 
change, we collected multiple valuation studies of preferences around the world and analyzed 
their results using a meta-regression analysis. We controlled for relevant factors such as 
traditional economic factors, as well as social norms and cultural values that have been often 
ignored. 
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1.3 DATA DESCRIPTION AND DATA TREATMENT 
 
In this study we used a meta-analysis, a technique involving the statistical analysis of a 
large number of results from individual studies with the aim of combining the main 
conclusions (Glass et al. 1981; Barrio and Loureiro, 2010). According to Brouwer et al. 
(1999) this allows us to explain differences in outcomes found in single studies, taking into 
account the possible differences according to their characteristics, including factors such as 
the format of the questions or the measurements used. The benefits of this technique 
compared to qualitative analyses are that it does not prejudge the research results, and that it 
avoids a subjective weighting of studies in the interpretation of the findings (Brouwer et al. 
1999). The potential disadvantages are a potential risk of bias selection of studies, and the 
possible existence of intra-study correlations between different observations from the same 
study (Wolf, 1986). 
 
The data collection process and further analysis followed the recommendations of Nelson 
and Kennedy (2009) and Stanley et al. (2013). Due to the important heterogeneity of the 
climate control policies and programs in place, we classified them into three main types of 
actions: mitigation, adaptation or a mixture of both. For this purpose, we grouped the studies 
using the definitions used by the IPCC (IPCC, 2007)
2
. As a result, mitigation programs 
contain “anthropogenic interventions to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of 
greenhouse gases;” while adaptation programs are defined as “adjustment in natural or 
human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.”  Finally, the third type of programs is a 
mixture of both, containing mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
 
Our data come from an intensive search of studies in different databases, including 
SCIENCEDIRECT, ECONLIT, and AGECONSEARCH. Specifically, we searched for 
studies that deal with climate change policies and report WTP estimates for the actions or 
policies analyzed. The keywords used in the search contained combinations of the terms 
“climate change,” “mitigation”, “willingness to pay”, and “adaptation.” Specifically, we 
                                                             
2 This information can be found in Klein et al. (2007) 
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analyzed studies that promote actions to combat climate change
3
. We reviewed a total of 79 
studies that estimate WTP to combat climate change through renewable energies, the 
reduction of emissions of different types of transportation (such as motor vehicles or aircraft), 
new cleaner products, reduction of energy dependency, support for the Kyoto protocol and 
deforestation programs, among others, since the 1990s. From these studies, 21 reported 
incomplete information or did not report WTP in comparable ways, and as a result were 
dropped from the final data set due to their large number of missing values
4
. It should be 
noted that in this application, the WTP analyzed were the average WTP estimates for climate 
change policies provided by each study for a sample of a given country. As a result, the final 
dataset used for this meta-analysis contained 58 studies from different countries
5
. In general, 
we found that most research on preferences towards climate change policies was carried out 
in America, representing more than 52.18% of the observations obtained, followed by Europe 
(34.15%), Asia (9.03%) and Oceania (4.64%). Moreover, it is important to take into account 
that most of the studies were from developed countries and higher income groups, as stated by 
Balderas et al. (2013), and as such, our results should not be directly generalized to the 
developing world. In some cases, we obtained multiple observations from a single study, with 
an average of 6.1 observations per study. The collected studies reported their results in 
different currencies ($US, €, etc.) and at different times. In order to homogenize all this 
information, valuations were converted to a standard currency, a monthly payment (expressed 
in Purchasing Power Parity Index (PPP)
6
, $US 2012). We used the mean WTP instead of the 
median estimate as the dependent variable, as used in previous meta-analyses, due to the fact 
that only a few studies report mean and median estimates (Loomis and White, 1996; Smith 
and Osborne, 1996; Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). Table 1.1 summarizes the articles and 
papers from which the observations were collected.  
  
                                                             
3 It is important to highlight that many studies value the replacement of traditional energy sources for green energy. However,  
we only took into account those that valued green energy as a means to combat climate change; or those that directly 
indicated the benefits of green energy in combating climate change to the respondents. 
4 The eliminated studies are Batley et al. (2001); Carlsson et al. (2013); Diedrich and Goeschl (2011); Farhar and Houston 
(1996); Jensen et al. (2010); Li et al. (2009); Li et al. (2004); Liao et al. (2010a); Markantonis and Bithas (2010); Mackerron 
et al. (2009); Mozumder et al. (2011); Oliver et al. (2011); Petrolia et al. (2010); Scarpa and Willis (2010); Strazzera et al. 
(2012); Willis et al. (2011); Wiser (2007); Zografakis et al. (2010); Zoric and Hrovatin (2012). Cameron and Gerdes (2007) 
and Cai et al. (2010) were also eliminated due to the lack of data for certain relevant variables.  
5 We have included all the WTP estimates provided for each paper with the aim not to bias the results. 
6 WTP estimates are first converted to dollars with the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) published by the OECD (2012), and 
then converted to $2012 currency with the Consumer Price Index obtained from the US Department of Labor (2012). 
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Table 1.1 Studies included in the meta-analysis 
Author/s 
Nº 
obs 
Publication 
year  
Type of program 
Type of 
policy 
Country 
Berk and Fovell 8 1998 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
mitigation USA 
Layton and Brown 12 2000 ecosystem base programs adaptation USA 
Roe et al. 1 2001 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation USA 
Berrens et al. 13 2004 other programs mitigation USA 
Nomura and Akai 3 2004 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Japan 
Cameron, T.A 6 2005 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
mitigation USA 
Bergmann et al. 4 2006 ecosystem base programs mitigation UK 
Viscussi and 
Zeckhauser 
2 2006 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
adaptation USA 
Zhai  et al. 7 2006 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
adaptation Japan 
Bigerna and Polinoni 3 2007 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Italy 
Borchers et al. 19 2007 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation USA 
Duffy et al. 2 2007 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation USA 
Hidano and Kato 9 2007 other programs both Japan 
Whitehead  and 
Cherry 
24 2007 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation USA 
Brouwer et al. 1 2008 ecosystem base programs both USA 
Lee and Cameron 4 2008 other programs mitigation USA 
Longo et al. 5 2008 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation UK 
Tseng and Chen 3 2008 ecosystem base programs adaptation China 
Arigoni et al. 12 2009 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
adaptation Brazil 
Bollino 9 2009 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Italy 
Cole and Brannlund 3 2009 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Sweden 
Koundouri et al. 1 2009 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Greece 
Rajmis et al 3 2009 ecosystem base programs both Germany 
Soliño et al. 6 2009 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Spain 
Solomon and Johnson 4 2009 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation USA 
Tseng et al. 2 2009 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
adaptation China 
Yoo and Kwak 2 2009 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Korea 
Brännlund and 
Persson 
10 2010 other programs mitigation Sweden 
Carlsson et al. 9 2010 other programs mitigation 
China, Sweden, 
USA 
Glenk and Fischer 5 2010 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
adaptation UK 
Hanemann, M. et al. 2 2010 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Spain 
Kaczan et al. 12 2010 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
mitigation Australia 
Liao et al. 2 2010b 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
adaptation China 
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Author/s 
Nº 
obs 
Publication 
year  
Type of program 
Type of 
policy 
Country 
Adaman et al 1 2011 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Turkey 
Akter and Bennett 4 2011 other programs mitigation Australia 
Chawla et al. 8 2011 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
adaptation Switzerland 
Chuen  et al. 1 2011 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
adaptation Malaysia 
Hanemann et al. 1 2011 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Spain 
Hidrue et al. 9 2011 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation USA 
Komarek et al. 24 2011 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation USA 
Layton and Levine 6 2011 ecosystem base programs both USA 
Shih and Chou 4 2011 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation USA 
Susaeta et al. 5 2011 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
both USA 
Ward et al. 4 2011 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation USA 
Achtnicht 16 2012 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Germany 
Aldy et al 1 2012 other programs mitigation USA 
Botzen and van der 
bergh 
3 2012 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
adaptation Netherlands 
Araña and León 3 2012 other programs mitigation Spain 
Cicia et al. 7 2012 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Italy 
Gracia et al. 5 2012 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Spain 
Kraeusel and Möst 4 2012 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Germany 
Longo et al.  9 2012 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Spain 
Soliño et al. 8 2012 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation Spain 
Zhang et al. 2 2012 
green energy and high 
efficiency 
mitigation China 
Botzen et al. 2 2013 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
adaptation Netherlands 
Brouwer and 
Schaafsma 
4 2013 
disaster and heat wave 
prevention 
adaptation Netherlands 
Kotchen et al. 6 2013 other programs mitigation USA 
Mueller 21 2013 other programs mitigation USA 
 
A regression technique outlined in the following section was used. Three different groups 
of explanatory variables were included in order to model preferences towards climate change 
adaptation and mitigation policies. First, we assessed the effect of the geo-physical conditions 
and site characteristics of the countries where the individual studies were conducted. To do 
so, we used the number of climatic disasters (climatic disasters) that occurred in each country 
when the study was conducted (The International Disaster Database, 2012). This database 
contains statistical information on extreme temperatures, droughts and wildfires. We expected 
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that this variable would have a positive coefficient as it represents the accumulated experience 
with respect to risky weather events. We also expected that this variable could be a proxy for 
the vulnerability that citizens may experience, something that has proved to be very relevant 
in other studies (Grothman and Patt, 2005).  
 
The characteristics of the study are also important in order to explain differences in WTP 
related to methodological procedures. In this sense, we included the variable face to face, 
identifying studies where the survey was conducted in person. We also considered whether 
the survey was conducted by telephone instead of over the Internet, or by using a combination 
of different methods (indirect). Bowling (2005) states that survey modes can have different 
effects on the data collected. We also identified whether the respondents were households 
(households) or individuals. In a contingent valuation survey, Lindhjem and Navrud (2009) 
found that households provided higher WTP estimates than individuals. An additional 
important explanatory variable is the temporal length of the required payment to support the 
program or public policy valued. Therefore, we included an indicator reflecting whether the 
proposed payment was a one-time payment (one-time) or a monthly payment (monthly), 
instead of an annual payment. In the previous literature, shorter time periods have shown a 
positive effect on the acceptance of the proposed policies (Loomis and White, 1996; Aldy et 
al. 2012).  
 
As previously stated, we specifically account for whether the program or action proposed 
was a mitigation program (mitigation) with respect to adaptation or a potential mix of both. 
Due to the wide variety of programs analyzed and in order to group the scattered 
observations, four categories were created that provide additional information. In particular, 
we included one variable reflecting whether the aim of the climate actions was to prevent 
disasters or to prevent heat waves (disasters and heat wave prevention). A second category 
contains all of the studies assessing preferences to reduce GHG emissions through green 
energies or promoting high efficiency products as fuels or appliances (green energy and high 
efficiency). An additional category contains studies assessing the protection of forests or 
animals and the use of forest resources as a measure to combat climate change (ecosystem 
based programs). Finally, we also included studies that proposed GHG emissions or the 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (other programs). In our analysis, we specifically identified 
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the issue of the payment vehicle. Brouwer et al. (1999) identified the effect of higher prices or 
taxes (higher prices/taxes), the establishment of a new tax or a voluntary contribution as 
payment mechanisms. Following previous meta-analyses, we also considered the effect of the 
year of publication (following Loomis and White (1996); Ojea and Loureiro (2011), among 
others). For this reason, we used a dummy variable to identify the studies published before 
2009 (before2009), and also included the sample size of the studies. Specifically, we added a 
variable that identifies surveys conducted with less than 1000 individuals (small sample). 
Noonan (2003) also studied the effect of sample size, finding that the higher the number of 
respondents, the lower the WTP obtained. In addition, we considered the effect of the impact 
factor of the journal where the study was published (impact factor) in order to control for 
quality differences across estimates (Gallet, 2010). In this case, and in order to retain 
observations in our empirical analysis, we established a zero impact factor for studies that 
have not yet been published. Finally, we included an indicator denoting whether the purpose 
of the proposed program had a national or a local-regional scope (local-regional).  Similar 
indicators were employed by Noonan (2003). With the aim of identifying the effects of the 
different valuation methods, we included two indicator variables controlling for whether 
choice experiments or other methodologies (field experiments, direct market prices, among 
others) were employed (choice experiment, other methodology), with the omitted category 
being the contingent valuation category. Florax et al. (2005) found that choice experiments 
provide lower estimates than contingent valuation. 
 
Another group of variables included consists of the socio-economic characteristics of 
each specific country. We included a dummy variable identifying the degree of development 
of different countries. We expected that developing countries would have a lower ability to 
pay due to income restrictions, in comparison to developed countries. It is nevertheless 
important to take into account that due to income restrictions, these countries may have a 
higher willingness to regulate climate change externalities. This variable was collected from 
World Bank data (WB, 2013).  
 
In this meta-regression we also considered additional context-type variables, as there are 
other important factors that should be taken into account in order to understand individual 
behavior, including personal and social norms (Viscusi et al. 2011). In order to consider these 
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effects, we included the societal political views, using a variable denoting whether the 
political party in power in each country at the time when each study was conducted was right 
wing (CIA, 2012) (right wing). This political orientation variable has been employed by 
several authors in order to evaluate climate policies,
7
 concluding that people with left-wing 
tendencies have a higher WTP for environmental programs than those who have a more 
conservative view (Carlsson et al. 2010; Solomon and Johnson (2009); Wiser (2007); Berrens 
et al. (2004), among others). Furthermore, we included the percentage of individuals who do 
not consider it justifiable to cheat on personal taxes (not cheating) from the World Values 
Survey (2012). Using this variable, we expected to represent the relative importance of social 
trust and cooperation versus free-riding behavior on the contribution to public policies. We 
also used this database to analyze the role of citizens who affirm to be individualistic. This 
variable reflects the percentage of individuals in a country that agree with the following 
sentence “I see myself as an autonomous individual”. Therefore, these people feel that they 
are not related to the society (individualism). 
 
We also analyzed the effect of other cultural social norms, in the sense of values shared 
by society (McBreen et al. 2011). In particular, the influence of culture is crucial in terms of 
climate change (Adger et al. 2013). With the aim of analyzing the impact of these cultural 
effects, we used the indexes developed by Hofstede (2001) that measure the dimensions of 
national cultures in a globally comparable manner
8
. For this study, we only analyzed the 
effect of four of Hofstede’s indexes. Specifically, the “uncertainty avoidance” index that 
represents “the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty 
and ambiguity”.  In addition, the “long term versus short term orientation” index. Hofsetede 
(2001) defines societies with long term orientation as those that “show an ability to adapt 
traditions to changed conditions, a strong propensity to save and invest, thriftiness, and 
perseverance in achieving results.” 
 
                                                             
7 More information on studies that consider these aspects can be found in Johnson and Nemet (2010). 
8 Hofstede conducted a study between 1967 and 1973 for IBM about cultural dimensions. Initially, this study contains four 
indexes: power distance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity and uncertainty avoidance. Then, 
in 1991 a new dimension was added, the long-term orientation, and in 2010 a sixth and seventh indexes were created, 
indulgence versus restraint and pragmatic versus normative. These indexes were built on a scale from 0 to 100. Each of these 
indexes only takes one value per country, not varying over time. In this regard the author indicates that “These relative scores 
have been proven to be quite stable over time.”( http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html) 
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The last two of Hofstede’s indexes included are the “masculinity versus femininity” and 
“indulgence versus restraint” indexes.  The first of them represents a “preference in society 
for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material reward for success”, while the 
“indulgence versus restraint” identifies an indulgence society as one “that allows relatively 
free gratification of basic and natural human drives related to enjoying life and having 
fun.  Restraint stands for a society that suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by 
means of strict social norms.” 
 
We did not control for the rest of the indicators provided by Hofstede due to 
multicollinearity problems among those indexes. Specifically, we detected the presence of 
high correlation between the indicator developing and the “power distance” and 
“individualism versus collectivism” indexes, with a correlation coefficient higher than 0.75. 
Furthermore, with respect to the index “pragmatic versus normative” we detected a higher 
correlation with the he “indulgence versus restraint” index, with a coefficient of 0.78. Table 
1.2 shows the description of the variables that were used and the respective summary 
statistics, and Figure 1.1 represents the distribution of these indexes across continents.
9
. 
 
 
 
  
                                                             
9 We do not include an income indicator in our regression due to the high correlation between this indicator and the Hofstede 
indexes. However, we include the indicator variable developing, which reflects income and vulnerability differences across 
countries. 
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Table 1.2 Variable description and summary statistics 
Variable  Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Logwtp Logarithm of the willingness to pay 1.410 0.817 
Country characteristics 
Climatic disasters Number of climatic disasters per country and year studied 2.930 3.224 
Study characteristics 
Face to face 1, if the survey method was face- to-face; 0 otherwise 0.235 0.424 
Telephone 1, if the survey method was by telephone; 0 otherwise 0.134 0.341 
Indirect* 
1, if the survey method was on-line or a combination of different 
methods; 0 otherwise 
0.631 0.483 
Households 1, if the respondent was a household; 0 otherwise 0.593 0.492 
Individuals* 1, if the respondent was an individual; 0 otherwise 0.407 0.492 
Mitigation 1, if the program proposed was a mitigation program; 0 otherwise 0.762 0.426 
Adaptation*  1, if the program proposed was an adaptation program ; 0 otherwise 0.172 0.378 
Both* 
1, if the program proposed was a mixture of adaptation and mitigation 
program; 0 otherwise 
0.065 0.248 
One-time 1, if the payment was a one-time payment; 0 otherwise 0.095 0.294 
Monthly 1, if the payment was a monthly payment; 0 otherwise 0.598 0.491 
Annual* 1, if the payment was an annual payment; 0 otherwise 0.306 0.461 
Impact factor Impact factor of journal  1.878 2.124 
Local-regional 
1, if the program proposed to the population had a local or regional 
objective; 0 otherwise 
0.423 0.495 
National* 
1, if the program proposed to the population had a national objective; 0 
otherwise 0. 
0.576 0.494 
Higher 
prices/taxes 
1, if the payment vehicle was higher prices or taxes; 0 otherwise 0.462 0.499 
Voluntary 
1, if the payment vehicle was a voluntary payment or a donation; 0 
otherwise 
0.098 0.298 
New tax 1, if the payment vehicle was a  tax; 0 otherwise 0.120 0.325 
Premium* 1, if the payment vehicle was a premium; 0 otherwise 0.049 0.216 
Fee* 1, if the payment vehicle was a fee; 0 otherwise 0.065 0.248 
Other type of 
payment* 
1, if the payment vehicle was not specified or it was another type ; 0 
otherwise 
0.139 0.347 
Small sample 1, if the size of sample analyzed was less than 1000 surveys; 0 otherwise 0.669 0.471 
Sample size-big* 
1, if the size of sample analyzed was higher than 1000 surveys; 0 
otherwise 
0.331 0.471 
Before 2009 1, if the study was published before 2009; 0 otherwise 0.462 0.499 
Choice 
experiment 
1, if the methodology employed was a choice experiment; 0 otherwise 0.450 0.498 
Contingent 
valuation* 
1, if the methodology employed was contingent valuation; 0 otherwise 0.494 0.501 
Other 
methodology 
1, if  the methodology employed was market values, field experiments, 
among others; 0 otherwise 
0.056 0.229 
Disasters and 
heat wave 
prevention 
1, if the program proposed had as objective to reduce the risk of 
disasters and to control climate variability; 0 otherwise 
0.202 0.402 
Ecosystem based 
programs 
1, if the program proposed an ecosystem based approach; 0 otherwise 0.090 0.286 
Green energy and 
high efficiency* 
1, if the program proposed had as objective to reduce GHG emissions 
through green energy or fuels and appliances with high efficiency; 0 
otherwise 
0.519 0.500 
Other programs 
1, if the program proposed had as to reduce GHG emissions or to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol; 0 otherwise 
0.210 0.408 
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Variable  Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Developing 
countries 
1, if the country studied was include in the developing countries 
classification; 0 otherwise 
0.079 0.270 
Right wind 
1, if the country studied was governed by a right-wing political party in 
the year studied 
0.497 0.501 
Left wind* 
1, if the country studied was governed by a left-wing political party in 
the year studied 
0.502 0.500 
Individualism 
The % of people that agree with this sentence "I see myself as an 
autonomous individual" 
67.407 16.288 
Uncertainty 
avoidance** 
“The uncertainty avoidance dimension expresses the degree to which 
the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and 
ambiguity. The fundamental issue here is how a society deals with the 
fact that the future can never be known: should we try to control the 
future or just let it happen? Countries exhibiting strong UAI maintain 
rigid codes of belief and behaviour and are intolerant of unorthodox 
behaviour and ideas. Weak UAI societies maintain a more relaxed 
attitude in which practice counts more than principles” 
55.224 18.052 
Masculinity 
versus femininity 
“The masculinity side of this dimension represents a preference in 
society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards 
for success. Society at large is more competitive. Its opposite, 
femininity, stands for a preference for cooperation, modesty, caring for 
the weak and quality of life. Society at large is more consensus-
oriented” 
58.357 17.189 
Indulgence 
versus restraint 
“Indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification 
of basic and natural human drives related to enjoying life and having 
fun.  Restraint stands for a society that suppresses gratification of needs 
and regulates it by means of strict social norms” 
59.169 14.73 
Individualism 
versus 
collectivism 
“The high side of this dimension, called individualism, can be defined as 
a preference for a loosely-knit social framework in which individuals are 
expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families. 
Its opposite, collectivism, represents a preference for a tightly-knit 
framework in society in which individuals can expect their relatives or 
members of a particular in-group to look after them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty. A society's position on this dimension is reflected 
in whether people’s self-image is defined in terms of “I” or “we”” 
75.951 20.569 
Power distance* 
“This dimension expresses the degree to which the less powerful 
members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed 
unequally. The fundamental issue here is how a society handles 
inequalities among people. People in societies exhibiting a large degree 
of power distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a 
place and which needs no further justification. In societies with low 
power distance, people strive to equalise the distribution of power and 
demand justification for inequalities of power” 
44.243 11.338 
Long term versus 
short term 
orientation 
The extent to which a society shows a pragmatic future-oriented 
perspective rather than a conventional historical short-term point of 
view 
35.603 20.813 
Pragmatic versus 
normative* 
“This dimension describes how people in the past, as well as today, 
relate to the fact that so much that happens around us cannot be 
explained” 
39.398 22.612 
Not cheating The percentage of citizens that do not justify cheating on taxes 50.715 24.972 
*These are the omitted variables**These definitions are available at Hofstede (2012): http://geert-
hofstede.com/dimensions.html 
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1.4 MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
With the dataset described above, and in order to provide robust results, we estimated 
different meta-regression models. Our estimation strategy relied on first presenting a number 
of reduced form models or baseline models. These were then extended by including additional 
relevant variables, such as the role of social factors. First, we estimated an Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) and then a Robust OLS, with the aim of controlling for possible influential 
observations. Using the Szroeter (1978) test, we assessed the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
finding that the test carries a value of 1.79 for a Chi-squared with 1 degree of freedom and an 
associated p-value of 0.181. Therefore, we concluded that there is no evidence of this problem 
existing in our dataset. However, and due to the possible correlation between the variables of 
our dataset, and with the aim to check the robustness of our results, we also estimated a 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) as well as a Random Effects model (RE) assuming the 
existence of both sampling error variability, and variability for each study included, in other 
words that intra-study variability and variability exists between the studies. 
Power distance
Individualism vs. collectivism
Masculinity vs.feminity
Uncertainty avoidance
Indulgence vs. restraint
Long term vs. short term orientation
Pragmatic vs. normative
Not cheating(%)
65.00 
34.59 
80.15 
68.06 
35.32 
91.97 
87.44 
41.75 
36.00 
90.00 
61.00 
51.00 
71.00 
31.00 
22.00 
63.90 
43.35 
67.50 
47.78 
63.49 
51.51 
27.50 
53.88 
40.60 
41.82 
87.67 
61.18 
47.88 
67.43 
31.26 
22.82 
57.29 
Figure 1.1 Social norms and cultural values per continent 
America Europe Oceania Asia
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The dependent variable in our model is a vector of monetary values representing the 
preferences for the various programs proposed to correct climate change effects, labeled as 
log(WTP). The independent variables are grouped into the three previously-described 
categories that include the type of policy characteristics in 
ciX
; the study characteristics in 
siX
 
and the socio-economic characteristics of the study sample in 
eiX
. The model corresponds to 
the following equation: 
 
log( )i c ci s si e ei iWTP X X X                   (1.1) 
 
Where   is the constant term, the   vector contains the coefficients associated with the 
respective independent variables and is the vector of the error term for the OLS.  
 
In order to test for the correct empirical specification used, we tested for the presence of 
multicollinearity through the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Indicator. Its corresponding 
mean value of 5.11 shows that there is no serious concern about multicollinearity. 
Furthermore, we looked at the functional form of our model, conducting a Box-Cox test. This 
test allowed us to assess the best empirical specification form through the transformation of 
the data to make the residual sum squares comparable. Specifically, we fit the model with the 
transformed dependent variable: 
 
( , ) ii i i
y
g y x

  

                 (1.2) 
 
where  and  are estimated on the assumption that residuals follow a normal 
distribution. In this way, when the estimated  is near 1, we should choose the linear 
specification, whereas if this value is near 0, the selected functional form should be a log 
specification. With our data, we obtained a value for  (p-value= 0.003). Therefore, 
we employed a semi-log specification for the dependent variable
10
. We also conducted a 
                                                             
10
 When taking the log transformation of the dependent variable, we find some missing values (due to the present of zero 
values), but this question does not affect our analysis due to the small number of cases, and moreover, this procedure reduces 
the existence of outliers. 

 

0.04  
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Grubbs test with the aim of assessing whether there are outliers, concluding that in our sample 
there is no presence of extreme values in the dependent variable. 
 
1.4.1 Research Hypotheses  
 
One of the interesting aspects of this paper is that it tests a set of hypotheses on the 
factors that can affect the WTP for climate change policies. Specifically, we focused our 
attention on two elements related to behavioural economics. The first issue concerns the 
question of individualism. We expected that individuals who feel like an autonomous 
individual (instead of an individual included in a society) would have a lower WTP for a 
social environmental policy. As previously mentioned, in the literature on climate change it is 
important to take into account that we are dealing with individuals, but also with groups. In 
this sense, members of a group are under greater pressure to do the “right thing” than those 
who think that they are autonomous. Cialdini and Goldstein (2004) stated “if we engage in 
behaviors of which others approve, others will approve of us, too”. Otherwise, as previously 
indicated, climate change can be seen as a global public good and two types of behaviors can 
arise when facing public policies: free-rider and conditional cooperation. According to 
Gächter (2006), we should consider that an agent can obtain benefits from a public good, even 
if this agent has not contributed to the public good in question, and that therefore, everyone 
has an incentive to hope that others would contribute towards the public good. 
 
In order to assess this expected effect, we tested the following hypothesis, with 
 as the coefficient associated with the individualism variable. We expected this 
variable to have a negative impact on WTP: 
 
0
1
0
0
:
:
individualism
individualism
H
H



                (1.3) 
 
Next, we studied the effect of the degree of compliance with taxes on societal policies. 
Specifically, by using the indicator not cheating we identify the percentage of individuals in a 
given country that do not justify cheating on taxes. We identified this indicator as a measure 
of the honesty of individuals. Lusk et al. (2007) concluded that more honest individuals are 
individualism
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unlikely to give untruthful responses. Therefore, we focused on testing whether their WTP is 
lower than those who do justify this behaviour. We identified the variable “not cheating” with 
the coefficient .  
 
0
1
0
0
:
:
notcheating
notcheating
H
H




                (1.4) 
 
1.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Following equation (1.1), and dropping the individual i subscripts for convenience, the 
empirical estimated model is: 
 
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 1/
ln( ) climaticdisasters face to face telephone households
onetime monthly mitigation disastersand heatwave prevention
ecosytemsbased programs other programs higher prices taxes
WTP     
   
   
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   
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2009
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choiceexperiment other methodology developing countries right wind
not cheating uncertaintyavoidance
    
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    
   
   4
25 26 27 ,
long termversus short termorientation
masculinityversus feminity indulgenceversusrestraint individualism      
  (1.5) 
 
With regard to the results, Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show the output of the baseline models, 
while Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show the results from the extended models. Overall, the models fit 
the data quite well with a R
2
 of more than 50% for the baseline models and more than 60% for 
the extended models.  
 
With respect to the results obtained, we will first examine in greater detail the results 
presented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4 that correspond to the baseline models. In the case of the geo-
physical conditions, we found that citizens that have more accumulated experience with 
respect to risky weather events have a greater WTP. In terms of the study characteristics, we 
found that surveys conducted via telephone or face-to-face provide lower WTP estimates than 
those conducted via the Internet or using a combination of different methods (except in 
Robust OLS). With respect to the payment periodicity, citizens prefer a one-time payment 
instead of annual payments, meaning they prefer short payments in time. This result is in line 
notcheating
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with the findings obtained by Loomis and White (1996). Another common result refers to the 
mode of payment: the results show that people prefer higher prices/taxes or the establishment 
of a new tax instead of other type of payments, such as donations, trust funds, etc. This result 
may be justified, given that the former are universal and avoid the free-rider problem. 
Brouwer et al. (1999) also found a positive coefficient for income taxes. With respect to the 
journal impact factor, we found that journals with higher impact factors tend to present lower 
WTP estimates. In addition, attending to the effect of the different methodologies used, we 
concluded that a choice experiment or other methodology provide lower estimates than the 
omitted variable (contingent valuation) (the same result was obtained by Florax et al. (2005)). 
Focusing our attention on the type of programs proposed with the aim of combating climate 
change, we concluded that mitigation programs are preferred over adaptation programs, or 
even over a policy mix, as observable in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, where the indicator 
corresponding with the mitigation policy is positive and statistically significant over the 
omitted variable (adaptation or a mix of both). These findings may be considered in the future 
in terms of policy design. Furthermore, people are more likely to pay for programs and 
policies designed to avoid disasters or to reduce heat waves (disasters and heat waves 
prevention) instead of supporting programs to promote green energies. 
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Table 1.3 Baseline meta regression results (1) 
  OLS Robust OLS 
LogWTP Coefficient Std. Err. P>|t| Coefficient Std. Err. P>|t| 
Geo-physical conditions 
Climatic disasters 0.114 0.014 0.000 0.114 0.014 0.000 
Characteristics of study 
Face to face -0.170 0.092 0.066 -0.170 0.113 0.136 
Telephone -0.455 0.133 0.001 -0.455 0.133 0.001 
Households 0.002 0.086 0.978 0.002 0.103 0.982 
One time 1.011 0.143 0.000 1.011 0.141 0.000 
Monthly 0.093 0.087 0.289 0.093 0.115 0.421 
Mitigation 0.418 0.119 0.001 0.418 0.127 0.001 
Disasters and heat wave prevention 0.837 0.111 0.000 0.837 0.108 0.000 
Other programs 0.040 0.103 0.698 0.040 0.101 0.691 
Ecosystem based programs 0.222 0.153 0.149 0.222 0.165 0.181 
Higher prices/taxes 0.729 0.090 0.000 0.729 0.118 0.000 
New tax 0.346 0.132 0.009 0.346 0.144 0.017 
Voluntary -0.141 0.145 0.332 -0.141 0.122 0.250 
Small sample 0.091 0.087 0.296 0.091 0.086 0.291 
Before 2009 -0.400 0.080 0.000 -0.400 0.089 0.000 
Impact factor -0.051 0.014 0.000 -0.051 0.016 0.001 
Local-regional 0.056 0.074 0.446 0.056 0.078 0.473 
Choice experiment -0.524 0.080 0.000 -0.524 0.082 0.000 
Other methodology -0.652 0.155 0.000 -0.652 0.130 0.000 
Constant 0.619 0.169 0.000 0.619 0.174 0.000 
N 366 
  
366 
  
F 23.120 
  
41.380 
  
Prob > F 0.000 
  
0.000 
  
Adjusted R2 0.535 
  
0.559 
  
Root MSE 0.557 
  
0.557 
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Table 1.4 Baseline meta regression results (2) 
  Random Effects GLS 
LogWTP Coefficient Std. Err. P>|t| Coefficient Std. Err. P>|t| 
Geo-physical conditions 
Climatic disasters 0.114 0.014 0.000 0.114 0.013 0.000 
Characteristics of study 
Face to face -0.170 0.092 0.065 -0.170 0.089 0.058 
Telephone -0.455 0.133 0.001 -0.455 0.129 0.000 
Households 0.002 0.086 0.978 0.002 0.083 0.977 
One time 1.011 0.143 0.000 1.011 0.139 0.000 
Monthly 0.093 0.087 0.288 0.093 0.085 0.275 
Mitigation 0.418 0.119 0.000 0.418 0.116 0.000 
Disasters and heat wave prevention 0.837 0.111 0.000 0.837 0.108 0.000 
Other programs 0.040 0.103 0.697 0.040 0.100 0.689 
Ecosystem based programs 0.222 0.153 0.148 0.222 0.149 0.137 
Higher prices/taxes 0.729 0.090 0.000 0.729 0.088 0.000 
New tax 0.346 0.132 0.009 0.346 0.128 0.007 
Voluntary -0.141 0.145 0.331 -0.141 0.141 0.317 
Small sample 0.091 0.087 0.296 0.091 0.084 0.282 
Before 2009 -0.400 0.080 0.000 -0.400 0.078 0.000 
Impact factor -0.051 0.014 0.000 -0.051 0.014 0.000 
Local-regional 0.056 0.074 0.445 0.056 0.072 0.433 
Choice experiment -0.524 0.080 0.000 -0.524 0.078 0.000 
Other methodology -0.652 0.155 0.000 -0.652 0.151 0.000 
Constant 0.619 0.169 0.000 0.619 0.164 0.000 
 
  
0.000 
     
0.502 
     
 
0.000 
     
N 366 
  
366 
  
Log restricted-likelihood 
  
-294.719 
  
Wald 439.350 
  
464.750 
  
Prob > Chi2 0.000 
  
0.000 
  
 
We reached similar conclusions when considering the extended models (Tables 1.5 and 
1.6), although we did observe that the face to face and new tax indicators are not statistically 
significant. In addition, we found that the monthly indicator is significant at the 10% 
confidence level depending on the estimated model. Moreover, we also concluded that 
ecosystem based programs are statistically significant, and so individuals also prefer 
programs that assess the protection of forests or animals and the use of forest resources as a 
measure to combat climate change. 
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However, depending on the estimated models, our results varied slightly with respect to 
the effect of some variables. Specifically, in the extended models we analyzed the role played 
by the socio-economic variables, finding that the developing countries indicator had a 
negative and statistically significant effect on WTP. As expected, this suggests that people in 
these countries are less willing to pay to combat climate change, probably due to their income 
restrictions. It is important to highlight that this result does not mean that poor countries value 
less the problem of climate change, rather they do not have a purchasing power comparable to 
developed countries. We also observed that studies conducted in countries with a right-wing 
political orientation result in lower WTPs than those from countries with a left-wing 
government, as indicated in previous studies
 
(Carlsson et al. 2010).  
 
Finally, considering the Hofstede indexes, we concluded that the indicator of long term 
vs. short term orientation is statistically significant, and always has a positive coefficient. 
This result may be explained by the fact that countries that plan more on a long-term basis 
have a larger WTP to fight climate change. Finally, the masculinity vs. feminity index is 
statistically significant, showing that societies in which masculinity is high are less willing to 
pay than their counterparts. In this case, some previous studies found that women are usually 
more egalitarian than men (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; List, 2004, among others).  
 
In conclusion, and with respect to the research hypotheses, the individualism indicator 
carries a negative coefficient, as would be expected. Therefore, countries with more 
individualistic individuals have a lower WTP for public climate control policies. This can be a 
consequence of these citizens not feeling any pressure to behave as members of a group, and 
that as a result they are not conditioned by other individuals will think of them. In addition, 
and with respect to the second hypothesis, we found a negative relationship between the 
percentages of citizens who do not justify cheating on taxes (not cheating) with the reported 
WTP for climate change. This may an indication of the fact that honest individuals (or those 
with strong personal norms) are more likely to respond in a sincere way to surveys, providing 
lower WTPs. 
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Table 1.5 Extended meta regression results (1) 
  OLS Robust OLS 
LogWTP Coefficient Std.Err. P>|t| Coefficient Std.Err. P>|t| 
Geo-physical conditions 
Climatic disasters 0.105 0.022 0.000 0.105 0.024 0.000 
Characteristics of study 
Face to face -0.122 0.095 0.200 -0.122 0.112 0.279 
Telephone -0.704 0.138 0.000 -0.704 0.149 0.000 
Households -0.045 0.096 0.639 -0.045 0.095 0.635 
One time 1.193 0.140 0.000 1.193 0.155 0.000 
Monthly 0.165 0.097 0.090 0.165 0.122 0.176 
Mitigation 0.299 0.147 0.042 0.299 0.131 0.023 
Disasters and heat wave prevention 0.844 0.126 0.000 0.844 0.130 0.000 
Other programs -0.121 0.103 0.243 -0.121 0.119 0.310 
Ecosystem based programs 0.379 0.182 0.038 0.379 0.186 0.042 
Higher prices/taxes 0.479 0.098 0.000 0.479 0.147 0.001 
New tax 0.167 0.139 0.233 0.167 0.195 0.393 
Voluntary 0.156 0.167 0.349 0.156 0.179 0.383 
Small sample -0.005 0.097 0.956 -0.005 0.119 0.965 
Before 2009 -0.246 0.113 0.030 -0.246 0.159 0.123 
Impact factor -0.036 0.013 0.007 -0.036 0.008 0.000 
Local-regional -0.012 0.079 0.883 -0.012 0.093 0.901 
Choice experiment -0.538 0.092 0.000 -0.538 0.075 0.000 
Other methodology -0.627 0.176 0.000 -0.627 0.213 0.003 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Developing countries -1.497 0.432 0.001 -1.497 0.407 0.000 
Right wing -0.387 0.098 0.000 -0.387 0.124 0.002 
Not cheating -0.005 0.002 0.002 -0.005 0.002 0.032 
Uncertainty avoidance 0.000 0.003 0.962 0.000 0.004 0.973 
Long-term versus short-term 
orientation 
0.011 0.006 0.041 0.011 0.005 0.019 
Masculinity versus femininity -0.015 0.005 0.003 -0.015 0.004 0.000 
Indulgence versus restraint 0.002 0.004 0.654 0.002 0.005 0.666 
Individualism -0.012 0.004 0.002 -0.012 0.004 0.003 
Constant 2.586 0.654 0.000 2.586 0.839 0.002 
N 342 
  
342 
  
F 24.400 
  
40.910 
  
Prob > F 0.000 
  
0.000 
  
Adjusted R2 0.650 
  
0.677 
  
Root MSE 0.479 
  
0.479 
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Table 1.6 Extended meta regression results (2) 
  Random Effects GLS 
LogWTP Coefficient Std.Err. P>|t| Coefficient Std.Err. P>|t| 
Geo-physical conditions 
Climatic disasters 0.105 0.022 0.000 0.105 0.021 0.000 
Characteristics of study 
Face to face -0.122 0.095 0.199 -0.122 0.091 0.180 
Telephone -0.704 0.138 0.000 -0.704 0.132 0.000 
Households -0.045 0.096 0.639 -0.045 0.092 0.624 
One time 1.193 0.140 0.000 1.193 0.135 0.000 
Monthly 0.165 0.097 0.089 0.165 0.093 0.076 
Mitigation 0.299 0.147 0.041 0.299 0.141 0.033 
Disasters and heat wave prevention 0.844 0.126 0.000 0.844 0.121 0.000 
Other programs -0.121 0.103 0.242 -0.121 0.099 0.222 
Ecosystem based programs 0.379 0.182 0.037 0.379 0.175 0.030 
Higher prices/taxes 0.479 0.098 0.000 0.479 0.094 0.000 
New tax 0.167 0.139 0.232 0.167 0.134 0.212 
Voluntary 0.156 0.167 0.348 0.156 0.160 0.327 
Small sample -0.005 0.097 0.956 -0.005 0.093 0.955 
Before 2009 -0.246 0.113 0.029 -0.246 0.108 0.023 
Impact factor -0.036 0.013 0.006 -0.036 0.013 0.004 
Local-regional -0.012 0.079 0.883 -0.012 0.076 0.878 
Choice experiment -0.538 0.092 0.000 -0.538 0.088 0.000 
Other methodology -0.627 0.176 0.000 -0.627 0.168 0.000 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Developing countries -1.497 0.432 0.001 -1.497 0.414 0.000 
Right wing -0.387 0.098 0.000 -0.387 0.094 0.000 
Not cheating -0.005 0.002 0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.001 
Uncertainty avoidance 0.000 0.003 0.962 0.000 0.003 0.960 
Long-term versus short-term 
orientation 
0.011 0.006 0.040 0.011 0.005 0.032 
Masculinity versus femininity -0.015 0.005 0.002 -0.015 0.005 0.002 
Indulgence versus restraint 0.002 0.004 0.654 0.002 0.004 0.640 
Individualism -0.012 0.004 0.002 -0.012 0.004 0.001 
Constant 2.586 0.654 0.000 2.586 0.627 0.000 
 
  
 
 
0.000 
    
 
0.423 
    
  
0.000 
    
N 342 
  
342 
  
Log restricted-likelihood 
  
-219.056 
  
Wald 658.870 
  
717.620 
  
 
 
0.000 
  
0.000 
  
 



2
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1.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present study has provided an analysis of existing literature on preferences and of 
WTP for climate change mitigation and adaptation policies through a meta-regression, 
offering a summary of the most important results. We acknowledge, however, that other 
lenses and moral aspects could be used in order to understand social preferences for climate 
policies. 
 
The main aim of this paper is to contribute towards identifying the main determining 
factors of climate change policies. We collected information from 58 studies around the 
world, finding results that can be useful in terms of policy design in order to increase the 
acceptance and compliance of public climate control policies. We acknowledge that the vast 
majority of our study sample is skewed toward the developed world, and have controlled for 
this issue in the estimated models.  
 
There are important lessons from this previous analysis that should be taken into account 
when designing effective policies to control climate change. Overall, our results show that 
mitigation actions are preferred over adaptation actions. In addition, policies should 
encourage the prevention of disasters and heat waves to combat climate change (disasters and 
heat wave prevention) in order to be more preferable. It is also important to note that 
economic conditions definitely play a role in terms of supporting efforts to combat climate 
change, and that in developing countries, there is less willingness to pay for climate control 
policies, however, this does not mean that poor countries value less the climate change 
problem. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this may imply that these societies may be 
more willing to regulate by using other mechanisms that do not require higher prices to be 
paid for goods or services. Also, in terms of time preferences, studies conducted in countries 
with a significantly long-term orientation have a higher WTP for climate change policies. 
These policies may be perceived as insurance towards future catastrophic events. 
 
We therefore believe that future studies should consider this set of initial findings in order 
to articulate more acceptable policies around the world in terms of climate change control. In 
this sense, particularly important factors are the roles of social norms and perceived risks, 
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ceteris paribus. It is important to take into account that there are other mechanisms to combat 
climate change, such as improved efficiency and infrastructures, which are not evaluated in 
the current set of studies. Here we have analyzed the acceptability in terms of willingness to 
pay for programs that require an economic sacrifice by consumers. 
 
In conclusion, a relevant finding of our work is that cultural and social dimensions are 
relevant in promoting the acceptability of climate change policies, as shown in the present 
analysis. We believe that these cultural and social norm dimensions may be reinforced by 
promoting informational campaigns in order to raise awareness amongst the public. This 
would make it possible to generate a solid body of knowledge that would be useful in 
increasing resilience towards extreme events, and a better use and management of energy and 
resources in general. Unfortunately, statistical data are very limited in order to reflect and 
empirically test the importance of environmental awareness at international levels. Future 
efforts should focus on collecting comparable data at international level in order to better 
understand the social norms and cultural backgrounds of societies. These data may become 
very useful and relevant in understanding support towards certain public policies and 
cooperative behaviors. 
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2. FARMERS’ PREFERENCES AND 
SOCIAL CAPITAL REGARDING AGRI-
ENVIRONMENTAL SCHEMES TO 
PROTECT BIRDS 
 
Abstract 
The steady decline of birds living in cereal steppe lands is a worrying situation that the 
European Common Agricultural Policy is attempting to remedy through the application of 
agri-environmental schemes (AES). We assess farmers’ preferences towards these AES, 
which call for a number of environmental practices to protect birds. Using a face-to-face 
survey in farming communities in Aragón (Spain), and through the estimation of an Ordered 
Logit model (OL), we assess the ranking of AES attributes, and obtain their economic 
valuation according to the farmers’ preferences. We find that social factors are also important 
in determining farmers’ decisions. In particular, the importance of social trust and expectation 
of compliance by other neighbors encourage farmers to sign up to AES. These and other 
results may be used to design more effective AES and help to solve this important 
biodiversity problem.  
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, bird communities living on cereal steppes in the north east of Spain have 
experienced a steady decline. Currently, these birds are classified in some regional 
communities, such as Aragón, as endangered species (Gobierno de Aragón, 2012a). Several 
factors aggravate this situation, including especially: changes in harvesting technologies, 
using techniques that are more intensive and detrimental for birds; reduction of cropping areas 
because of abandonment (Plieninger et al. 2013) or conversion to other uses, leaving less food 
and habitat available for cereal steppe birds (SEO/Birdlife, 2012). Spain is one of the 
countries in Europe with the largest number of bird species (Fundación Biodiversidad, 2009) 
with, for example, three-quarters of the world’s population of bustards (Otis tarda) found in 
Spain. Of 580 different species, this source notes that around one quarter are threatened or 
endangered, representing more than 45% of the total in Spain. This is a worrying situation, 
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and reflects the state of the ecosystems that are essential to maintain a rich diversity of bird 
species. The European Commission (2014a) also notes that birds are a good indicator of the 
diversity and integrity of ecosystems. For example, Nguyen (2007) used the bird community 
composition to evaluate the forest disturbance in areas of Mexico. 
 
To counter this threat to bird biodiversity, and based on the programs developed by Rural 
Development Program under the fund FEADER for the period 2007-2013, most Autonomous 
Communities in Spain with Special Protection Areas for birds (SPAs) have applied agri-
environmental schemes (AES) to protect endangered bird communities. These measures 
provide payments to farmers who voluntarily agree to carry out farming practices over a five-
year period to protect and preserve bird habitats. Farmers who enter into this agreement have 
to implement measures to promote the breeding and feeding of birds in rainfed arable land. As 
compensation, an agri-environmental payment is provided to cover the extra costs derived 
from fulfilling the contractual requirements as examples of payments for environmental 
services (PES) (Baylis et al. 2008).  
 
At present, these AES have a number of general requirements, with specific conditions 
that vary from region to region. In Spain, these contracts require fallow land to be left 
untouched in order to create and support refuge areas that benefit certain species of birds. 
There is also a condition that establishes a crop rotation to create a diverse and rich structure 
of plants and invertebrates, together with the obligation to cultivate fodder or green crops that 
provide habitat and food for birds. In addition, there are two other contractual requirements: 
to create and to maintain boundaries to provide food and refuge areas for birds; to restrict 
harvesting or ploughing until the birds’ reproductive cycle is complete (SEO/Birdlife, 2012).  
 
These AES require that farmers change the way they manage their farms in order to 
preserve the biological diversity associated with agricultural systems (Carricondo et al. 2012). 
Although AES have been implemented for the last 15 years, bird populations continue to 
decline and the agricultural systems on which they depend continue to suffer from processes 
of abandonment, intensification or transformation (SEO/Birdlife, 2012). However, we cannot 
assert that these measures have failed without some knowledge of the counterfactual, though 
Carricondo et al. (2012) note that in Aragón the percentage of desirable practices included in 
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AES is below the average (36%), implying that AES may be not optimally designed for bird 
protection in this area. These authors suggest that in some Spanish regions, such as Catalonia, 
the success has been higher than in our study area, despite the high degree of local 
participation in these AES contracts by farmers in Aragón. We offer some suggestions to 
improve the effectiveness of these measures; including a focus on areas where there are 
stronger social relations and the protection of these birds is important, and the use of 
economic payments that take into account both the productive diversity of each area, and 
preferences towards participation. Since land abandonment is one of the main factors 
threating this pseudo-steppe ecosystem, it is important to seek a balance between favourable 
practices and the economic viability of farms, and also to involve and engage the farming 
community. Therefore, we analyse farmers’ preferences, focusing on the role of social factors 
and farmers’ valuation of AES requirements and other contract conditions.  
 
To do so, we conducted a survey in the region of Aragón, which included a choice 
experiment (CE) exercise. This methodology has been used successfully in different studies 
(Adamowicz et al. (1994); Boxall et al. (1996); Roessler et al. (2008)). Specifically, and with 
respect to agri-environmental measures, CE have been used in a range of contexts by Ruto 
and Garrod (2009), Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010), Christensen et al. (2011), Broch and Vedel 
(2012) and Kuhfuss et al. (2013). 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents a short review of 
the literature on famers’ preferences and the description of CE; section 2.3 analyses the effect 
of social capital and economic incentives, while Section 2.4 contains the survey description 
and data. The empirical modelling strategy is described in section 2.5, while Section 2.6 
presents the results and the welfare estimates. Section 2.7 concludes. 
 
2.2 FARMERS’ PREFERENCES FOR AES 
 
Few studies have focused their attention on understanding farmers’ preferences towards 
agri-environmental measures. Earlier studies, such as those by Wynn et al. (2001) and 
Vanslembrouck et al. (2002), refer to the important role of considering the characteristics of 
the required practices, finding that the flexibility of the proposed contracts is one of the most 
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important and valued characteristics (Wynn et al. 2001). Ruto and Garrod (2009) analyse how 
policy makers can make variations in AES characteristics to increase the likelihood of 
enrolment. They show that farmers prefer short-term contracts and have positive preferences 
for the attribute that reflects the flexibility over which areas of the farm enter into the scheme. 
In Spain, Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010) investigated farmers’ preferences for different contract 
options, concluding that they have a strong preference for maintaining their current 
management strategies; however, they also suggest that participation can be increased by 
modifying certain attributes of the AES. Christensen et al. (2011) explored how to improve 
existing agri-environmental subsidies, finding that farmers are willing to trade off contractual 
obligations against the size of the payment. Broch and Vedel (2012) look at the regulatory 
aspects of AES, specifically analysing the preference heterogeneity in order to improve 
policies. They include the likelihood of monitoring as one of the contractual characteristics, 
finding that this increases the level of compensation that farmers would like to receive (€38 
per 1 point increase in the likelihood of monitoring). This happens even for those who have a 
positive attitude towards monitoring.  Kuhfuss et al. (2013) address the low degree of 
participation by French farmers in AES designed to reduce the use of pesticides, and note 
especially that the reasons that farmers enroll in AES are heterogeneous. They go beyond the 
individual costs and benefits of participation to consider the collective dimension of these 
measures by introducing a collective incentive, a monetary bonus paid per hectare enrolled 
conditional on a 50% participation rate among local farmers. They conclude that introducing 
the collective dimension enhances the efficiency of schemes, providing that farmers believe 
that the threshold (50%) can be achieved. In this respect, Parkhurst et al. (2002) analyze the 
role of an agglomeration bonus; this is an economic incentive that pays an extra bonus in 
order to maximize habitat protection and at the same time minimizes landowner effects. In 
addition, it also incentives non-cooperative individuals. 
 
Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to the role that social dimensions may play in 
farmers’ preferences. As Pretty and Smith (2004) note, economic incentives are important, but 
sometimes not enough to achieve a certain goal. Therefore, our focus is on famers’ 
preferences and to the extent to which they are influenced by economic incentives and social 
factors. 
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2.2.1 The choice experiment (CE) 
 
We use a choice experiment (CE) to study farmers’ preferences. Farmers were invited to 
rank two types of agri-environmental contracts with the same attributes, but at different levels. 
In each choice experiment task, as a third option, farmers were also given the status quo 
option of declining both experimental contracts, and thus decline to participate in the AES 
designed to protect cereal steppe birds. To select the appropriate attributes, we reviewed the 
literature and carried out a focus group and pre-test, where a valuation of the different 
proposed attributes was included.  
 
Table 2.1 contains a detailed description of the attributes and levels included in the choice 
experiment. These were selected considering the results of the focus group and pre-test. 
 
Table 2.1 Attributes and respective levels 
Attributes Description Levels 
Payment Compensation rate (euros per ha crop). 30€/ha 60€/ha 90€/ha 120€/ha 
Flexibility 
The freedom to decide how much of the total 
area enrolled in the contract can be excluded 
without penalty each year after contract 
agreement. A maximum of 40% can be 
excluded. 
0% 40% 
  
Fine 
Amount of money to be paid if the farmer is 
caught cheating (in addition to the return of 
the payment). It will be applied for any 
infringement of the law1. 
0€/ha 200€/ha 
  
Cultivate 
Obligation to include alfalfa or sainfoin in a 
variable percentage of the crop area.  
0% 20% 
  
Restriction  
Prohibition of working in fallow lands in some 
months of the year in order to allow nests. 
No 
restrictions 
April 1st  to  
August 1st   
 
There are also a number of further requirements that are constant across contracts 
requirements and consequently not included in the CE but that they are explained to 
participants before make their decision about contracts. For example, the cereal stubble must 
be kept until 31
st
 December, while leaving overwinter stubbles in at least 50% of the land. 
Also, the use of pesticides in the non-cultivation period is not allowed in any of these 
contracts. These additional requirements are constant for all contracts, and consequently, not 
                                                             
1 A fine with almost double of the top compensation rate was designed so that the net payment per ha is negative, in the case 
of infrigement. 
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included as attributes of the CE. The attributes are similar to those of the contracts already 
available, with the exception of the fine, which is proposed as a novelty. 
 
Table 2.2 contains a summary of the perceptions of farmers towards the attributes, where 
we can see that the payment is the most highly considered (74% of the respondents). 
 
Table 2.2 Valuation of proposed attributes for the total sample (%) 
Characteristics 
Stated Consideration Level  
I do not 
consider it 
I do not consider 
it much 
I consider it 
somewhat 
I consider it a 
lot 
This is what I 
consider the most 
Payment 0.57 1.15 4.58 20.06 73.6 
Flexibility 9.48 19.25 33.33 30.75 7.18 
Fine 26.72 33.91 21.55 13.22 4.6 
Cultivate 23.92 34.29 25.07 12.97 3.46 
Restriction 15.03 25.43 33.82 19.08 6.65 
 
All of the attributes entered the choice set at two levels, except the payment attribute at 
four levels. We chose these levels to help the farmers taking part to understand the survey, as 
they were relatively elderly (mean age=56
2
). From the total number of possible combinations 
of the attribute levels we selected eight profiles to obtain suitable pairs. We used a generator 
following Street and Burgess (2007), designed for four attributes with two levels and one 
attribute with four levels and two alternatives, and obtained a choice of eight pairs with 97.6% 
efficiency relative to the optimal design, estimating only main effects. We also randomly split 
the total number of choices into two sets, to reduce the number of choice sets per individual 
(An example of the choice set is shown in Table 2.3).  
 
Table 2.3 Example of a choice set presented in the survey 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTRACT 
Contract 
A 
Contract 
B 
Does not endorse any  
contract for bird protection 
Payment 120€/ha 30€/ha 
 
Flexibility 40% 0% 
 
Fine 0€/ha 200€/ha 
 
Cultivate 0% 20% 
 
Restriction  April 1 to August 1 No restrictions   
Which contract do you select? Indicate 1 = most preferred, 2 = average, 3 = least preferred 
 
  
                                                             
2
 According to Gobierno de Aragón (2012b), 20.05% of the population is older than 65 years. The aging process is more 
prominent in farming areas. 
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2.3 THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 
 
Behavioural economics and social psychology have shown that the utility level of 
individuals depends not only on their absolute level of wealth, but also on how individuals 
compare themselves with others and how they evaluate their position in the social groups to 
which they belong (Kuhfuss et al. 2013). Polman and Slangen (2008) analysed the likelihood 
of enrolling in agri-environmental schemes, showing that AES based only on farm and farmer 
characteristics is incomplete since it neglects the effects of motivational issues and social 
capital. 
 
We analyse farmers’ preferences taking into account contract requirements and 
conditions, but also assess how social capital influences their decisions. Several studies, for 
example Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993, 1995, and 2000), conclude that social capital is 
related to positive outcomes which facilitate cooperation and coordination. Specifically, with 
respect to natural resource management, Richter and Grasman (2013) highlight the 
importance of social capital while Pretty and Smith (2004) define social capital as social 
bonds and norms, highlighting the role that this aspect plays “in collective management 
programs at different scales”. Four components of social capital have been defined by Pretty 
and Ward (2001): 1) the relations of trust; 2) relations of reciprocity and exchange; 3) 
common rules, norms and sanctions within the community; 4) the connectedness in networks 
and groups. Similarly, Halkos and Jones (2012) suggest that the most important elements of 
social capital are social trust, institutional trust, social norms and social networks. In this 
sense, relations of trust may reduce the transaction costs and at the same time establish social 
obligations. Relations of reciprocity and exchange can also create trust, although trust can be 
easily broken (Pretty and Smith, 2004). In our case, we note that common rules reinforce 
group interests, whilst sanctions punish those who break the rules.  
Apart from social factors, we also analyse the role of economic incentives and the 
potential for of free-riding behaviour and moral hazard. In addition to the establishment of the 
economic payment as a compensation for the fulfilment of certain requirements, the proposed 
contracts also include a fine to reinforce compliance with the requirements established by the 
AES. In addition, this fine is associated with a likelihood of monitoring of 5% (similar to the 
practice in past contracts, European Commision, 2014b). Hart and Latacz-Lohman (2005) and 
Ozanne and White (2008) have studied moral hazard through the effect of monitoring and 
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compliance in AES, showing that these contracts should be reinforced with monitoring. In the 
reviewed literature, only Broch and Vedel (2012) study the implications of monitoring. 
However, and as the probability of monitoring nowadays is regulated and fixed at a 5% level, 
our novelty is the introduction of the fine to reinforce a sustainable behaviour.  
 
As a hypothesis, we analyse whether social trust can serve as an incentive to reinforce the 
effect of a fine. Laffont and Martimort (2001) stressed that social behaviour and cultural 
norms play an important role in societies, although it is also important to recognize the power 
of individuals’ interests. Incentive compatibility constraints and moral hazards are important, 
and there is a potential for farmers to participate in the AES, but fail to comply with the 
conditions. To counter this potential, we include the likelihood of monitoring and the fine as 
ways of controlling their behaviour. Laffont and Martimort (2001) state that monitoring and 
penalties are costly to implement, while such penalties have a limited effect depending on 
participants’ total assets. We test whether social trust can reinforce the effect of an economic 
penalty. 
 
To obtain this indicator we questioned farmers directly about whether their neighbors’ are 
likely to fulfil the contract requirements, with a 5-point scale (1 for “no compliance at all” and 
5 for “compliance at 100% level”). We then constructed a dummy variable that identifies 
social trust if the respondent believes that their neighbors are complying at the 100% level 
(69% of respondents think that their neighbors will comply). We expect that farmers who 
trust their neighbors’ efforts to fulfil their contracts, positively value the existence of a fine, 
and therefore, the presence of this attribute increases their utility level. Previous literature has 
suggested that individuals tend to behave in the same way as others, for example, Papyrina 
(2012) suggests that people prefer to conform to other members of their groups, and Cialdini 
and Goldstein (2004) stated “if we engage in behaviours of which others approve, others will 
approve of us, too”. In the case of deviation, farmers may also see the penalty as fair. Fehr 
and Gächter (2002) elaborate the idea of altruistic punishment. This is characterized by the 
fact that individuals sometimes punish others, although the punishment may be costly for 
them. Therefore, we expect a positive coefficient for this cross-product. In order to properly 
understand the role played by the contract attributes, we assume that farmers select contracts 
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that on average are expected to be comparable with those selected by other participants of the 
same group.  
 
In addition, we also analyse the effect of institutional trust that reflects the degree of 
deterrence and the effect of the fine. The institutional trust measure was obtained from a 
question formulated in order to discover the opinion about the likelihood of being caught and 
penalized if somebody infringes the established contractual rules (48% of farmers think that 
the likelihood of being caught and penalized is high or very high). We expect that farmers 
who believe that institutions will monitor their behaviour (i.e. high institutional trust) will 
value the fine as superfluous, and as an unnecessary cost; i.e. in a more negative way. The 
main reason is that institutional trust can act as a mean of deterrence.  
 
Although social capital also includes the relationships of reciprocity or exchange, we 
were not able to analyse this aspect due to the lack of specific data. The fourth component is 
the connectedness in groups; Pretty and Smith (2004) highlight three types of relations 
proposed by Woolcock (2001): are links between people with similar objectives (bonding); 
the capacity of groups to make links with others that may have different views (bridging); the 
ability of groups to engage vertically with external agencies (linking types of social capital). 
We include these characteristics in our empirical modeling strategy aiming to analyse their 
role on farmers’ decisions.  
 
Specifically, we employ a trade union membership variable as an indicator of social 
networks. We expect that farmers who are members of a trade union (bridging relations) to 
value the fine more positively than their counterparts, as a protection of the interests of their 
group in addition to the individual interests. For instance, Granovetter (2005) suggests that 
social networks affect economic outcomes, because of: a) the quantity and quality of 
information they have; b) the networks as a source of reward and punishment; c) trust in the 
rest of members to do the “right thing” despite of the presence of incentives to do the 
opposite. With regards to the bonding relation, we also expect that famers who found out 
about these policies from other farmers will value less negatively the fine attribute than the 
average. 
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2.4 SURVEY DESCRIPTION AND DATA 
 
A face-to-face survey was carried out in Aragón, north-eastern Spain, during the summer 
of 2012, interviewing a sample of 359 farmers, including both farmers with and without 
experience with these AES. Specifically, around 55% of farmers have previous experience 
with some of the existing measures in practice. The survey requested information about the 
farmers’ knowledge of AES, their experience with these policies, and the perceived benefits 
and associated drawbacks. A second block of questions dealt with the characteristics of the 
contracts. Perceived success indicators were contemplated in the third block, and the fourth 
block included questions related to the profiles of the farmers and their farms. Finally, socio-
demographic characteristics were elicited in the last part of the survey.  
 
In terms of the sample characteristics, the average age of the farmers is over 56. In 
addition, around 78% have primary education. Only 17% of participants are women
3
. 
Moreover, 25% of farmers earn an agricultural income less than €20,000/year, 53% of farms 
have more than 55 hectares and 21% have livestock. Around 40% have their own machinery, 
and 16% believe that their farms will be abandoned in the future. With respect to the success 
of the AES, 57% of farmers think that they are very or extremely effective in protecting cereal 
steppe birds. Finally, 71% of respondents in our sample are engaged in agricultural activity on 
a full-time basis.  
 
We also consider other indicators to test the effects of social capital. First, we look at the 
relationships of trust and include an indicator that reflects social trust. 69% of respondents 
trust that their neighbors are fulfilling the contractual requirements at 100%. However, on 
institutional trust, there is low confidence in the effectiveness of the public authorities, and 
only 48% of farmers indicate that this likelihood is high or very high on a 5-point scale with 1 
representing “less than 5%” and 5 “over 60%”. The social capital dimension of common 
norms, rules and sanctions is reflected, at least partially, by including a fine as one of the 
attributes of the contract. The connectedness in groups is composed of three indicators: the 
bonding component, where 30% claim to have found out about these contracts through other 
farmers: the bridging indicator, reflected by 22% of the sample belonging to a trade union; 
                                                             
3 This is a typical characteristic of Spanish farms. According to the data of the National Institute of Statistics, for 2007 only 
11.15% of women worked on farms (INE, 2012). 
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linking relations, where 4% of respondents know about these schemes through bank offices 
and 54% through agricultural extension offices.  
 
We analyse the role of farms’ and farmers’ characteristics and social capital on ranking 
the AES contracts through the interactions of these variables with the different contractual 
attributes. Specifically, we include the following cross-products. First, with respect to the 
payment attribute, we try to identify differences in preferences of women via the term 
(payment*women), of young respondents (payment*young), of farmers with basic level of 
studies and of those who have large farms (payment*basic education, payment*big farm). In 
addition, and with the aim to elicit farmers´ preferences for the rest of contractual attributes, 
we include some other cross-products in the empirical specification. In particular, in the case 
of restriction, we consider the effect of livestock (restriction*livestock). To reflect cultural 
diversity and analyse participants’ awareness, we asked farmers whether they knew popular 
sayings associated with cereal steppe birds, where 6% of respondents knew popular sayings 
associated with birds, indicating their awareness of the value of birds or the relationships 
between birds and climatic episodes. We analyse this indicator together with the restriction 
variable (restriction*proverb). The reason is that we expect that these farmers may have 
different perceptions towards costly attributes, (such as restriction) in order to preserve bird 
species, valuing this restriction less negatively than their counterparts. Finally, we also assess 
whether farmers with previous knowledge about AES value in a more negative way the fine 
(fine*know). Table 2.4 shows the complete list of the variables employed in our modelling 
strategy.  
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Table 2.4 Description of variables 
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev 
Dependent variable 
Ranking 
2, for the most preferred contract; 1 for the average contract; 0 for the 
least preferred contract 1.015 0.815 
Attributes 
Payment The payment attribute 50.000 44.727 
Flexibility The flexibility attribute 0.333 0.471 
Cultivate The cultivate attribute 0.333 0.471 
Fine The fine attribute 0.333 0.471 
Restriction The restriction attribute 0.333 0.471 
Farm and farmers’ characteristics 
Young 1, if the farmer is less than 55 years; 0 otherwise 0.487 0.499 
Basic 
education 
1, if the respondents had basic education; 0 otherwise 
0.777 0.416 
Women 1, if the respondent is a woman; 0 otherwise 0.171 0.377 
Livestock 1, if the farmer has livestock; 0 other wise 0.213 0.411 
Big farm 1, if the farm size is bigger than 55 hectares; 0 otherwise 0.527 0.409 
Know 1, if farmer affirms a clear understanding of these measures; 0 otherwise 0.584 0.492 
Social capital variables 
Proverb 1, if the respondent knew a proverb related to birds; 0 otherwise 0.062 0.241 
Social trust 
1, if the farmer thinks that their neighbors are fulfilling the requirements of 
the contracts with a high probability 0 otherwise 0.689 0.463 
Other 
farmers 
1, if the farmer had learnt about these contracts through other farmers; 0 
otherwise 0.304 0.460 
Trade union 1, if the respondent is member of a trade union; 0 otherwise 0.216 0.411 
Institutional 
trust 
1, if the respondent thinks that the likelihood of being caught and penalized 
is high or very high; 0 otherwise 0.483 0.499 
 
2.5 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
In order to elicit farmers’ preferences, we use a CE framework, which allows individuals 
to select between N alternative options; in our case, two alternatives (two different contracts) 
that contain a number of attributes at different levels presented to each individual four times. 
As recommended by Adamowicz, Louviere and Swait (1998), a status quo option (neither 
contract) was also presented to participants to give them the option of not signing up a 
contract (the opt-out option). Similar exercises have been used to evaluate other agri-
environmental measures (see for example, Christensen et al. 2011; Espinosa-Goded et al. 
2010; Ruto and Garrod, 2009). 
 
Formally, this attribute-based choice method has its theoretical grounding in consumer 
theory (Lancaster, 1966), that utilities for goods can be decomposed into separate utilities for 
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their component attributes and random utility theory (McFadden, 1973; Hanemann and 
Kanninen, 1999).  
 
We asked each respondent to order/rank the contracts according to their preferences. 
Therefore, we also estimate an Ordered Logit model (OL)
4
. We detected the presence of 
heteroskedasticity through the Breusch and Pagan test
5
, and therefore apply a correction in the 
estimation of the model. The basic ordered choice model is based on this regression: 
 
'U x                     (2.1) 
 
where U is the exact but unobserved dependent variable, 
'x is the vector of independent 
variables and   is the vector of regression coefficients which we aim to estimate, and  is the 
error term. Since we cannot observe U but only the categories of response: 
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              (2.2) 
The probabilities which enter the log likelihood function are: 
 
   Prob Prob U is in th rangeiy j j             (2.3) 
 
And the functional form of the model is presented below, where the cumulative density 
function is denoted by F(z): 
 
exp( )
( ) ( ),
1 exp( )
z
F z z
z
  

              (2.4) 
with 'z x   
                                                             
4 We weighted observations from individuals in order to correct for the panel structure of our data. Specifically, we have 12 
observations for each individual, therefore, through the weighting we have specified that these observations are from the 
same farmer. We also have estimated an RPL and an ECM identifying only the most preferred contract, however, we do not 
include these model results as the significance of variables was limited. 
5 In the Breusch and Pagan test we obtain a statistic of 21.5 following a Chi-squared of 1 degree of freedom and with a p-
value of 0.000. 
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2.6 RESULTS 
 
In Table 2.5, we show the results obtained for baseline and extended OL, where all of the 
attributes are statistically significant at the 1% significance level. The payment attribute shows 
the expected and significant positive coefficient - receiving compensation increases 
respondent’s utility and likelihood of accepting the proposed contract. Fine, on the other 
hand, has a large, significant and negative sign, indicating a reduction in the probability of 
accepting a contract. With regard to the rest of the attributes, flexibility has a positive 
coefficient as expected, with farmers preferring contracts with some flexibility to decide how 
much land enters into the scheme each year (Wynn et al. (2001) and Ruto and Garrod (2009) 
reach similar conclusions). Finally, the coefficients associated with cultivate and restriction 
have a negative sign. That implies that the obligation to grow certain green crops in their 
lands, and the prohibition to work their lands some months of the year are both less likely to 
lead to contract acceptance. These results are logical because both characteristics imply a 
restriction in their management practices. To conclude the baseline model, we include the 
Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) with the aim to reflect that the status quo option. As 
expected, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant; therefore, the selection of one 
of the proposed contracts increases the utility above not choosing either one.  
 
With the objective to obtain more information about farmer preferences, we also estimate 
an extended OL. In order to test the correct empirical specification used, we have tested for 
the presence of multicollinearity of our interaction terms through the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) indicator, obtaining a mean value of 2.74, which denotes a low level of 
correlation among the variables. Again, all single attributes are statistically significant and 
carry the expected signs, although their magnitude does change, mostly being reduced, with 
the exception of ASC and Payment, as expected with the addition of explanatory variables. 
The addition of the cross products shows that young farmers obtain higher utility from these 
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contracts than others (payment*young). Farmers with just primary school derive less utility 
(payment*basic education) than the average sample, possibly reflecting a reluctance amongst 
those with less education to change or adopt new practices. In addition, farmers who operate 
larger farms obtain higher utility compared with the average farmer from the payment 
attribute (payment*big farm). This result may be related to the fact that for larger farms the 
contract restrictions can be less onerous at the margin than for the smaller counterparts. 
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) conclude that gender differences in economic experiments 
are important factors that should be taken into account when we analyse altruistic decisions, 
and we also observe that women obtain less utility from the payment (payment*women). The 
livestock and restriction (restriction*livestock) interaction is negative, suggesting that 
prohibiting fallow land working is more constricting for livestock farmers than others, giving 
that this reduces the amount of fodder, reflecting the fact that limiting use of land during some 
months of the year adversely affects their livestock operations. Farmers who declare 
knowledge of proverbs related to birds show an increased antipathy towards restriction 
(restriction*proverb). This appears to imply that greater environmental awareness does not 
imply a reduced requirement for compensation for an AES contract. This can be a 
consequence of the fact that farmers think that birds have always survived under these 
conditions and therefore they do not understand the need for introducing restrictions. Farmers 
who have previous knowledge of AES are more adversely affected by fines than others 
(fine*know). Therefore, it seems that for these farmers with previous experience, the 
introduction of the fine decreases the likelihood of selecting a contract more than for their 
counterparts. Although the fine is a new attribute, current contracts have some requirements 
already in terms of surveillance and monitoring, while that the joint effect of both may proof 
to be rather dissuasive. 
 
Our results show that, when farmers consider neighbors’ compliance with the contractual 
requirements (social trust) jointly with the existence of a penalty in the event of failing to 
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fulfil the requirements, (fine*social trust), their utility level increases – they are more likely to 
opt for an AES contract. This suggests that social trust reinforces the incentive effect of fines 
by encouraging similar behaviours amongst other farmers, reinforcing common norms. Fines 
may also be seen as an effective way of controlling potential selfish behaviour of others 
(altruistic or fair punishment), reinforcing social trust. Similarly, members of a trade union 
value fines more positively than their counterparts (fine*trade union). This could reflect 
bridging relations through which these farmers trust in the rest of members of their trade 
union and they have a social pressure to the right thing despite the existence of incentives to 
do the contrary. Polman and Slangen (2008) also found that farmers involved in general 
networks have a higher probability of enrolling in contracts. With respect to the bonding 
relation, those farmers who have found out about these subsidies from others also value the 
fine more positively than the mean (fine*other farmers). This result also reinforces the output 
obtained for the interaction between fine and social trust. It seems that social pressure is an 
important way of controlling behaviour in AES in this sample. Finally, those respondents who 
think that the likelihood of being caught and penalized is high or very high value the fine 
more negatively (fine*institutional trust), which is to be expected, since the existence of the 
fine is only relevant if the miscreant is likely to be found out. 
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Table 2.5 Ordered Logit model results 
 
Baseline Ordered Logit Extended Ordered Logit 
 
Coefficient Std. Err. P|z|>Z* Coefficient Std. Err. P|z|>Z* 
Characteristics of AES 
Payment 3.621 0.001 0.000 4.573 0.003 0.000 
Cultivate -9.179 0.074 0.000 -2.654 0.108 0.000 
Fine -53.278 0.067 0.000 -39.942 0.257 0.000 
Restriction -47.138 0.063 0.000 -29.999 0.106 0.000 
Flexibility 42.166 0.063 0.000 27.021 0.097 0.000 
ASC -16.454 0.054 0.000 -143.418 0.087 0.000 
Farm and farmers characteristics 
Payment*young 
  
0.195 0.002 0.000 
Payment*basic education 
  
-0.020 0.002 0.000 
Payment*women 
  
-0.284 0.003 0.000 
Payment*big farm 
  
0.083 0.002 0.000 
Restriction*livestock 
  
-45.674 0.172 0.000 
Restriction*proverb 
  
-45.075 0.321 0.000 
Fine*know 
 
  
-59.299 0.194 0.000 
Social capital characteristics 
Fine*social trust 
  
76.590 0.160 0.000 
Fine*other farmers 
  
27.243 0.175 0.000 
Fine*trade union 
  5.990 0.185 0.000 
Fine*institutional trust 
  -3.713 0.160 0.000  
 
313.654 0.030 0.000 352.263 0.058 0.000 
Log-likelihood -4502.218 
  
-1859.339 
    
 
250.869 
  
   
 
  
870.463 
  
McFadden Pseudo R2 0.027 
  
0.190 
  AIC 9018.400 
  
3754.700 
  N 4213 
  
2090 
  
 
2.6.1 Welfare estimates 
 
After estimating the proposed models, we calculate the welfare estimates. We follow the 
guidelines proposed by Hanemann (1984). In Table 2.6 we report results for the baseline and 
extended OL models. From the baseline model, the least valued attribute in absolute terms is 
the fine, indicating that farmers have to be compensated with an additional €14 per hectare 
when a fine of €200/ha is included in the contract with a probability of monitoring of 5%. 
With respect to the prohibition of working lands during certain months of the year 
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(restriction), the results show that individuals will accept a compensation payment of an 
additional €13 per hectare for 5 months cultivation prohibition. In addition, respondents have 
to be compensated with €2.5/ha for the obligation to include a percentage of 20% of green 
crops in their lands. Finally, farmers would be willing to trade-off €11/ha in order to have 
flexibility (40%) over the land allocated to AES.  
 
However, the results from the extended model, show that inclusion of the demographic 
and social capital interactions generally reduces the underlying valuation of the main 
attributes – reducing the perceived costs of the fine (especially) and also cultivation and 
restrictions, and reducing the value of flexibility, as well as reducing the average cost 
(compensation) of the average (general) AES.  
 
We also find that the current economic compensation paid by the public authorities is 
well above the monetization of the degree of disutility caused by the restriction established in 
the AES as reflected in our contract options. On average we estimate that the mean 
compensation varies between €10/ha to €18/ha, while present payments for such contracts are 
at least between €60/ha - €120/ha depending on the requirements. It is important to highlight a 
few reasons that may be behind the discrepancy between these results. First, the payments of 
these contracts are considered as a fixed source of income for the farmers and as such, these 
are particularly valued in rural communities where the outside working opportunities and 
income diversification strategies have been reduced during the current economic crisis. 
Another important clarification is that we have evaluated preferences towards future contracts 
(put in place when current contracts will finish), offered as a replacement of the current ones. 
As a consequence, it may well be that lower compensations may be demanded for future 
contracts in order to compensate for future efforts versus current efforts. Another important 
aspect to consider is that our welfare estimates may vary depending on specific conditions, 
such as the experience of farmers with AES (Espinosa et al. 2010), the quality and 
productivity of land, whether farmers have livestock, attitudes towards nature conservation, 
attitudes towards others (Schulz et al. 2014), and others. However, these results carrying 
lower compensation requirements are in line with the current experience with these AES in 
Aragon. In this area the allocated budget has been always depleted due to the high demand of 
enrolment and interest in subscribing AES. A significant issue, as pointed out earlier, is that 
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farmers from this area are relatively elderly in comparison with other areas of the country, and 
with higher retirement rates. In this socio-economic context, AES represent an alternative 
source of income to agricultural activity, particularly when compared with abandonment or 
retirement. Therefore, we acknowledge that it may be worthwhile to address this gross 
overpayment with the use of competitive actions, instead of using the “first comes, first 
serves” allocation rule of current contracts. In this line, Bamière et al. (2013) have compared 
three types of policies based on incentives (a subsidy per ha, an auction and agglomeration 
malus); finding that, the auction strategy is more cost-efficient.  
 
Table 2.6 Welfare estimates for the extended models 
 
Baseline OL 
 
Coefficient Std. Err. P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Flexibility 11.645 0.018 0.000 11.609 11.680 
Restriction -13.018 0.017 0.000 -13.052 -12.984 
Cultivate -2.535 0.020 0.000 -2.574 -2.496 
Fine -14.713 0.018 0.000 -14.748 -14.679 
Average -18.620 0.025 0.000 -18.671 -18.570 
Extended OL 
 
Coefficient Std. Err. P>|z| 95% Confidence Interval 
Flexibility 5.813 0.021 0.000 5.771 5.854 
Restriction -9.090 0.021 0.000 -9.131 -9.050 
Cultivate -0.571 0.023 0.000 -0.616 -0.525 
Fine -3.107 0.024 0.000 -3.153 -3.061 
Average -9.966 0.061 0.000 -10.087 -9.845 
 
2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study, we examine farmers’ preferences for participating in agri-environmental 
contracts, specifically considering the role of economic incentives (including fines) as well as 
the roles of social norms and social capital. This social context is an important issue for the 
effective outcome of conservation policies, particularly when applied in small rural 
communities. Policy makers could consider that fines may be a persuasive way of 
encouraging fulfilment of AES contracts. In addition, social norms are important in terms of 
preferences towards the contracts. In particular, farmers who are more socially involved and 
therefore more visible, may be more concerned about fines than their counterparts. This may 
84 
 
be because in the event of receiving a sanction, the news will spread quickly in a rural 
community.  
 
However, we find that when complying with the requirements is the general norm in this 
group of farmers, the interaction between social trust with the fine attribute has a positive 
effect on utility, with respect to the utility derived from the fine alone. In practice this may 
imply that fines are more likely to encourage participation when social trust is present. This 
may be potentially related to the fact that farmers want to make sure that when their neighbors 
act as free riders, they may be penalized as well and, therefore the fine may be perceived as a 
fair or altruistic penalty (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Therefore, in the presence of a strong 
social trust, the fine could be a good way to control free-riders. The reason is that, on the one 
hand, free-riders can be punished, and on the other hand, compliant farmers may feel 
respected. Furthermore, and given that neighbors are expected to fulfil their contracts, the 
existence of the fine may ensure that each individual participant has no incentive to deviate 
from this social agreement, increasing their willingness to accept AES contracts. This result is 
reinforced by the fact that farmers who have found out about these AES through other farmers 
or farmers members of trade unions also positively value the fine. Therefore, our results 
indicate that social pressure and social networks are important factors that can help to 
cultivate farmers’ attitudes towards more sustainable results. As a result, areas with higher 
social pressure should have a greater degree of acceptance with contracts in the presence of a 
fine, and perhaps this aspect should be taken into account in the future design of AES. On the 
other hand, we detected another important result, related to the information sources for the 
AES. Farmers who have previous knowledge of these measures value the fine more 
negatively, which means that fines act as a deterrence factor. The same result is obtained for 
farmers who believe in institutional trust. As with Polman and Slangen (2008), we find that 
motivational aspects can increase the effectiveness and efficiency of AES. Specifically, social 
pressure and the existence of prior information about AES are good tools to ensure the correct 
behaviour of farmers in the presence of a fine. 
 
We also find that the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of farmers are 
quite relevant in terms of affecting their preferences towards these conservation contracts. In 
particular, we find that young farmers more positively value the payment with respect to the 
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average farmer. Furthermore, farmers who own livestock more negatively value the 
restriction attribute than the average, whereas, farmers with a basic education or women 
derive less utility from the payment than the average. Further, owners of large farms more 
positively value the payment than the average.  
 
In conclusion, these findings are in line with other similar findings in the literature, while 
they provide additional evidence about the negative impact of the potential fine on farmers’ 
utility as a coercive mechanism. These conclusions may be useful in order to articulate future 
conservation contracts with adequate economic compensation and economic penalties in the 
event of the non-fulfilment of contractual requirements. Another important conclusion is that 
our sample farmers appear to be willing to accept substantially lower economic compensation 
than that which is currently provided for similar contracts. Therefore, contracts in areas with 
high demand could be redesigned, allowing for the admittance of a higher number of farmers, 
while providing lower subsidies. As a limitation of this study, and point for future research, it 
could be very interesting to compare the cost of establishing a fine (in terms of monitoring 
and sanctioning) with the social benefits derived from its establishment. The reason is that we 
have detected that fines can be a good mechanism to control behaviour; nevertheless, we do 
not know which will be the administration’s costs to implement it. 
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3. PROMOTING CONSERVATION IN 
SHELLFISH FISHERIES: THE ROLE OF 
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND SOCIAL 
NORMS 
 
Abstract 
The shellfish sector suffers from the overexploitation of many species at worldwide level. 
In this study, our aim is to analyze through a choice experiment (CE) the preferences of 
shellfish gatherers themselves with respect to a proposed conservation management program, 
assessing in this context the role of time preferences, the effect of co-management through a 
Marine Protected Area (MPA), the effect of social norms and the impact of poaching on 
shellfish fisheries. With regards to time preferences, we find that current users are quite 
impatient with regard to their extraction levels, which can be a consequence of the risky 
environment in which they are involved. Furthermore, we find that poaching has a double 
negative effect. Firstly, it contributes towards the overexploitation of the resource, and 
secondly, this illegal activity means that shellfish gatherers become more impatient in terms 
of their time preferences for exploiting the resource. With regard to social norms, we find that 
when the fulfillment of rules is the general norm, and that the efforts required in the 
management plan are accepted without producing any reduction in the shellfish gatherers’ 
utility.  
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2012) has presented evidence on the 
overexploitation and depletion of many fish populations, encouraging the need to recover 
many species. Specifically, the FAO (2006) has estimated that since 1990, 17% of fish stocks 
have been overexploited worldwide, 7% have been depleted, and 1% are recovering from 
depletion. Technological progress has been indicated as a major cause, increasing the capacity 
of fishing vessels to more intensively exploit a greater number of fish resources, contributing 
to the current fishing crisis (Beddington et al. 2007).  
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To address this situation of overexploitation, different types of management have been 
implemented around the world. In particular, Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs),  which 
require the allocation of units of harvest, and Territorial Use Rights for Fishing (TURFs) 
which allocate units of space, are the most commonly proposed systems. Specifically, TURFs 
are defined by Poon and Bonzon (2013) as “an area-based fishery management approach in 
which groups, or in rare case individuals, are granted secure, exclusive privileges to fish in a 
specified area.” Wiley et al. (2012) have highlighted a number of potential benefits from the 
TURFs management systems, such as the mitigation of rent dissipation linked to open areas; 
the maximization of the value of the catches, and other additional benefits compared to ITQs, 
as a result of which they can promote maximizing the value of the catch instead of competing 
to capture resources. The characteristics of the resources (sedentary vs. migratory), the 
number of users, the unemployment rate and the degree of association are elements that may 
affect TURF’s success (Franquesa, 2004). Wiley et al. (2012) emphasize that apart from the 
establishment of TURFs there are other necessary requirements to obtain successful results, 
pointing out that outcomes are dependent on the governance structure used to deal with 
management problems, while an efficient and fairly internal coordination of fishermen 
together with low transaction costs are also important factors. Furthermore, Ostrom (1990) 
also argued that in order for collective management to be successful it has to take into account 
other social issues, such as the leadership, education or social cohesion of members. 
 
In this sense, an FAO report from 2010 indicated that it is very important that managers 
or responsible agents of fisheries management understand that when stocks are overexploited 
or when fishermen have an irresponsible attitude towards exploitation, the absence of 
measures will have consequences in the future, resulting in losses of potential future benefits 
in the form of food, income, and jobs, among others. De la Torre Castro and Lindström 
(2010) show that the origin of the problem of fishery management is based on the interactions 
of human and natural domains. Therefore, it is not only important to consider economic 
incentives but also the involvement of users in the management process, and to understand the 
motives that managers may have in carrying out certain types of practices that cause an 
overexploitation of resources. In particular, Pretty and Smith (2004) state that economic 
incentives are important, but that sometimes these are not sufficient in order to achieve a 
certain conservation objective. Pretty (2003) highlights that social links and norms are 
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important for sustainability. More recently, Jamie (2014) (following Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008)) suggests that monetary incentives have two drawbacks: they are difficult to 
implement from a political point of view, and individuals are not affected by the 
environmental consequences of their actions. Another important point is made by Cardenas 
(2009) in arguing that sometimes economic incentives and institutional actions can serve to 
promote personal interest instead of public motivations. Therefore, it seems that both 
economic incentives and the role of social norms should be analyzed when we deal with 
public resources. 
 
Our aim in this paper is to use a choice experiment (CE) to analyze preferences towards a 
particular management program that calls for a trade-off between present and future revenue. 
Understanding how management policies could be improved is especially relevant due to the 
failure of those that are currently in use. The CE methodology has been used successfully in a 
number of studies (Knowler et al. (2009), Agimass and Mekonnen (2011), Pulina and 
Meleddu (2012), among others). In particular, and in this CE setting, we are also interested in 
testing the following hypotheses: 1) Following Viscusi et al. (2008) we test whether time 
preferences are positive.  Knowledge of the implicit discount factor is an important issue that 
affects extraction patterns. To our understanding, only three studies (Curtis (2002), Akpalu 
(2008) Johnson and Saunders (2014)) have analyzed this question in relation to fisheries 2) In 
our area of study, poaching has become one of the most important problems; and so, due to 
the seriousness of the current situation with respect to illegal extraction activity, we analyze 
the influence of this factor in users’ time preferences. Our aim is to know whether shellfish 
gatherers become more impatient when they take into account the poaching activity 
surrounding these areas. 3) In this study we also take Marine Protected Areas (MPA) into 
account, thereby testing Ostrom’s theory with respect to the involvement of users in the 
management process, and whether this implies more effective results in terms of conservation 
when dealing with common pool resources. At this point, it is important to consider that the 
main principles of collective action proposed by Ostrom (1990) are applied, at least in theory, 
within the Marine Protected Area (MPA). In order to test this latter hypothesis, our sampling 
methodology contains observations from an MPA as well as other selected areas that act as 
control areas. 4) We also analyze the role of social norms in shellfish gatherers’ behavior. 
With this purpose, we included different questions in our survey in order to understand the 
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type of social norms that are present among users in this sector, specifically testing whether 
the presence of a social norm based on cooperation with the law among users makes shellfish 
gatherers obey the requirements defined in the management plan.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the application of CE in fisheries is presented 
in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the empirical models, while section 3.4 presents the research 
hypotheses. Section 3.5 contains a description of the survey and the data. Section 3.6 presents the 
results, while the paper concludes with a final discussion in section 3.7. 
 
3.2 THE APPLICATION OF CHOICE EXPERIMENT (CE) IN FISHERIES 
 
3.2.1 The area of study 
 
This study centers its attention on the shellfishing sector of one Autonomous Community 
in the North West of Spain, Galicia. This activity is conducted in an artisanal way and has a 
great social importance. It is an important source of income for more than 3,903 persons, in 
large part, women (more than 84% in 2013)
1
. At the same time, it is a source of social 
empowerment for these women (Frangoudes et al. 2008). According to data published by the 
regional government of Galicia, (Xunta de Galicia, 2013) the main species collected in this 
sector are two types of clams (Ruditapes decussatus and Venerupis pullastra) and cockles 
(Cardium edule). Specifically, in 2013 the total economic value of these species amounted 
more than 33€ million, with a total of 3,639 tons auctioned2.  
 
In our area of study, Galicia, TURFs have been applied in the shellfish sector since 1992. 
However, this sector still suffers from overexploitation in addition of being affected by 
poaching. Poachers are individuals who catch the resource without having legal permission. 
In addition, they do not respect the months when extraction is banned, or the limits in terms of 
the catch sizes or number of kilos that can be extracted per day. Freire and García-Allut 
(2000) analyzed the state of artisanal coastal fisheries, finding symptoms of a general state of 
overexploitation as a consequence of the mismatch between management and the biological 
                                                             
1 These data is available on the website of the regional statistics office, (IGE, 2014): 
http://www.ige.eu/web/mostrar_actividade_estatistica.jsp?idioma=gl&codigo=0301004 
2 These statistics are available on the fishery statistics website at: www.pescadegalicia.com  
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and socioeconomic context. This is a worrying situation that frequently appears on the front 
pages of the major national newspapers, showing how poaching causes outbreaks of violence 
between poachers and guards
3. Therefore, the “tragedy of the commons” proposed by Hardin 
(1968) can take place, although there are no open access areas. Furthermore, there are serious 
conflicts between the users which have been published by the Galician Association of 
shellfish gatherers (AGAMAR).
4
  
 
Shellfish fisheries are grouped into fishermen’s guilds (Cofradías). The Galician 
Federation of Fishermen Guilds (2014) defines these associations as “public law 
corporations, endowed with the legal personality and capacity to act in fulfillment of the 
purposes and the exercise of the functions they are entrusted. These act as bodies for the 
purposes of consultation and cooperation with the government in promoting the fishing sector 
and represent the economic and corporative interests of the professionals in the sector, 
notwithstanding their representation as organizations of employers and fishermen.” In 
Galicia there are currently 62 fishermen’s guilds with a long tradition, according to the 
Galician Federation. They include all of the shellfish gatherers that are working in a particular 
geographical area (Franquesa, 2004). It is compulsory for the members to sell the resource at 
auction at the local market that belongs to the fishermen’s guilds, with members also having 
to pay a monthly fee to support the administrative costs. The author also highlights the 
importance of fishermen’s guilds in order to control and discipline guild members. It is 
important to denote that it is mandatory to be a member of the fishermen’s guilds to work as a 
shellfish gatherer. Under the fishermen’s guilds, this shellfishing sector is regulated by strict 
laws that limit the quantity of products that can be extracted per gatherer per day, also 
defining the minimum size requirements. Furthermore, these regulations also limit the amount 
of catching days per season. It is important to take into account that fishermen’s guilds are 
guided by technical support provided by biologists who work together with the leaders of the 
shellfish gatherers to produce the yearly management plan. This management plan has to be 
approved by the assembly of shellfish gatherers and by the fishermen’s guilds, and finally by 
the regional government, the Xunta de Galicia. Macho et al. (2013) note that in Galicia the 
                                                             
3 This news can be seen in different Spanish newspaper such as: El País, 09-16-2012; La Voz de Galicia, 12-09-2013 and 10-04-
2014 
4The website of AGAMAR includes an article on how the chairman of the shellfish gatherers’ association of Vilanova was 
assaulted by the leader of the fishermen’s guild with a rake (11-19-2013).  
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role of scientific advisors has made it possible to provide accurate information and ensure 
well-organized fisheries at the same time as supporting decision making processes.  
 
In our area of study there are also two Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). This an 
interesting aspect to be analyzed, given that co-management is a very relevant aspect, as 
previously commented by Ostrom (1999) and Dietz et al. (2003), who refer to the importance 
of bottom-up decision-making
5
 strategies that can help to deal with situations of over-
exploitation.  
 
3.2.2 CE applications to fisheries 
 
In this study we conducted a face-to-face survey employing the CE methodology. It is 
important to note that this is a fairly novel technique in the field of fisheries management. To 
facilitate the first contact with shellfish gatherers we collected information through the 
websites of fishermen’s guilds and groups of shellfish gatherers. After an initial phone call or 
e-mail we visited the area where they work, and interviewed shellfish gatherers while they 
were working on the beach, or if they preferred in a common space during their break. One of 
the first applications was conducted by Aas et al. (2000) who evaluated different management 
alternatives to the harvesting regulations in Norway. Wattage et al. (2005) pointed out that as 
the management of fisheries is defined by multiple objectives, more efficient solutions can be 
found when the preferences of the various stakeholders are known. Moreover, they indicate 
that CE methodology can provide useful information for the management process. In addition, 
Knowler et al. (2009) also employed the CE approach to evaluate several programs in India, 
and Wattage et al. (2011) in analyzing uncertainty regarding the value of the reserved habitats 
to the fishing industry in Ireland. However, in this latter case, the CE was applied to the 
residents of the Republic of Ireland and not only to the users. Agimass and Mekonnen (2011) 
used a CE to evaluate willingness to pay (WTP) for fisheries and watershed management in 
Ethiopia. Their results show that socioeconomic variables such as education, household 
income and family size are significant when determining the selection of a management plan. 
More recently, Pulina and Meleddu (2012) used this methodology to evaluate the 
                                                             
5
 Ostrom (1990) pointed out seven principles of design related to collective action, which are: clearly defined boundaries, 
congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions, collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, 
graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, and a minimal recognition of rights to organize. These principles have been 
used in the MPA in Galicia. 
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implementation of an MPA in Italy, concluding that these stakeholders prefer to improve 
sustainable yields, to reduce their internal conflicts and to increase the profits from the 
fishery. With respect to shellfisheries, studies such as Nunes et al. (2009) have analyzed the 
importance of conflicting objectives in the sector. Specifically, they studied how the process 
of gathering shellfish damages areas where birds come to feed. However, in the previous 
literature, we did not find any other studies that analyzed the established research hypotheses. 
Therefore, this current application pays special attention to the time preferences of shellfish 
gatherers, the effect of co-management through a MPA, and the impact that poaching has on 
local shellfish gathering areas. 
 
In our CE modeling exercise, taking into account the difficult biological situation facing 
certain species in Galicia, we presented a management plan with the aim of improving and 
recovering the abundance of the resources. Usually, the local government draws up 
conservation plans to recover affected species. As a clear and recent example, we may cite the 
biological situation of the common cockle (Cerastoderma Edule). According to the official 
statistics
6
 elaborated by the regional government, the data show that between 2008 and 2013, 
the amount of catches decreased by 64%, putting pressure on other species that began to 
suffer from over-exploitation. The conservation plan presented to shellfish gatherers also 
implied accepting an agreement that will have a duration of five years, while every year there 
would be a certain number of months when gathering is prohibited
7
. During these months of 
prohibition of activity, shellfish gatherers will be compensated with an economic subsidy of 
€1200/month8. The positive effects of this prohibition on catches will not be immediate, i.e. 
there will be a waiting period to achieve the biological improvement of stocks. In addition, as 
part of the recovery plan, we include a limitation about the number of shellfish catchers. 
Finally, it is indicated that in cases when individuals accept to participate and do not obey the 
rules, they will be sanctioned with the return of the economic subsidy (€1200/month) and 
20% more as a fine. We also include a social sanction of publishing the names of individuals 
who infringe the law. As stated by Alpizar (2014), shame and pride are forms of social 
sanctions and rewards, respectively, to encourage desired behaviors. Therefore, we consider 
                                                             
6 These statistics are available on the website of the fisheries statistics office: www.pescadegalicia.com 
7 Depending of the area, some shellfish gatherers do not have extraction ban periods because they have different beaches to work, 
and while one beach is closed, others are open to work. 
8 We include an economic subsidy with the aim of reducing protest responses. We selected this amount of money to help users to 
deal with different types of expenses such as insurance, and membership fees for the fishermen’s guilds. 
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that publicizing the name of those who are disobeying the rules can act as a social punishment 
mechanism.  
 
Participants were given the opportunity to select between three types of management 
plans containing the same attributes, but presented at different levels. In each choice 
experiment task, participants were also given a third option to choose not to adopt either 
Management Plan A, Management Plan B nor Management Plan C.  
 
To select the included characteristics of the management program, we follow the 
description of current policies while revising the literature. We also conducted a pre-test 
which included an evaluation of the different attributes that were proposed.  
 
The selected attributes included in the management plan available to shellfish catchers 
were
9
: 1) the number of years in which users do not perceive any improvement in the 
resource; denoted as delay
10
; 2) the percentage of improvement in the abundance of the 
resource that will be achieved (improvement); 3) the third characteristic is the extraction ban 
that indicates the number of years for which fisheries will be closed, and therefore extraction 
will not be allowed. 4) The attribute coworkers
11
 indicates the maximum number of catchers 
that could benefit from this plan. Table 3.1 contains a detailed description of the 
characteristics included in the choice experiment.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 The levels chosen for each attribute were pre-tested with a sample of shellfish gatherers and the presence of a biologist. The 
extraction ban levels are similar to the current management plans. Depending of the area of study, the number of shellfish 
gatherers working in each area is very different; therefore we chose the same levels for all areas of study and taking into account 
that in the MPA that we analyze there are around 20 women shellfish gatherers. Moreover, the levels of delay and improvement 
are an approximation because they vary according to the conditions of each area:  the number of workers, the degree of illegal 
activity and pollution, among others. We explain to participants that this is a hypothetical situation where we only try to 
understand their preferences.  
10 The time of delay is the waiting time plus the extraction ban. In order to consider non-linear time effects, the variable delay is 
included considering two out of the three possible levels 0.66 years (8 months), between 0.66 and 1.33 years (8 and 16 months), 
between 1.33 and 2 years (16 and 24 months) achieved.  
11 It is important to take into account that the number of shellfish gatherers is limited by the regional  government (Xunta de 
Galicia). Therefore, it is necessary to have a license (PERMEX) to work. Each year, the regional government evaluates whether 
the number of PERMEX can increase. 
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Table 3.1 Attributes description and levels 
Attributes Description Levels 
Delay 
Number of waiting years until 
the improvement is noticeable 
0.5  
(6 months) 
1  
(12 months) 
1.5  
(18 months) 
Improvement 
Percentage of improvement in 
the abundance of resources 
10% 15% 25% 
Extraction ban 
Number of years with extraction 
ban 
0.16  
(2 months) 
0.33  
(4 months) 
0.5 
(6 months) 
Coworkers 
Number of shellfish gatherers 
that could benefit from the 
conservation program 
20 40 60 
 
After defining the attributes and their levels, we proceeded to design the combination of 
choices to be presented to the respondents, employing the JMP program from SAS. 
Specifically, we included four attributes with three levels each. We specified a main effects 
model with one interaction effect (in order to obtain the discount factor). We obtained a 
choice of twelve cards with a 93.01% efficiency with respect to the optimal design. Finally we 
designed twelve choices sets for each respondent. Table 3.2 contains an example of the choice 
sets included. 
 
Table 3.2 Example of choice set card presented  
  
Management 
Plan A 
Management 
Plan B 
Management 
Plan C 
Does not endorse 
any management 
plan 
Delay 
0.5 
 (6 months) 
0.16 
 (2 months) 
0.33 
 (4 months)  
Improvement 10% 15% 25% 
 
Extraction ban 
1.5 
 (18 months) 
0.5 
 (6 months) 
1 
 (12 months)  
Coworkers 40 20 60   
Which Management Plan do you 
choose?    
 
3.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
We consider the existence of time preferences using a flexible framework in which 
hyperbolic discounting can be considered: 
0
0
( ,..., ) ( )
T
t
T t
t
U x x u x

               (3.1) 
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where  represents the utility obtained with the catch levels in each period t; 
where  is the utility obtained with catches in a specific period t,  is the parameter that 
allows the possibility of an hyperbolic discounting and  the discount factor. We analyze 
time preferences following Viscusi et al. (2008), who use a CE to estimate discount rates for 
environmental quality. With this aim, we included two specific attributes in our design: the 
time of delay and the improvement level experienced in the resource. Through the cross-
product of both characteristics, it is possible to estimate how participants value the 
improvement in the quantity of a resource that is now available, and how these values vary 
according to the average waiting time.  
 
Specifically, taking into account time preferences and the characteristics of the 
management plans, the utility function corresponding with our CE can be expressed as: 
 
1 2 3
2
4 5
0.66
*
ij ij ij
ij
t
ij ij ij
t
improvement extraction ban coworkers
delay delay improvement
U   
  


  
   
   0.66,...., 2t       (3.2) 
 
where  denotes the respondent and  denotes any of the alternatives proposed 
(management plans). To obtain the discount factors (δ) for the two different time periods, 1.33 
and 2 years (16 and 24 months), we apply the following formulation:  
 
5
1
*
1/
1
delay improvement
improvement
n



 
 
 
 
   1.33, 2t         (3.3) 
 
In order to motivate the theoretical model, it is important to take into account that the 
costs of the program are immediate while the benefits start at least after a period of 0.66 years 
(8 months
12
). That is, the extraction ban needs to start at the beginning of the conservation 
plan while the improvement in the abundance of the resource will happen then after some 
years required for biological growth. To study the tradeoffs between the present value of costs 
and future improvements, we consider the standard exponential discounting case with a 
                                                             
12 In our case and as a point of difference with the study of Viscusi et al. (2008), benefits start at least after 0.66 years (8 months) 
[0.16 years of extraction ban and 0.50 years of delay], because in fisheries it is not possible for benefits to begin immediately.  
0
( ,..., )
T
U x x
( )tu x 
t
i j
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constant annual discount factor . In this setting, there is a time where users cannot work 
(extraction ban) and a delay of t  years before the improvement begins. With a delay of t  
years, the discount factor is 
t . We suppose that the utility function is additively separable 
and linear in cost extraction ban and that the improvement in the level of abundance of 
resource is given by the improvement. Thus, the present value of the 5-year imposition of 
costs beginning after 0.66 years (8 months) is 2 3 4[1 ]extractionban        . In a similar 
fashion, the present value of the level of improvement in shellfish then of the time of closure 
is given by 2 3 4[1 ]timprovement        . As the terms in brackets are identical, the 
shellfish gatherer’s utility function reduces to ascertaining if the value of costs is greater than 
the future improvement ( )timprovement . The value of 1/ (1 )r   , where r  is the 
discount rate. Therefore,1/ (1 )tr  units of abundance of shellfish will result from 
improvements that begun immediately (in our case 0.66 years) and will be equivalent to a unit 
of abundance of shellfish improvement that begins after a period of t years. The cost of 
imposition will be valuable if the utility of the improvement in shellfish abundance in year is 
as least as great as (1 )tr  multiplied by the impact on utility of the annual cost. Therefore, 
through this application we aim to estimate the average tradeoff of users between the delay 
period and the improvement on the level of abundance of shellfish. In this case, we analyze 
time preferences for two delay periods, 1.33 and 2 years (16 and 24 months).  
 
If we consider the hyperbolic discounting, we need to consider a new parameter 0 1   
and 1  . Therefore the present value of the cost and of the improvement is multiplied by   
given that they include the discount factor and we exclude the initial period. Thus, the present 
value of the cost is 2 3 4[1 ]extractionban         and the improvement is 
2 3 4[1 ]timprovement        . The parameter    represents the reduction of the value 
of all delayed payoffs.  
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With the goal of testing the robustness of the results and analyzing the formulated 
research hypotheses, we extend equation (3.2) as follows: 
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0.66,..., 2t    (3.4) 
 
Where additional included variables are described and summarized in Table 3.3 (Section 
3.5). In particular, poaching implies that this illegal activity is seen as one of the major 
disputes in their areas; MPA identifies members of MPA; young represents individuals 
younger than 50 years of age; organized means that the users work in an organized way; little 
surveillance refers to one of the causes of poaching; lower income identifies individuals who 
earn less than €1000/per month; employment represents individuals who think that the 
generation of more jobs in their area is one of possible solutions to fight against poaching; 
experience represents individuals with less than 5 years of experience as shellfish gatherers; 
and social norm compliance represents the existence of this social norm.  
 
As an empirical strategy and in order to control for the potential heterogeneity of 
preferences, we estimate a Random Parameters Logit model (RPL)
13
. This model assumes 
that the functional form of utility and arguments are common among individuals within the 
sample, but that the parameters vary between individuals and this model does not assume the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. Moreover, we assume that the attribute delay is 
random and follows a normal distribution. The reason is that during surveys, we detected 
different opinions about this characteristic, ranging from very positive to negative. 
  
                                                             
13
 Previously, we estimated a Conditional Logit model, assuming the independence of the irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. 
In order to test whether the CL model is appropriate for our data, we employ the Hausman and McFadden test (1984), obtaining a 
Chi-square statistic of 19.65 following a Chi-squared of 6 degrees of freedom, with a p-value of 0.003. 
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3.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
3.4.1 Time preferences 
 
Our aim is to evaluate the effect of the time of delay with respect to the level of 
improvement that may be obtained in the future. Specifically in this case study, we expect that 
that cross products of delay*improvement are negatively decreasing the utility levels, 
although less than the delay. Our aim is to show that timing is important. 
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3.4.2 Illegal activity 
 
A second objective is to test the effect of illegal fishing. We expect that users who are 
concerned with illegal catching activities will be more impatient, and that therefore they will 
exhibit lower discount rates. Thus: 
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3.4.3 Marine Protected Areas: the effectiveness of co-management 
 
We expect that shellfish gatherers belonging to an MPA and who have permission to 
work in it act in a more sustainable way than the rest of the users. To assess this issue, we 
analyze the utility changes with respect to two of the attributes that conform the choice 
experiment for MPA members. We expect that the attribute coworkers carries a negative sign, 
implying that the entrance of more shellfish gatherers, and therefore the possibility of 
overexploitation is more negatively valued. 
 
0 11
1 11
: 0
: 0
H coworkers* MPA
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



              (3.7) 
 
On the contrary, we expect that the delay may be less negative than the average for users 
of MPA because this limitation will imply that the shellfish resource can grow.  
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3.4.4 Social norms 
 
Social norms are defined by Ostrom (2000) as “shared understandings about actions that 
are obligatory, permitted, or forbidden.” In the questionnaire, we asked about the level of 
compliance among their coworkers and their own level of compliance. We expect that as the 
norm was to fulfil the regulation, the obligation to respect it does not imply a negative effect 
on the utility level compared with the average, because this is seen as a part of their 
obligations. 
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             (3.9) 
 
With the aim of reflecting the social norm of compliance, we present a percentage scale 
in the survey that goes from 10% to 100% which is related to their level of individual 
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compliance, but also to the level of compliance of coworkers, where some participants chose 
higher percentages of compliance. To capture this social norm we also create a dummy 
variable that identifies those respondents who selected values of 80% or above.  
 
3.5 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
A face-to-face survey was conducted throughout 2013 and in the winter of 2014. 
Specifically, we obtained data from the different coastal provinces and one MPA. A sample of 
146 shellfish gatherers was interviewed. As mentioned, Marine Protected Areas (MPA) have 
been created in Galicia with the aim of fighting against overexploitation issues
14
. The MPA 
that we included in this research is located in the Northwest of Galicia (Spain), in Cedeira. It 
was created in 2009 (Xunta de Galicia, 2009) with the aim of maintaining biodiversity as well 
as preserving clean seas in which the exploitation of fishery resources is sustainable. 
Furthermore, this management tool allows for new socioeconomic opportunities for shellfish 
gatherers and also for the fishing communities through tourism and marine culture. All these 
facts are made possible through the recovery of population of exploited resources. 
 
Our survey solicited information about their work history, their working habits, their 
opinions about current legislation and perceived problems. Finally, socio-demographic 
characteristics were elicited in the last part of the survey. We observed that more than 93% of 
respondents were women, as expected in this activity. In addition, the average age of our 
sample is about 50 years. On average, the number of individuals who live in the same 
household is around 3.67 persons. With respect to the level of studies we found that 15.40%
15
 
of the respondents had a higher level of studies. In terms of income, we found that about 
72.70% of participants stated that they receive less than €1000 per month for their activity16. 
Furthermore, 22% of respondents are members of trade unions and 16.10% are members of an 
MPA. About 24.50% of the participants have less than 5 years of experience in their work and 
around 69.90% think that there is a coworker who acts as a leader in the group. In addition, 
around 37.76% of respondents work in this activity due to family links or tradition. Another 
                                                             
14 In Galicia, there are two MPA. Initially, we tried to include both areas as part of our study, although finally we included only 
one of them due to the impossibility of obtaining collaboration from the second area. 
15 Most of the sample had a basic level of studies, but had a perfect knowledge of their work and the sea. 
16 It is important to consider that they harvest about 15 days per month for a maximum of 4 hours per day. The general comment 
during the interview was that their income levels have decreased in a very significant way due to the economic crisis. 
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important aspect is that 83.22% of users affirm that they have taken courses and attended 
special training sessions on fishery management, but only 51.35% declare that these were 
useful for their daily fishing activity. In addition, around 37.10% of users believe that their 
coworkers and neighbors follow a norm of compliance. Around 73.40% of users comment 
that they work in an organized way. Furthermore, we also asked shellfish gatherers about their 
opinion regarding the main problems they face, to which they responded that the main 
problem is poaching (88.55%). We also found that they have concerns regarding pollution of 
the sea (67.95%) and climate change (52.80%). Around 20.22% also state that tourism 
activity as a problem. Therefore, it seems clear that they are working within an uncertain 
environment.  
 
In this sense, the users believe that the current rate of unemployment and the possibility 
of obtaining higher undeclared income are the main causes of the high level of illegal activity 
(61.87% and 68.00% respectively). They also mention low penalties, the existence of 
marginalized groups and limited surveillance (48.83%, 52.51% and 30.71%, respectively) as 
additional factors that encourage poaching activities. With regard to possible solutions to fight 
against poaching, these were indicated as the creation of new jobs (38.50%), more 
surveillance (44.70%), higher penalties (55.42%), controls over intermediaries (53.97%) or 
punishing poachers by having to carry out social work (49.14%). In addition, it is important to 
highlight that more than 81.80% of the participants state that poaching generates conflicts in 
their areas, and around 93% of respondents consider that this illegal activity is harming the 
resource. With respect to their opinion as to whether this activity is disapproved by society, 
around 30.80% believe that this is currently the case. (Table 3.3). 
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Table 3.3 Description of the variables 
Variable Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Choice Dependent variable 0.250 0.433 
Characteristics of Management Plans 
Delay 0.66 
1, if the delay attribute is less than 0.66 years (8 months); 0 
otherwise 
0.333 0.471 
Delay 1.33 
1, if the delay attribute is between 0.66 and 1.33 years (8-16 
months); 0 otherwise 
0.396 0.489 
Delay 2 
1, if the delay attribute is between 1.33 and 2 years (16 and 24 
months); 0 otherwise  
0.271 0.444 
Delay Attribute delay  0.956 0.657 
Improvement Attribute improvement (expressed in %) 11.457 8.225 
Delay1.33*improvement Cross product of the attribute of delay and improvement 6.147 8.493 
Delay2*improvement Cross product of the attribute of delay and improvement 3.957 6.991 
Extraction ban Attribute extraction ban  0.237 0.18 
Coworkers Attribute coworkers 27.914 21.112 
User’s characteristics 
Young 1, if the respondents age is less than 50 years; 0 otherwise 0.455 0.498 
Lower income 
1, if the respondents affirm that their monthly income is less than 
€1000; 0 otherwise 
0.727 0.445 
Experience 
1, if the respondents affirm that they have less than 5 years’ 
experience as a shellfish gatherer; 0 otherwise 
0.245 0.43 
MPA 
1 for respondents who are members of a Marine Protected Area; 0 
otherwise 
0.161 0.367 
Organized 
1, if respondents affirm that they work in an organized way; 0 
otherwise 
0.734 0.442 
User’s opinions 
Social norm  
compliance 
Social norm of compliance with law. This variable reflects that 
respondents answered that the level of compliance with the law is 
higher that 80% for themselves or their coworkers. 
0.371 0.483 
Employment 
1, if respondents think that the generation of more jobs will be the 
one of the solutions to poaching; 0 otherwise 
0.385 0.487 
Little surveillance 
1, if respondents think that one of the causes of poaching is the 
scant surveillance that exists; 0 otherwise 
0.307 0.461 
Poaching 
1, if respondents think that poaching is one of the main disputes in 
their area; 0 otherwise 
0.818 0.386 
 
3.6 RESULTS 
 
Table 3.4 presents the results of the baseline RPL model. As may be seen, all of the 
attributes included in the choice exercise are statistically significant. The improvement attribute 
carries a positive coefficient, representing an increase in the utility of shellfish gatherers. The 
possibility of new people entering (coworkers) is also perceived as positive on average. On the 
contrary, the coefficient associated with the delay and extraction ban both have negative signs, 
showing reductions in users’ utility. One interesting result is that although we indicated that there 
will be an economic subsidy to compensate for the time when gathering is prohibited, users 
perceive these restrictions as negative. We believe that in general, shellfish gatherers expect to 
110 
 
obtain more income from their work than the amount of compensation received (€1200/month). 
Another issue that was mentioned by the shellfish gatherers during the process of collecting the 
data was that they do not trust free subsidies. With regards to the cross product of the delay 
levels and the improvement attributes, (delay*improvement) we can see that they bring about a 
decrease in the utility level. This decrease in utility increases with the time of delay.  
 
Table 3.4 Results from the baselines RPL models 
 
Baseline 
Baseline with the effects of 
poaching 
Variable Coefficient. Std. Err. P>|z| Coefficient. Std. Err. P>|z| 
Mean 
Improvement 0.103 0.008 0.000 0.126 0.013 0.000 
Extraction ban -0.932 0.247 0.000 -0.938 0.247 0.000 
Coworkers 0.048 0.002 0.000 0.048 0.002 0.000 
Delay -0.819 0.223 0.000 -0.815 0.222 0.000 
Delay 1.33*improvement -0.027 0.008 0.001 -0.027 0.008 0.001 
Delay 2*improvement -0.045 0.011 0.000 -0.045 0.011 0.000 
Improvement*poaching  
 
-0.028 0.013 0.026 
Std. Dev. 
Delay 2.502 0.187 0.000 2.486 0.187 0.000 
Log likelihood -1597.683 
  
-1595.159 
  N 6864 
  
6864 
  
LR 
2
(1)  
 
596.030 
  
595.560 
  Prob > 0.000 
  
0.000 
  
 
With the aim of obtaining more information about the preferences of shellfish gatherers, 
we also estimate an extended RPL, the results for which are presented in Table 3.5. First, in 
order to test the correct empirical specification used, we tested for the presence of 
multicollinearity through the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) indicator with a mean of 3.27, 
which denotes that there are no serious correlation problems. All of the attributes are 
statistically significant and carry the expected signs.  
 
In the extended model we obtain similar conclusions with regards to the attributes 
included in the CE. In addition and with regards to the coworkers attribute, young shellfish 
111 
 
gatherers perceive the entrance of new colleagues (coworkers*young) as an element that 
decreases their utility levels with respect to the average. This may be a consequence of young 
users thinking about improving their current living conditions and the possibility that the 
arrival of a new member will decrease their benefits, taking into account the difficult situation 
that they are facing. On the contrary, users who affirm that they work in an organized way 
with their partners value more positively the possibility of new people entering, perhaps 
because they perceive the advantages of working in groups and cooperation 
(coworkers*organized). Moreover, we also find that for individuals who consider that one of 
the feasible solutions to poaching is the generation of new jobs, this does not imply that users 
positively value the entrance of new workers (coworkers*employment). With respect to the 
delay characteristic, the individuals who make less than €1000 value positively the waiting 
time, perhaps due to the fact that for these users this is a possibility of future higher income 
(delay*lowerincome). Finally, the shellfish gatherers with less experience positively value the 
extraction ban. This could be a consequence of the fact that they have more awareness 
(extraction ban*experience). 
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Table 3.5 Results from the extended RPL model. 
  Extended RPL model 
Variable Coefficient. Std. Err. P>|z| 
Mean 
Improvement 0.128 0.013 0.000 
Extraction ban -1.621 0.291 0.000 
Coworkers 0.055 0.004 0.000 
Delay -2.523 0.510 0.000 
Delay 1.33*improvement -0.027 0.008 0.001 
Delay 2*improvement -0.045 0.011 0.000 
Improvement*poaching  -0.026 0.012 0.034 
Delay*lower income 1.682 0.491 0.001 
Delay*social norm compliance 0.708 0.421 0.093 
Delay*little surveillance -0.295 0.431 0.493 
Delay*MPA 2.111 0.645 0.001 
Coworkers*MPA -0.037 0.005 0.000 
Coworkers*organized 0.013 0.004 0.003 
Coworkers*young -0.010 0.004 0.019 
Coworkers*employment -0.011 0.004 0.005 
Extraction ban*experience 2.476 0.536 0.000 
Std. Dev. 
Delay 2.382 0.187 0.000 
Log likelihood -1544.843 
  N 6864 
  
LR 
2
(1)  
 
531.710 
  
Prob >
2
  
0.000 
  
 
3.6.1 Hypotheses Results: 
 
3.6.1.1 Time preferences 
 
Attending to the time preferences, we find that the coefficients associated with the cross 
product (delay*improvement) are negative. Therefore they show the negative effect of the 
waiting time in spite of the improvement. Thus, in Table 3.6 we can observe the variations of 
the obtained discount factors and discount rates estimated at the maximum levels, depending 
on the waiting time. The displayed discount factor for 1.33 years (16 months) of delay is 
estimated as 0.914 (9.4% of discount rates for the baseline and extended models; while they 
are around 0.937 for a period of 2 years (24 months) (6.7% of discount rate). Therefore, we 
observe that users are quite impatient if we compare their discount rate with the annual 
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interest rate in the financial market, which has been around 4% since 2013 (INE, 2014). It is 
important to consider that following Hotelling’s rule, and Johnson and Saunders (2014), 
individuals with higher discount factors are more inclined towards resource conservation. On 
the contrary, individuals with lower discount factors and more present bias would be more 
inclined towards unsustainable levels of resource exploitation. Another important issue is the 
income level of individuals. It is also crucial to consider the environment in which the users 
work, the age of the respondents and the current situation of poaching and over-extraction. As 
previously mentioned, the average age of this sample is around 50 years, and so we believe 
that a large part of the sample may be considering retirement, and thinking more about the 
present than the future. The current economic downturn has also reduced their income to a 
considerable extent (according to comments that users made when we conducted the surveys), 
and therefore they are seeking to increase their income rapidly. Dupoux and Martinet (2014) 
suggest that differences in income generate different preferences, either in terms of 
environmental preferences or in terms of time preferences. In addition, Holden et al. (1998) 
suggest a link between poverty and discount rates. They state that higher discount rates 
appeared to be driven up by poverty and liquidity constraints. On the contrary, Moseley 
(2001) argues that poor individuals may have lower discount rates because they are often 
willing to sacrifice current consumption to save assets for the future as a survival strategy. 
Holden (2014) notes that individuals who live in risky environments will not survive if they 
are too short-sighted and do not plan their survival strategies in a careful way. Finally, taking 
into account the current risky situation may be logical in order to find higher discount factors. 
As a consequence, we believe that these may be aspects that explain a certain degree of 
impatience. When we compare our results with the results obtained in previous studies, we 
find that Curtis (2002) obtained a mean discount factor through a CE of 0.70 over an eight-
year horizon for fishermen in the Irish Sea; Akapalu (2008) found that fishing boat skippers in 
Ghana show a mean discount factor of 0.43. Johnson and Saunders (2014) found that discount 
factors vary from 0.40 to 1.0.  
 
In addition, as may be seen in Table 3.6, discount factors increase over time. Therefore, 
there is a possibility of hyperbolic discounting. We have included the parameter to allow for 
this possibility. First, we test whether the differences between them are statistically significant 
using a t-test of mean differences, obtaining a t-value of 3300 and p-value of 0.000. Thus, our 
 

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results confirm the presence of hyperbolic discounting. We calculate the value of the  
parameter following Viscusi et al. (2008). To do this we analyze the utility of the 
improvement after 1.33 years (16 months) ( 1.33 2 3 4[1 ]improvement        ) and after 
2 years (24 months) ( 2 2 3 4[1 ]improvement        ). Then, we obtain the ratio of 
these utilities, obtaining a δ of 0.983 and a   of 0.13
17
. 
 
3.6.1.2 Illegal activity 
 
In order to analyze the influence of this problem on the behavior of current users, we 
include a cross product as the improvement*poaching. Our aim is to analyze how discount 
factors vary with the poaching effects (Table 3.6). We find that users become slightly more 
impatient, with a decrease in the discount factor (0.894 for 1.33 years of delay and 0.922 for 2 
years) and the subsequent increase in discount rates (11.9% and 8.49% respectively). In 
addition, if we take into account the results of the extended model we also observe that 
discount factors vary between 0.895 and 0.923 (for 1.33 and 2 years, respectively), while the 
discount rates are around 11.7% for 1.33 years and 8.3% for 2 years of delay. However, as in 
the extended model we include more indicators, given that discount factors can be influenced 
for more issues than poaching (MPA, education, age, among others). In order to analyze 
whether the marginal impact of these variables is statistically significant, we conduct a test of 
means between the discount factors, with and without poaching. We obtained t-test values for 
the baseline model of 175.719 and 175.275, for 1.33 and 2 years of delay respectively, with p-
values of 0.000. Similar t-test values were obtained for the extended model. Therefore, we 
confirm that poaching affects the time preferences of users in a significant way. In this sense, 
we believe that if the current situation is not improved, this could have severe implications for 
legitimate users, because, as already mentioned, the results suggest that users may become 
more aggressive with regard to extraction levels. 
  
                                                             
17 We take into account the ratio of the utility of zero delay (in our case less than 0.66 years) to the utility obtained after 1.33 
years of delay, which produces: . Then, we substitute for the value of δ of 0.983. 

2 3 4
1.33 2 3 4
0.103 [1 ]
0.091 [1 ]
improvement
improvement
   
    
   

   
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Table 3.6 Estimated discount factors 
 
Without poaching 
 
1.33 years (16 months) 2 years (24 months) 
 
Mean 95% Conf. Interval Mean 95% Conf. Interval 
Baseline model with the effects of poaching 
Discount factor 0.914 0.914-0.914 0.937 0.937-0.937 
Discount rate (%) 9.406 9.405-9.407 6.717 6.716-6.718 
Extended model 
Discount factor 0.914 0.914-0.914 0.937 0.937-0.937 
Discount rate (%) 9.445 9.444-9.446 6.732 6.731-6.733 
 
With poaching 
 
1.33 years (16 months) 2 years (24 months) 
 
Mean 95% Conf. Interval Mean 95% Conf. Interval 
Baseline model with the effects of poaching 
Discount factor 0.894 0.893-0.894 0.922 0.922-0.922 
Discount rate (%) 11.92 11.892-11.948 8.495 8.475-8.515 
Extended model 
Discount factor 0.895 0.895-0.895 0.923 0.923-0.923 
Discount rate (%) 11.741 11.715-11.766 8.353 8.335-8.371 
 
3.6.1.3 Marine Protected Areas 
 
With respect to the formulated hypothesis, we find that members of an MPA have a greater 
economic understanding of the implications of the attributes of the program, on average, given 
that they reduce their utility levels as a consequence of the introduction of coworkers 
(coworkers*MPA). However, it is important to consider that this result could be influenced by 
the fact that there are fewer workers in the MPA than in the other areas. On the contrary, they 
value less negatively the waiting time (delay) to allow stocks to recover (delay*MPA).  
 
Our results are in line with those of previous studies. Perez de Oliveira (2013) studied the 
case of one area in Galicia (Lira), where after years of overfishing, illegal fisheries and the 
consequences of the Prestige oil spill, a fishermen’s organization pioneered the creation of a 
marine reserve. He found that involving fishermen in this process brought about a better 
understanding of norms, and improved compliance with current regulations. The same study also 
concluded that the effectiveness of the marine reserve was very high during the first few years, 
but that recently this has been undermined due to the reduction of financial support. Moreover, 
other studies highlight the importance of the involvement of users in management strategies. For 
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example, Arlinghaus and Mehner (2005) evaluated the preferences of recreational anglers, 
finding that anglers should be considered in the design and implementation of management 
programs in order to facilitate their knowledge about the outcomes and risks of policy options. 
Stewart et al. (2013) analyze stakeholders’ perspectives of the stalked barnacles in a national 
park of Portugal, concluding that the majority of stakeholders believe that the resource was 
overharvested and that their needs should be considered as part of the legislation process. More 
recently, Ovando et al. (2013) also analyzed the benefits of “cooperative fisheries,” showing that 
they often coordinate harvesting activities and lead direct conservation actions, such as the 
establishment of MPAs. Afflerbach et al. (2014) analyzed the functioning of marine reserves 
together with TURFs, arguing that the success of marine reserves as tools to improve the 
sustainability of fisheries can be limited without additional management actions such as TURFs. 
 
3.6.1.4 Social norms 
 
With respect to the third hypothesis, the effect of social norms on compliance with rules, we 
find that the delay does not decrease the utility levels compared with the average for those who 
do comply. This may be a consequence of the fact that shellfish gatherers following the norm do 
not suffer losses in terms of utility with these restrictions (delay*social norm compliance). 
Therefore, it seems that social norms are important factors that should be taken into account 
when proposing management programs that require certain types of conduct.  
 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study, we model shellfish gatherers’ preferences for management plans through a CE, 
specifically considering the role of economic incentives as well as the role of social norms. We 
find important conclusions that policy makers may take into account when designing effective 
conservation recovery programs. Specifically, we observe that shellfish gatherers positively 
value the improvement of the resource and the possibility of the arrival of new coworkers. On the 
contrary, shellfish gatherers negatively value the delay and the extraction ban even though this 
latter aspect was compensated with an economic subsidy.  
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Another important factor that should be taken into account in the design of new effective 
policies is the effectiveness of the MPA, where the principles proposed by Ostrom (1990) 
function as tools to preserve the resource. In this sense, shellfish gatherers involved in an MPA 
behave in a more conservative fashion in terms of their extraction preferences, understanding the 
effect of the delay attribute. Therefore, the involvement of users in the management process may 
be an effective solution in terms of sustainability. Nevertheless, it is important to take into 
account in this time of crisis that enforcement and compliance are important factors in order to 
achieve effective results from marine reserves (Afflerbach et al. 2014). Thus, the reduction of 
economic subsidies from the public administration could imply the loss of effectiveness from 
this management system. 
 
Attending to time preferences, we observe that in our sample of shellfish gatherers in 
Galicia, the discount factor for a delay of 1.33 years (16 months) is about 0.914 (9.4% of 
discount rate) while for 2 years (24 months) it is around 0.937 (6.7% of discount rate). In this 
sense, we detected that users become more impatient if they consider poaching. In this case, 
Ostrom (1990) pointed out that discount rates are affected by the “physical and economic 
security faced by appropriators.” 
 
We also conclude that social norms matter. This is an important result, given that in this area 
of study, despite the application of TURFs
18
, management problems still exist and therefore the 
consideration of social norms could help management strategies. Specifically, we find that in a 
small society where the fulfillment of the norm is the general rule, the establishment of 
restrictions is accepted without producing a decrease in the utility.  
 
In this paper we contribute to the literature on fisheries management by examining one area 
where TURFs are not as successful as may have been anticipated. Specifically, we conclude that 
establishing TURFs is not sufficient to achieve successful results. Thus, the key features 
proposed by Wiley et al. (2012) to obtain effective results, such as a closed group of users, 
boundary enforcement and providing proper incentives seem to be very important. In our area of 
study, these are failing, because users are not protected from poachers, and so they do not have 
incentives to carry out a sustainable behavior. It is important to remember that only 37% of the 
                                                             
18
 We cannot test the effectiveness of the establishment of TURFs in terms of total catching, as there are no data available prior 
to TURFs. 
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users believe in higher levels of compliance from their coworkers, and also have to deal with 
pollution episodes and the impacts of climate change; therefore it seems that this risky 
environment with regards to their payoffs, without taking the current economic crisis into 
account, is affecting their conservation preferences. This means their incentives toward 
sustainable behavior are diminished. Therefore, policymakers should be taking into account the 
effectiveness of MPA, the time preferences of users and the role that social norms may play in 
shellfish gatherers’ preferences when they design management policies.  
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4. SHARING THE GAINS AND 
SHARING THE PAINS IN FOREST 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Abstract 
One of the most common tools in economics, to analyze individuals’ decisions, is the Public 
Good Games (PGG). In this study we conducted a PGG with a sample of users of a common 
pool resource (CPR). Individuals have an endowment of money and have to decide the amount 
to be allocated into a common fund to preserve and manage the CPR. A key difference from 
previous studies is the inclusion of a sanction, to be shared out across the group. Our goal is to 
analyze the factors that motivate the sharing of the contribution to the CPR, as well as factors 
affecting the willingness to share the sanction. In addition, we test the compliance of the 
principles of collective action, proposed by Ostrom (1990), and their implications in the 
management of PGG. We have found that in line with previous literature, individuals are willing 
to share an important amount of the endowment with their neighbors. However, in the case of the 
sanction, users prefer that the common fund pays their amount of respective penalties.   
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Traditional economic theory argues that individuals are rational and selfish. In terms of 
environmental resource markets, the most typical result will be non-cooperation and free-riding 
behavior; thus, zero cooperation is the result predicted for most environmental resource 
extraction games (Hardin, 1968). However, several studies have shown that deviations from the 
output of traditional economic theory take place (Gächter and Herrmann, 2006). Specifically, 
Ostrom (1990) pointed out that communities can govern their natural resources without 
overharvesting. To test this hypothesis of rational and selfish individuals, some of the most used 
tools in economic literature have been the Public Good Games (PGG). Ostrom et al. (1992) have 
argued the possibility that in common pool resources (CPR) individuals reach successful 
agreements to manage resources efficiently. In this sense, provision of information, 
communication and the possibility of sanctioning are important factors that can help 
management strategies. Other studies analyze important factors to sustain cooperation. Fehr and 
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Fischbacher (2003) stated that individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruist and 
selfish people are crucial in cooperation, as well as the environment in which these individuals 
act. According to their results more altruist individuals can influence selfish ones. More recently, 
Rustagi et al. (2010) indicate that structural factors, such as the characteristics of the resource, 
the size of the group and socioeconomic differences, and other social behaviors such as 
conditional cooperation or costly enforcement of the norm can explain these deviations. 
Cardenas (2011) emphasizes that it is necessary to take part in the conflict between self-interest 
and group interest to avoid overexploitation. In this respect, literature has focused significantly 
on the role that institutions, regulations and economic incentives can play. Nevertheless, studies 
such as Cardenas (2011) conclude that policymakers should also take into account that their 
regulations can alter the normative behavior of users, as they combine the valuation of the 
regulation with their subjective thoughts regarding this mechanism. Janssen et al. (2013) also 
emphasize that it is important to allow for the enforcement of rules and social norms as they can 
act as complements or substitutes. Therefore, aspects such as communication, information, 
sanctioning, social behavior and others factors, including the characteristics of resources, or of 
the environment, matter.    
 
In this study, we conduct a modified one shot linear Public Good Game (PGG) in a CPR 
with users of the resource. With this PGG our aim is to analyze forest owners’ decisions in a 
parallel setting to reality. Thus, throughout this game we set out an amount of money that has to 
be shared out and assume each individual makes a decision freely. In this sense, the PGG has 
been adapted as much as possible to a real situation familiar for our participants. In addition, we 
evaluate whether the principles of collective action (Ostrom, 1990) are functioning in our area of 
study and their derived implications in the PGG decisions. Our objective is to introduce some 
novelties with regards to previous literature. In this sense we include a sanction to be shared out 
and compare attitudes with regards to sharing. We did not find any other study which analyzes 
this kind of economic incentive with CPR owners in a PGG. Furthermore, we also evaluate some 
aspects that have received little consideration in the literature. In particular, we analyze users’ 
decisions instead of using laboratory experiments with students. We test the effect of different 
amounts of endowment in a PGG. Next, we test the effects of collective action principles in 
users’ decisions. Throughout this study, we hope to shed light on the kind of economic 
incentives which are better in terms of promoting more cooperative results (rewards vs. 
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punishments). Cooperation among users may increase sustainable management and encourage 
other conservation policies.  
 
4.1.1 Area of study 
 
Our area of study is located in the North West of Spain, Galicia. This is one of the most 
important forest areas of Europe. This forest surface is about 1.4 million hectares, which 
represents 48% of the total territory. Furthermore, more than 120,000 hectares correspond to 
certified forest surface, which places Galicia at the head of Spain in terms of sustainable forest 
management (Xunta de Galicia, 2014). The main problems of this sector are related to the 
abandonment of traditional forest practices due to de-population (Gómez- Vázquez et al. 2009) 
and the presence of forest fires. Barreal et al. (2012) highlight that Spain is one of the five 
countries with the most fires in the South of Europe. Within Spain, Galicia suffers around 45% 
of the total country´s wildfires, representing 23% of affected surface. A study conducted by 
Ponte and Bandín (2008) (members of the police department) indicates that since the 1990s, 
forest fires in this region have turned into a social disturbance.  
 
Given this context, it is important to analyze the management of Galician forests: 98% of the 
territory is managed by private owners and 2% is owned by the public sector (Gómez-Vázquez et 
al. 2009). The private forests are managed both by single owners, as well as collective owners 
known as communal forests (Comunidade de Montes Veciñais en Man Común, CMVMC). 
There are around 2,800 communal forests which occupy about 700,000 ha (Xunta de Galicia, 
2014). The Spanish Government (2012) defines them as “private forests, with independence of: 
origin, productive capacity, current utilization and agrarian vocation, are of the neighbors´ 
communities. In addition, communal forests are exploited in a community regimen, without 
allocation of quotas among neighbors. Furthermore, these forests are indivisible, inalienable, 
imprescriptible and indefeasible goods.” Thus, we are studying a CPR, given that forests in our 
area of study are excludable.  
 
Communal forests have existed for centuries and have played an important role in 
agriculture (Caballero, 2014). They were regulated under a common law until the year 1968
1
, 
                                                             
1 This law is available at: https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-1968-904  
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when an institutional framework for communal forests was established, without individual 
quotas of property. These communities are also a signal of identity, of Galician culture and are 
an economic and productive indicator, due to the creation of jobs and wealth (Xunta de Galicia, 
2014). To be a member of the communal forest the individual has to reside in the local 
community and attend meetings and assemblies, where one member of each household or family 
is represented and decisions about the CPR are taken collectively. One important issue that has 
been detected in Galicia is that in areas where communal forests are present, the incidence of 
forest fires is lower. In this sense, Fuentes-Santos et al. (2013) show that 61.52% of forest fires 
occur in forests where there exists private land management (which represents about 65% of 
forests); 15.88% in public land management (roughly 2% of forests) and the rest (22.59%) in 
collective management (about 33% of forests).  
 
However, conflicts among communal forests also arise. Internal conflicts highlight 
disagreements among commoners, whereas external conflicts demonstrate conflicts involving 
various parties: between neighbor communities and government organizations (based on different 
perspectives between owners and government); with enterprises (cession rights of resources and 
their uses); but the most important are external socio-economic and environmental conflicts with 
NGOs (Gómez-Vázquez et al. (2009) ). 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the PGG, while 
section 4.3 presents the empirical approach. Data description is in section 4.4. Section 4.5 shows 
the main results while the paper concludes with a final discussion in section 4.6. 
 
4.2 PUBLIC GOOD GAME  
 
Field experiments have shown that the hypothesis of selfish and rational behavior is not 
always true. One of the most typical mechanisms to analyze individuals´ decisions with respect 
to public goods is the PGG or a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Isaac and Walker, 1988). 
Brekke et al. (2011) state that the understanding of how individuals make voluntary 
contributions is important. This game is played by n individuals. All individuals i  receive an 
endowment e  and simultaneously and independently decide whether to keep this endowment for 
themselves or invest a given amount  0,ig e  in the CPR. The total amount contributed by all n  
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participants together equals ig g , where 0 ig e   is multiplied by a number m , with 
1 m n  , and mg is divided equally among all participants. As m n , the individual´s return, 
obtained from the amount contributed to the group fund, is smaller than the amount that would 
have been kept to oneself ( / )i img n g . Therefore, when the PGG is played once, and 
considering that players are rational and selfish in maximizing utility, contributing nothing is a 
dominant strategy. However, since 1m  the joint group outcome ne g mg  is maximized 
when everybody contributes with the endowment full. Every participant would then be better off 
compared to when all contribute nothing ( )me e . Thus, individual rational behavior leads to a 
Pareto suboptimal outcome, making the PGG a social dilemma (Dawes, 1980). Following 
Ostrom et al. (1992) and taking into account our study we can express the utility function of 
users as: 
 
( ) 0
( / ) 0
i i
i i i
u g e if g
e g mg n if g
 
   
            (4.1) 
 
A recent paper by Chaudhuri (2011) conducts a survey about the PGG literature. The main 
conclusions of this study are that the most typical issues analyzed in PGG are conditional 
cooperation, costly punishments and others means to sustain cooperation. In addition, this author 
also highlights that until 1995 the main conclusions obtained with respect to the investment in 
public goods are that in one-shot experiments the contribution is on average 40% and 60% of the 
optimal level with large variations from 100% to 0%. In addition, when individuals play the 
game repeatedly, contributions decline over time and more participants choose to “free-ride” 
(Ledyard, 1995). Fehr and Gintis (2007) find two types of behavior: free-rider or conditional 
cooperators. The first type corresponds to those who never contribute to a public good, and the 
second to those who increase their contribution when they expect that others will also contribute. 
Specifically, Fischbacher et al. (2001) conducted a PGG, finding that around 50% of the subjects 
can be classified as conditional cooperators. Furthermore, the key factors that favor the 
cooperation among individuals are communication, the establishment of a threshold and a higher 
marginal per capita return. Nevertheless, there are others factors that can also influence choices; 
for example: gender, the size of the group, and reciprocal motivations, among others. Ostrom et 
al. (1992) stated that information, communication and sanctions can help to reach agreements 
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efficiently. Andreoni (1995) concludes that studies of preferences for cooperation should also be 
considered in the analysis.  
 
The possibility of sanctions has been extensively studied in previous literature. Thus, Fehr 
and Gächter (2000) show through a PGG that cooperators, can be willing to punish free-riders 
even when this is costly for them. Croson (2007) has studied three theories to explain decisions 
made in PGG: those of commitment, altruism, and reciprocity; concluding that in the reciprocity 
model, contributions made by individuals are positively related to the contributions of others, or 
with their beliefs about those contributions. Janssen et al. (2013) found that distrust in 
regulations may influence individuals to break the rules. Van Miltenburg et al. (2014) describe 
that both punishments and rewards are effective means to establish cooperation in social 
dilemmas.  
 
In this study we conducted a modified one shot PGG where members of communal forests 
have to make a decision about how to share both: a reward and a punishment. First, our PGG is 
modified due to the fact that we do not create explicit groups of users, but rather, single users are 
told to consider the rest of the members (50 members
2
) in their decisions. Therefore, the group 
under consideration will be composed of all users. A second important aspect to take into 
account is that the contributions to the fund will allow different management efforts in forests to 
be carried out, from which the community will benefit, specified as 40% over the initial amount 
invested
3
. In addition, our PGG is described as a real situation that collective owners can face as 
owners of the communal forest. According to the last Law of 2012
4
 that manages communal 
forests, the earnings of forest communities have to be split following this rule: at least 40% has 
to be reinvested while 60% can be reinvested or can be assigned to buy forests; improve the 
value of the forest in terms of heritage, cultural and environmental issues; use for public services 
or share out benefits among communal owners. In addition, and as stated, we also include a 
sanction to be shared out. It is important to highlight that the game is conducted through an 
interview and no real money is being played. Bethwaite and Tompkinson (1996) also carry out 
an Ultimatum Game in the same fashion. In addition, we pay special attention to the question of 
                                                             
2 We have chosen 50 members as we contacted communities with a great variety in terms of the number of users. Therefore, we 
explained that this is a hypothetical situation. According to Balboa et al. (2006) the average number of owners by communal 
forest is about 54. 
3 In the case of the “punishment” the return has no sense. 
4 This law is available at: http://www.xunta.es/dog/Publicados/2012/20120723/AnuncioC3B0-050712-0001_es.html  
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the size of the reward and punishment. Figures 4.1a and 4.1b show the game presented to forest 
owners. One of the objectives of this paper is to analyze which economic incentives promote 
more cooperative behavior: a reward or a punishment?  
 
Figure 4.1a: Case A: Reward 
Imagine that you are a member of a communal forest that is formed by 50 neighbors. Your community has 
received a reward by the “Law against fires” as a consequence of the effort that this communal forest 
organization has made to fight against forest fires and the good condition of the forest. These funds can be used 
freely by collective owners. Therefore, you can collect your proportional amount or reinvest it in the community 
fund. The amount that you deposit in the fund will be used to finalize works in the forest from which the 
community will obtain some benefits equivalent to 40% of the initial amount invested. Using the following table, 
please indicate your preference: 
 
Reward When splitting the reward among 50 
members,  you have the right to: 
I take: I deposit in the fund: 
If the reward is €500 €10   
If the reward is €5,000 €100   
If the reward is €50,000 €1,000   
 
Figure 4.1b: Case B: Punishment 
Imagine that you are a member of a communal forest that is formed by 50 neighbors. Your community has been 
punished by the “Law against fires” as a consequence of an inadequate effort, made by this communal forest 
organization to fight against forest fires and due to the very poor condition of the forest. This amount of money 
can be paid by collective owners or a community fund. Therefore, you can pay your proportional amount or you 
can decide that the community fund pay your amount. In the following table, please indicate your preference: 
 
Punishment As there are 50 members, splitting the 
punishment you should pay: 
I pay: The fund pays: 
If the punishment is €500 €10   
If the punishment is €5,000 €100   
If the punishment is €50,000 €1,000   
 
Another important goal is to understand the role that social norms and social factors play 
when individuals have to make decisions of sharing out an economic incentive. Thus, we also 
test, whether the principles of collective action proposed by Ostrom (1990) are being complied 
with, as well as the implications when individuals face decisions. The questions asked to 
commoners can be seen in Section 4.5.2 (Table 4.3). 
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4.3 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
 
4.3.1 Empirical Model 
 
We model individuals’ allocations as a function of the size of the reward vs. the punishment, 
the social characteristics of individuals and the most relevant socio-economic characteristics, 
among other variables. To that end, we estimate an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Using the 
Szroeter (1978) test, we assessed the presence of heteroskedasticity, finding that the test carries a 
value of 23.32 for a Chi-squared with 1 degree of freedom and an associated p-value of 0.00 in 
the case of the reward. Therefore, we conclude that there is some evidence of heteroskedasticity. 
For the case of punishment, the test carries a value of 0.01 for a Chi-squared with 1 degree of 
freedom and a p-value of 0.91, indicating no heteroskedasticity. To deal with this problem we 
estimate an OLS clustered by the communal forests from which respondents are members. The 
dependent variables in this regression equation are the vectors of the total distributions (rewards 
and punishments), labeled as (Y ); the vector of explanatory variables ( iX ) is grouped into four 
categories that include: the endowment size sX ; the forest and forest management characteristics 
fX , and the socio-economic characteristics, seX ; the social characteristics of interviewers, scX ; 
while the vector ( )L is the latent indicator that represents the principles of collective action 
obtained through factor analysis. 
 
The OLS model corresponds to the estimation of the following equation: 
 
          0 ,i s se scsi sei sci i if fiY X X X X L       (4.2) 
 
where  is the usual constant term, the corresponding   are the coefficients associated 
with the respective explanatory variables to be estimated, and   is a vector of error term, 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d). We estimate four OLS models to explain the 
distribution of rewards and punishments with and without the effect of the principles of 
collective action. 
0
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4.3.2 Research Hypothesis 
 
Furthermore, we analyze whether the size of the reward or punishment to share out, 
influences the decisions of collective owners. We expect that different sizes of the endowment 
will imply different allocations into the fund. In this sense, Anderson et al. (1998) found that 
contributions increase with the endowment and Andersen et al. (2011) concluded that stakes 
matter in the Ultimatum Games. Therefore our aim is to test whether this issue also occurs in our 
PGG. 
 
0
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: 10 100 1000 0
se se se
se se se
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H
  
  
  
  
     (4.3) 
 
4.3.3 Factor Analysis 
 
With the aim to incorporate the principles of collective action in the regression models, we 
conducted a factor analysis to reduce the several variables obtained from the survey of owners to 
the most relevant variables for our analysis (See Table 4.3). 
 
Factor analysis is a statistical technique used for data reduction purposes and it is commonly 
used in social sciences (Harman, 1976). Thus, we employ this technique to reduce the set of 
responses to the principles of collective action to a small number of latent explanatory factors 
that affect the forest owners’ decisions. We assume that there are a number of unobservable 
factors or latent variables that account for the correlations among the observed variables such 
that, when latent variables are constants, the partial correlations among observed variables 
become zero (Loureiro et al. 2013). Therefore, these factors determine the observed variables, 
which in our particular case study are the responses to the principles of collective action (Table 
4.3).  
 
The empirical results that we obtain from this factor analysis will allow us to incorporate 
latent constructs into the analysis of factors that motivate the allocations of money received by 
respondents. We extract the initial motivation factors underlying the responses by employing the 
eigenvalue rule to select the optimal number of factors and to perform confirmatory analysis of 
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the factors. Then, we estimate the various motivational factors. To conclude, we include the 
estimated factors into the analysis of the fund allocations. 
 
4.4 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
A face-to-face and online survey were carried out in north-west Spain, in the region of 
Galicia, from 2013 until summer 2014, interviewing a sample of 96 forest owners. Two types of 
surveys were designed with the same questions but one version includes the PGG as a reward 
and the other as a punishment. The survey requested information about the characteristics of 
communal forests, from which they are members, with the objective to reflect members’ 
knowledge. In addition, we also included questions related to their opinion of public authorities, 
and the way in which decisions relating to forest questions are made. Moreover, the survey also 
included questions to test whether the principles of collective action were functioning. The PGG 
was presented in another section of the questionnaire and included some questions to understand 
the degree of effort made by members, to maintain a forest in good condition and therefore 
assesses their opinion of other forest owners’ efforts. It is important to highlight that the PGG 
was conducted individually. The same strategy was employed by Haughli (2014) with the goal of 
promoting comprehension amongst participants. Finally, socio-demographic characteristics were 
elicited in the last part of the survey.  
 
With the data collected in both surveys (the reward and punishment versions) we find that 
74.44% of the respondents are men. In addition, the average age of our sample is about 54.75 
years, and the number of individuals who live in the same household is around 3.07 persons. 
With respect to the level of studies we found that 45.88% of the respondents have a basic level of 
studies or no studies (primary education). With respect to income-related questions, we detected 
that about 31.32% of participants make less than €1,500/monthly (less €1500) in these rural 
communities.  
 
With regards to the characteristics of forests and forest management, more than 34.44% of 
respondents affirm to be collective owners of forests with less than 100 ha (forest size). With 
respect to the number of members, about 51.11% of the forests have more than 100 communal 
members (over 100 members). In addition, we asked respondents about the degree of forest 
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conservation in their community, and 48.32% of respondents affirm that the forest conservation 
status is quite strong. Nevertheless, around 27.77% of respondents think that the future of 
forestry over the coming 50 years will worsen (poor future for forestry). Moreover, we find that 
33.33% of users mention that the last fire that they remember was in last 5 years (last fire). 
 
Regarding the owners’ opinion about the main problems that forests are facing in their areas, 
32.58% mentioned the de-population of rural areas as the principal worrying issue. Furthermore, 
28.08% stated negligence with respect to the care of forests, and with a similar % forest fires 
were mentioned by 28.07% of respondents. Moreover, 15.73% indicated low economic 
profitability as the main issue facing forestry today. In addition, other tree diseases were 
mentioned by 14.61% of users. Finally, the invasion of non-native species and the over-
exploitation or de-forestations were also commented on by 8.97% and 3.36% of the commoners, 
respectively. 
 
From an economic point of view, 6.23% of users indicate that they are moderately 
competitive (forests create some additional sources of income but they are not a fixed source of 
income). Moreover, we find that around 64.44% mention that the last time when they sold timber 
was at least 5 years ago (last timber sold). About 54.44% believe that the public administration is 
dealing with forest problems badly or quite badly (poor administration). With the goal to know 
more about the effort that they put in forest tasks, we asked about their level of effort compared 
with the rest of the owners; 32.22% state that their own effort is higher than the rest of the 
members (greater effort); while 20.45% think that the rest of the owners do the necessary tasks 
to keep the forest in good condition (commoners do tasks). We obtain more information about 
their own work asking about their degree of participation in activities promoted by communal 
forests; 66.66% of respondents said they participate all or most of the time. 
 
With the aim of obtaining more information about their social characteristics, we included 
questions to know whether they were born in forest locations, with 72.22% answering in the 
affirmative (place born). About 55.55% responded that their relationships with the rest of owners 
are very or quite good (very good relationship). Furthermore, 58.88% of owners agree with the 
following sentence: “The majority of my community members can be trusted” (trust in 
neighbors). In addition, 46.66% of individuals indicated that their decisions are made with the 
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family and not individually (decisions in family). To gain insight into their time preferences, we 
evaluated the degree of agreement or disagreement with the following sentence: “Forest 
management will have to be undertaken thinking more about present than future generations” 
(present before future). We find that 17.77% agree with this statement. We also find that 13.33% 
confirm experiencing the following feeling: “Often, I give things without expecting anything in 
return” (give free). While 26.66% affirm feeling the following often or very often:  “Sometimes, 
I think that it is not fair that some people work less and have the same rights as me” (not fair). 
We also asked landowners whether they think that they have a leader to deal with forest issues 
and 63.33% responded in an affirmative way (leader). Furthermore, 28.57% of respondents are 
members of trade unions (trade union). To conclude, around 37.64% of the respondents 
confirmed occupying or have occupied a position of responsibility in their area, and 26.66% 
affirmed feeling more connected to left wing parties (left wing). It is important to highlight that 
this description of our sample is based on both versions of the survey (reward and punishment). 
In Table 4.1, we show the summary statistics for the variables analyzed, differentiating between 
the reward and punishment versions. 
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics 
  
Reward Punishment 
Variable Description Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Fund 
Amount of money allocated  or taken from the 
fund 323.120 402.883 344.573 447.498 
Size of endowment 
e10 
1, if the size of the individual reward or 
punishment is €10; 0 otherwise 0.333 0.473 0.333 0.473 
e100 
1, if the size of the individual reward or 
punishment is €100; 0 otherwise 0.333 0.473 0.333 0.473 
e1000 
1, if the size of the individual reward or 
punishment is €1000; 0 otherwise 0.333 0.473 0.333 0.473 
Characteristics related to forestry and forest management  
Forest size 
1, if the size of forest is equal or less than 100 
ha; 0 otherwise 0.490 0.502 0.170 0.378 
Poor future 
for forestry 
1, if owners think that over a period of 50 years 
the future of forestry will be poor; 0 otherwise 0.224 0.419 0.341 0.476 
Over 100 
members 
1, if the numbers of commoners is higher than 
100; 0 otherwise 0.633 0.484 - - 
Poor 
administration 
1, if owners think that the management of 
forestry carried out by the administration is very 
or quite poor; 0 otherwise 0.510 0.502 0.585 0.495 
Last fire 
1, if owners remember that the last fire was in 
last 5 years; 0 otherwise 0.306 0.462 - - 
Last timber 
sold 
1, if the last time that owners sold timber was at 
least 5 years ago; 0 otherwise 0.735 0.443 - - 
Greater effort 
1, if owners think that their own effort is greater 
than the rest of the owners; 0 otherwise - - 0.415 0.495 
Commoners 
do task 
1, if owners think than the rest of the owners do 
the necessary tasks to keep the forest in good 
condition; 0 otherwise 0.184 0.389 - - 
Socio-economic characteristics 
Less than 
€1500 
1; if the monthly income obtained is less than 
€1500; 0 otherwise 0.490 0.502 - - 
Primary 
education 
1, if owners have no studies or have basic 
studies; 0 otherwise 0.429 0.497 0.439 0.498 
Social characteristics 
Place Born  
1, if owners were born in forest locations; 0 
otherwise 0.673 0.471 - - 
Very good 
relationship 
1, if owners respond that their relationships with 
the rest of owners are very or quite good; 0 
otherwise 0.490 0.502 0.634 0.483 
Decisions in 
family 
1, if owners affirm that their decisions are made 
with the family and not individually; 0 otherwise 0.531 0.501 0.390 0.490 
Trust in 
neighbors 
1, if owners agree with the following sentence: 
"The majority of my community members can be 
trusted"; 0 otherwise 0.429 0.497 - - 
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  Reward Punishment 
  
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Present 
before future 
1, if owners agree with the following 
sentence: "Forest management will have to 
be undertaken thinking more about present  
than future generations"; 0 otherwise  0.204 0.404 0.146 0.354 
Trade union 
1, if owners are member of trade unions; 0 
otherwise 0.319 0.468 0.243 0.431 
Give free 
1, if owners do the following action very 
often: "I often give things without expecting 
anything in return"; 0 otherwise 0.163 0.371 0.098 0.298 
Left wing 
1, if owners confirm identifying more with 
left wing parties; 0 otherwise 0.204 0.404 0.341 0.477 
Not fair 
1, if owners think often or very often the 
following: "Sometimes, I think that it is not 
fair that some people work less and have 
the same rights as me"; 0 otherwise 0.204 0.404 0.341 0.476 
Leader 
1, if owners think that they have a leader to 
deal with forest issues; 0 otherwise 0.571 0.497 0.707 0.457 
Factor 1 Rules -0.193 1.031 0.302 0.874 
Factor 2 Penalties -0.178 1.128 0.279 0.675 
Factor 3 Boundaries -0.374 0.909 0.586 0.847 
Factor 4 Monitoring 0.223 1.036 -0.350 0.834 
 
4.5 RESULTS 
 
4.5.1 Public Good Game 
 
The distribution of reward and punishment is presented in Figures 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. With 
regards the reward, the amount of money shared can be considered as a proxy of cooperation 
(Stoop et al. 2012). Assessing the results, we can see that when the endowment to share out is 
€10, around 93.75% decide to allocate the full amount to the common fund and the rest (6.25%) 
decide to keep the €10. Thus, on average the mean contribution is about €9.65. Nevertheless, for 
a punishment of €10, only 29.27% decide to pay the total amount of the fine from their own 
pockets, while more than 69% prefer that the community fund pays the penalty. Thus, on 
average owners allocate about €7.30 to be paid by the fund (See Figure 4.2).  
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However, when the endowment is higher the decision changes. Specifically, for an 
endowment of €100, 4.26% decide to allocate the money to their pockets while 6.38% decide to 
split the endowment at 50% and 89.36% allocate €100 to the fund. On average, the contribution 
to the fund is about €94.18. When the punishment is €100, only 14.63% face the fine directly, 
while 75.61% also decide that the fund should pay and the rest make different allocations (2.44% 
allocate €5 and 4.88%, €50). Therefore, the average amount of fine allocated to the fund is 
€80.25 (See Figure 4.3). 
 
 
 
This situation changes slightly when the endowment is even higher. In this way, for an 
amount of €1000, around 2% of individuals keep the total amount in their pockets; another 2% 
decide to donate €100 to the fund. Furthermore, roughly 24% split the reward at 50% and around 
64% decide to send the total amount of money to the fund. On average the mean contribution to 
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the fund for this endowment is about €836.95. For a punishment of €1000, 4.88% will pay the 
total amount while 92.68% decide that the fund should pay (€946.10 on average) (See Figure 
4.4).  
 
 
Therefore, we observe that the higher the size of the reward, the higher the amount of money 
that collective owners keep in their pockets, making these differences statistically significant
5
. 
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that they are quite generous because the percentages of 
money kept by them is quite small. In the survey of literature conducted by Chaudhuri (2011), it 
was found that average contributions were about 40% to 60% of the optimal level. This is an 
interesting result in terms of cooperation as we do not have any mechanism to further it (such as 
penalties, communication, among others). Stoop et al. (2012) have concluded in their study that 
without any kind of contact among players, cooperation is not guaranteed.  
 
This situation changes drastically when participants have to distribute a fine. Therefore, 
when forest owners face a fine their behavior changes; this time, the higher the penalty, the 
higher the amount of money that they prefer the fund to pay. Summarizing, Table 4.2 shows the 
percentage of money allocated to the fund. In the case of the reward: the higher the endowment, 
the lower the contribution to the fund. To the contrary: the higher the size of punishment, the 
higher the allocation to the fund. These differences are statistically significant
6
. Therefore, when 
                                                             
5
 We have conducted a t-test of mean differences in STATA 10.1 S.E. Specifically; the value obtained is -6.464 with a p-value of 
0.000 comparing the rewards of size 10 and 100. Comparing the reward of 10 with the reward of 1000 we obtain a statistic of -
7.581 with a p-value of 0.000. Finally, the comparison between the reward of 100 and the reward of 1000 reports a statistic value 
of -6.578 and a p-value of 0.000. 
6
 We have conducted a t-test of mean differences in STATA 10.1 S.E. Specifically; the value obtained is -5.722 with a p-value of 
0.000 comparing the punishment of size 10 and 100. Comparing the punishment of 10 with the punishment of 1000 we obtain a 
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we compare the effectiveness of rewards and punishments, we find that rewards imply better 
results in terms of user generosity. In the next subsection, we present the results obtained with 
regards to the principle of collective action. In order to understand what drives these allocations 
we also estimate OLS models. 
 
Table 4.2 % of money allocated to the fund 
 
Reward Punishment 
e 10 96.60 73.10 
e 100 94.18 80.25 
e 1000 83.70 94.62 
 
4.5.2 Principles of collective action 
 
The survey results, relating to the principles of collective action, are presented in Table 4.3. 
With regards to the principle of clearly defined boundaries, it was found that around 80% of 
respondents believe that in their communities all members know each other; 50% think that 
residents who are not members of the communal forest know this, while 64.21% consider that 
neighbors respect community members in practice.  
 
When examining congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions, it is important to note that only 56.52% of commoners think that the rules that they 
have to follow are appropriate for resource conservation. In addition, the same percentage 
believes that they are appropriate and that the community can manage forests well. More 
interesting results are obtained with respect to the law’s effectiveness; only 51.09% believe that 
it is effective. Moreover, 62.37% think that the existing rules respect local traditions, while 
70.21% felt these measures could be improved. Analyzing the results for the principle of 
collective choice arrangements, 89.25% confirm that forest decisions are taken collectively with 
individuals equally represented. In addition, 64.13% state that there are controls to ensure 
compliance by the forest community and 56.04% state that there are also controls for outside 
members (principle of monitoring). With regards to the principle of graduated sanctions, 63.74% 
of sampled commoners affirm that there are penalties for people who do not comply with the 
requirements and 46.25% state that these penalties vary depending on the degree of infraction. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
statistic of -7.163 with a p-value of 0.000. Finally, the comparison between the punishment of 100 and the punishment of 1000 
reports a statistic value of -6.373 and a p-value of 0.000. 
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Only 32.97% express that there is a quick mechanism to resolve conflicts and 52.17% believe 
that their rights and decisions are respected by non-members and the administration. 
 
Therefore, and as a conclusion, we observe that principles of collective action are not 
functioning perfectly in our sample of communal forests. Maybe, the adoption of these principles 
could be improved as a way to deal with the current management problems. 
 
Table 4.3 Questions to test whether the principles of collective action are functioning 
  
No Yes D/K 
Clearly defined  
boundaries 
Do you think that in your community all 
community members know each other? 
19.20 79.79 1.06 
Do you think that the residents who are not 
community members are clearly not part of the 
community? 
38.30 50.00 11.70 
Do you think that in practice the neighbors do not 
respect community members to the community? 
27.40 64.21 8.42 
Congruence between 
appropriation and  
provision rules and local 
conditions 
Do you think that the rules of forestry, that have 
to be complied with, are appropriate to conserve 
the resource? 
34.80 56.52 8.70 
Do you think that these rules are appropriate to 
manage forests? 
37.00 56.52 6.52 
Do you think they are effective? 38.00 51.09 10.90 
Do you believe these rules respect the local 
traditions and beliefs? 
26.90 62.37 10.80 
Would you say that existing standards can be 
improved? 
4.26 70.21 25.50 
Collective choice  
arrangements 
In terms of decisions around forestry issues, are 
these taken collectively, together and equally 
represented? 
8.60 89.25 2.15 
Monitoring 
Are there controls to ensure compliance by the 
community? 
26.10 64.13 9.78 
Are there controls to ensure compliance by 
neighbors who are not members of the 
community? 
33.00 56.04 11.00 
Graduated  
sanctions 
Are there penalties for owners who do not comply 
with the obligations laid down in the law? 
14.30 63.74 22.00 
If there are sanctions, are they variable 
depending on the offense committed? 
26.30 46.25 27.50 
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No Yes D/K 
Conflict resolution  
mechanisms 
Are there quick mechanisms to solve the conflicts 
that can arise? 
38.50 32.97 28.60 
Minimal recognition  
of rights 
Do you think that their rights and decisions are 
respected by others, who are not members of the 
community and the administration? 
23.90 52.17 23.90 
 
4.5.3 Factor analysis and OLS results 
 
4.5.3.1 Factor analysis 
 
The results from the factor analysis are presented in Tables 4.4 and 4.5
7
. As a first step, we 
do not impose limits on the number of factors. We employ the Kaiser test (Kaiser, 1960) to 
determine the relevant number of factors. The Kaiser rule indicates that each observed variable 
contributes one unit of variance to the total variance in the dataset. Therefore, any component 
displaying an eigenvalue greater than one, accounts for a greater amount of the variance than had 
been contributed by a single variable. Any component carrying an eigenvalue less than one, 
accounts for less variance than that contributed by any one single variable. Table 4.4 results 
suggest retaining four factors that carry an eigenvalue greater than one.  
 
Table 4.4 Eigenvalues 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 4.826 2.458 0.322 0.322 
Factor 2 2.368 0.434 0.158 0.480 
Factor 3 1.933 0.871 0.129 0.608 
Factor 4 1.062 0.066 0.071 0.679 
Factor 5 0.997 0.241 0.066 0.746 
Factor 6 0.755 0.044 0.050 0.796 
Factor 7 0.711 0.087 0.047 0.844 
Factor 8 0.625 0.117 0.042 0.885 
Factor 9 0.507 0.145 0.034 0.919 
Factor 10 0.362 0.056 0.024 0.943 
Factor 11 0.306 0.064 0.020 0.964 
Factor 12 0.243 0.087 0.016 0.980 
Factor 13 0.156 0.079 0.010 0.990 
Factor 14 0.077 0.005 0.005 0.995 
Factor 15 0.072 . 0.005 1.000 
                                                             
7 It is important to highlight that in questions to test the principles of collective action, users could respond “Yes”, “No” or 
“Don t´ know”. We decided to recode the “Don t´ Know” responses as “No” so as not to drop more observations due to our limited 
number of responses. 
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Moreover, Table 4.5 explains the rotated factor loadings that show the relative contribution 
of each question in testing the principles of collective action on the retained factors. The values 
around 0.30 are flagged in bold. These four factors will be used as explanatory variables in the 
OLS model: 
 
 Factor 1 is associated with the rules that commoners have to follow. Thus, this factor 
includes whether these rules are suitable for resource preservation, for correct resource 
exploitation and whether they are effective. Therefore, it aggregates owners’ opinions about 
rules. We denote this factor as “rules”.  
 
 Factor 2 is associated with penalties and whether current laws could be improved. Thus it 
sums up if there are punishments for those who infringe the rules and whether they vary 
according to the degree of offense. Thus, we denote this factor as “penalties”. 
 
 Factor 3 is associated with boundaries. It aggregates owners’ opinions about whether 
they know each other and about neighbors knowing who are not members of the communal 
forests. We denote this factor as “boundaries”. 
 
 Factor 4 is associated with monitoring. Thus it includes questions that analyze whether 
there are controls both inside and outside of the forest. This factor is denoted as “monitoring”.  
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Table 4.5 Rotated Factors 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
Do you think that in your community all community members 
know each other? -0.073 -0.064 0.326 0.157 
Do you think that the residents who are not community members 
are clearly not part of the community? -0.112 0.066 0.416 -0.001 
Do you think that in practice the neighbors do not respect 
community members to the community? -0.044 -0.128 0.339 0.033 
Do you think that the rules of forestry, that have to be complied 
with, are appropriate to conserve the resource? 0.350 0.058 -0.229 -0.071 
Do you think that these rules are appropriate to manage forests? 0.311 0.080 -0.155 -0.019 
Do you think they are effective? 0.308 0.060 -0.149 -0.056 
Do you believe these rules respect the local traditions and 
beliefs? 0.197 -0.033 0.017 -0.090 
Would you say that existing standards can be improved? 0.047 0.330 -0.033 -0.147 
In terms of decisions around forestry issues, are these taken 
collectively, together and equally represented? -0.024 -0.044 0.098 0.283 
Are there controls to ensure compliance by the community? -0.070 0.055 0.034 0.472 
Are there controls to ensure compliance by neighbors who are not 
members of the community? -0.019 -0.032 0.006 0.405 
Are there penalties for owners who do not comply with the 
obligations laid down in the law? 0.049 0.406 0.007 0.033 
If there are sanctions, are they variable depending on the offense 
committed? 0.028 0.357 -0.226 0.124 
Are there quick mechanisms to solve the conflicts that can arise? -0.067 0.198 0.264 -0.017 
Do you think that their rights and decisions are respected by 
others, who are not members of the community and the 
administration? 0.058 -0.014 0.187 -0.048 
 
4.5.3.2 OLS results 
 
As we have mentioned previously; in order to understand what drives the allocations of 
money we estimate OLS models with and without the effect of principles of collective action. In 
Table 4.6, we summarize our results. The first three columns present the results for the “reward”, 
whilst in the last three columns, the “reward” results take into account the variables related to the 
principles of collective action. “Punishment” results are presented in following columns next to 
the model of punishment and principles of collective action. Overall, the models fit the data quite 
well with R
2
 between 88.90 and 94.70%, respectively. 
 
First, we examine and discuss the estimates shown in Table 4.6 for the “reward”. With 
regards to the endowment size, we observe that the coefficients obtained for e10 and e100 are 
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negative and statistically significant, with respect to the omitted category e1000. Contributions to 
the fund are lower for smaller endowment
8
 sizes. 
 
We also analyse the effect of different characteristics of owners to understand their 
decisions. Thus, Bechtel and Scheve (2014) conclude that socio-demographic characteristics 
play an important role in social dilemmas. With regards to the characteristics of forestry 
management, we observe that communities with larger hectares, or with higher numbers of 
members, allocate greater amounts of money to the fund (forest size, over 100 members). This 
may be consequence of the fact that they are richer communities. Furthermore, areas that have 
sold timber in the last five years also show a positive coefficient (last timber sold). Therefore, 
recent earnings may imply more generous decisions. 
 
With regards to socio-economic characteristics, we observe that people with primary 
education make higher contributions to the fund compared to people with more studies. In 
addition, we note that people earning less than €1500/monthly contribute less (less €1500), 
which is to be expected for those on lower incomes. 
 
Examining other social characteristics, we observe that neighbors, who believe that the 
majority of the community can be trusted, make lower allocations to the fund (trust in 
neighbors). Therefore, we find that trust may not necessarily imply higher allocations to the 
common fund because this also may depend of their economic income. On the contrary, those 
who state that forest management should be undertaken thinking more in terms of the present 
generation, show positive contributions to the fund (present before future). In this sense, these 
users prefer to invest in a common fund that can improve the collective good. In the same way, 
people who identified themselves with the political left wing (left wing) make higher 
contributions, as do those who declare doing favours for their neighbors without expecting 
anything in return (give free). This last indicator could also be considered as a proxy for altruism. 
Altruism is defined by Batson and Powell (2003) as a motivation for increasing another person's 
welfare.  
 
                                                             
8 We obtained a statistical value of 31.11 with a p-value of 0.000 with a test conducted in STATA 10.1 S.E. 
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Examining reward results, taking into account collective action principles, (through factor 
analysis), three indicators lose their significance (forest size, less €1500, trust in neighbors), but 
the remaining variables maintain it, and in addition, we achieve more insights. With regards to 
the endowment size, the results are similar to those obtained in the baseline model. Furthermore, 
individuals making decisions with family on forest-related matters, and those who believe their 
neighbors carry out the necessary tasks to keep forests in good condition, make higher 
contributions to the fund (decisions in family, commoners do tasks). Therefore, users’ efforts 
may have a positive effect in terms of donations to the common fund and from which all users 
can benefit. Factors creating a negative effect, include individuals who believe that the future of 
forestry will deteriorate and the existence of a leader – these individuals make low contributions 
(poor future for forestry, leader). With regards to factors that represent the principles of 
collective action, we find that factors 2 and 4 are statistically significant and have a negative 
coefficient; therefore they imply fewer contributions to the fund. These factors are associated 
with penalties and monitoring, respectively. Finally, the rest of the indicators, including the 
baseline reward model, maintain their significance. 
 
Now, we present and discuss the results obtained for the “punishment” regression. With 
respect to endowment size, we observe that punishment with e10 and e100 show a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient with regards to the omitted e1000
9
. Therefore, when we are 
explaining fine payments, the larger the endowment, the greater the amount allocated to the fund. 
Furthermore, in terms of the characteristics of forests and forest management, we find that 
owners who believe that the future of forests will worsen (poor future for forestry) allocate more 
punishment to the community fund.  
 
Regarding other socioeconomic characteristics, we find that commoners with lower 
education levels decide that the fund should pay higher amounts (primary education). Assessing 
other social characteristics, we find that individuals who think more in terms of the present than 
the future (present before future) and those who identify more closely with the left wing political 
parties (left wing) make higher fund allocations for sanctions. To the contrary, those who think 
there is a leader in their communities make lower allocations to the fund (leader). 
                                                             
9 We obtained a statistical value of 166.33 with a p-value of 0.000 with a test conducted in STATA 10.1 S.E. 
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The regression model which takes into account the principles of collective action shows 
more information. With regards to endowment size, results are in line with those obtained in the 
previous baseline model. Nevertheless, we detect that for three indicators, their coefficients 
change the sign. Specifically, the introduction of the latent variables which represent the 
principles of collective action, make people who think in present terms (present before future) 
and those who more closely identify with left wing political parties (left wing) are more willing 
to pay a higher amount of sanction from their own pocket, while those who believe in the 
existence of a leader make higher allocations of the punishment to the fund. The rest of the 
indicators maintain their statistical significance. Furthermore, participants stating that the 
administration is not managing forests appropriately, (poor administration) make higher 
allocations to the fund. In this sense, we believe that these users may think that the sanction is 
not fair, as the administration is not handling forest management well. Moreover, those who 
confirm making greater efforts than their neighbors (greater effort) make higher allocations to 
the fund. Perhaps these owners do not feel the same degree of responsibility. Additionally, users 
who make decisions with family on forest-related matters, (decisions in family), those having 
good relationships with their neighbors (very good relationship) and owners who state they are 
trade union members (trade union) make higher allocations of punishment to the fund.  
 
With regards to the principles of collective action, we can observe that factors 1, 3 and 4, 
which represent “rules”; “boundaries” and “monitoring” have a negative coefficient, and share 
smaller sanction allocations to the fund. Therefore, it seems that the existence of clear rules, 
boundaries and control make individuals assume higher amounts of fines themselves. On the 
contrary, factor 2, associated with “penalties” shows a positive coefficient, implying minor 
allocations to the fund. We interpret this result in the following way: the fact penalties form part 
of their management strategies means, that when facing a punishment from the outside, one feels 
less responsible for it.  
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Table 4.6 OLS models 
 
Reward Reward  with collective action Punishment Punishment with collective action 
Fund Coefficient. Std. Err. P>|t| Coefficient. Std. Err. P>|t| Coefficient. Std. Err. P>|t| Coefficient. Std. Err. P>|t| 
Size of endowment 
e10 -793.494 43.667 0.000 -803.052 46.215 0.000 -927.031 35.038 0.000 -934.474 26.931 0.000 
e100 -715.793 38.265 0.000 -728.036 38.803 0.000 -852.188 35.391 0.000 -859.211 26.777 0.000 
Characteristics related to the forest and forest management  
Forest size 68.439 22.127 0.005 -7.704 39.835 0.849 -2.876 28.962 0.922 
   
Poor future for forestry 19.549 23.648 0.417 -73.804 28.244 0.018 25.418 12.433 0.059 60.850 11.357 0.001 
Over 100 members 81.186 26.729 0.006 96.046 32.876 0.009 
      Poor administration 13.114 12.646 0.311 20.816 33.923 0.547 -33.661 25.360 0.204 61.917 10.717 0.001 
Last fire 41.447 27.882 0.151 -7.300 23.646 0.761 
      Last timber sold 95.465 31.045 0.006 93.084 49.489 0.076 
      Greater effort 
     
-4.626 18.428 0.805 30.971 13.059 0.049 
Commoners do tasks 23.601 31.149 0.457 148.911 51.240 0.009 
      Socio-economic characteristics 
Less than €1500 -38.375 13.623 0.010 2.730 28.374 0.924 
      Primary education 156.956 37.598 0.000 165.662 24.387 0.000 57.323 22.908 0.024 98.673 22.306 0.003 
Social characteristics 
Place born -40.718 34.877 0.256 -11.073 28.855 0.706 
      Very good relationship 14.099 20.155 0.492 -5.342 25.628 0.837 63.771 43.686 0.165 112.882 21.674 0.001 
Family decisions 17.723 13.349 0.198 37.249 12.828 0.009 -35.139 23.520 0.156 212.383 9.515 0.000 
Trust in neighbors -87.129 21.676 0.001 -12.274 48.542 0.803 
      Present before future 133.705 19.765 0.000 93.100 45.504 0.056 101.986 46.423 0.044 -212.308 14.209 0.000 
Trade union 19.884 15.948 0.226 4.914 33.920 0.886 45.068 28.187 0.131 141.496 15.673 0.000 
Give free 176.687 56.246 0.005 292.607 37.809 0.000 
      Left wing 157.740 30.965 0.000 215.204 39.431 0.000 105.463 32.169 0.005 -241.378 16.503 0.000 
Not fair 18.179 25.191 0.478 -33.853 21.482 0.132 5.507 17.529 0.758 1.029 14.253 0.944 
Leader -37.836 27.278 0.179 -84.560 19.868 0.000 -60.795 31.752 0.075 58.784 6.135 0.000 
Factor 1 “Rules” 
  
-30.063 26.679 0.275 
   
-192.570 6.059 0.000 
Factor 2 “Penalties” 
  
-25.782 11.603 0.039 
   
202.574 13.415 0.000 
Factor 3 “Boundaries” 
  
7.698 14.221 0.595 
   
-47.831 7.267 0.000 
Factor 4 “Monitoring” 
  
-26.202 11.016 0.029 
   
-34.053 8.768 0.006 
Constant 543.437 47.854 0.000 536.424 64.441 0.000 863.418 54.599 0.000 707.163 32.927 0.000 
R-squared 0.889 
  
0.898 
  
0.915 
  
0.947 
  Root MSE 144.170 
 
N=111 146.100 
 
N=99 140.570 
 
N=96 123.570 
 
N=57 
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4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze, in the context of a CPR, how common owners 
make decisions. Through a modified PGG we have analyzed how landowners share out a 
reward and a punishment. Our interest is to study the differences in behavior when forest 
owners receive a reward as a consequence of their good actions and whether their behavior 
is any better, knowing they can be punished. 
 
Evaluating how positive economic incentives are shared (reward), our results are in 
line with previous studies, finding that on average people make higher contributions to a 
CPR than suggested by traditional economic theory. Specifically, we find that communal 
forest owners are quite generous with contributions over 80% of the reward received. 
Nevertheless, an interesting and novel result is obtained with regards to the sharing of 
“punishments”. In this sense, people are more egoistic and prefer that a common fund pays 
the majority of the penalties. Therefore, our results imply that the establishment of a 
reward implies more cooperative behavior than the establishment of a penalty. We also 
find that endowment size is an important factor to consider. In this sense, Andersen et al 
(2011) concludes that the size of the stake matters in ultimatum games.  
 
With regards to the principles of collective action, we have included several questions 
in the survey and through factor analysis we have obtained four main latent indicators: 
rules, boundaries, penalties and monitoring. Examining the role they each play in 
individuals’ decisions, we observe that when owners face the sharing of a reward, this does 
not imply more cooperative results. However, in the case of the punishment, three of the 
factors: rules, boundaries and monitoring make individuals assume higher amounts of the 
imposed fine. Therefore, these principles help to promote cooperation when common 
owners face costly economic incentives. 
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4.8 ANNEX 
 
Ostrom (1990) proposed some principles that can be useful to achieve success for CPR 
management in terms of maintenance and cooperation. Thus, these principles are: 
 
1. Clearly defined boundaries: individuals with rights to extract resource units from 
the common pool resource (CPR) must be defined clearly as the boundaries of the CPR 
itself. This is the first step in organizing collective action. Without this principle, Ostrom 
(1990) argued that local users could find outsiders reaping the benefits without making any 
contributions. Specifically, the questions included in the survey analyze this principle: 
whether all communal users know each other, whether non-members also know that they 
are not members and thus hus, if limits are respected. 
 
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: the 
rules of appropriation should be related to the local conditions and to provision rules. 
Specifically, they make reference to time, place, technology and the quantity of units. 
Questions included are related to whether rules are appropriate to conserve the resource, 
whether the community has the right to appeal, whether they are effective, the degree of 
respect towards local traditions, and to conclude their opinion about if they could be 
improved. 
 
3. Collective-choice arrangements: individuals can participate in the modification of 
operational rules. Ostrom (1990) clarifies that although good rules may exist, this fact does 
not guarantee that users will follow then. The question that we include to test the existence 
of this principle is whether decisions related to forests are taken collectively. 
 
4. Monitoring: individuals who monitor the CPR are responsible in the presence of 
appropriators. Thus, questions to analyze are whether there are controls to ensure 
compliance and if so, whether these are respected. 
 
5. Graduated sanctions: those who do not comply with the rules should face 
graduated penalties depending on the degree of non-compliance. First, we asked whether 
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there are penalties for individuals who do not comply and if these vary depending on the 
offense committed.  
 
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms: the appropriators and their officials should have 
reasonable access to resolve conflicts. It is important, when we are dealing with rules 
expected to be in place for a long period of time, that mechanisms exist that allow the 
discussion and solution of problems. We asked whether there are quick mechanisms to 
solve conflicts. 
 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize: the rights of collective owners are not 
questioned by external authorities. Users should feel that they are involved in rule design. 
Ostrom (1990) highlights that when government authorities are the only ones to set rules it 
is going to be difficult for users to sustain such rules long-term. To examine this issue, we 
asked their opinion on respecting their rights and decisions. 
 
In our survey and with the aim of testing whether these principles are functioning in 
our area of study, we have included several questions as can be seen in Table 4.3. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
  
 
III. CONCLUSIONS 
 
III.1 MAIN FINDINGS BY CHAPTER 
 
The analysis carried out in this dissertation shows evidence of the importance of 
economic incentives and social norms to manage environmental and natural resources. Social 
factors have been studied in recent literature; nevertheless, little is known about their role in 
policies. Thus, in this work, different case studies have been analyzed with a double objective: 
first, to assess the importance of social norms besides economic incentives in order to 
improve environmental policies. Second, direct users and stakeholders (instead of students) 
participated actively in this research. This aspect allows obtaining important conclusions that 
help to understand their current management strategies. 
 
Focusing in the first chapter of this dissertation, a meta-analysis about climate change 
policies has been conducted. In the field of climate change, several studies have analyzed the 
willingness to pay (WTP) of citizens for policies to combat this global problem. These studies 
have proposed different kind of policies and different valuations methodologies in different 
countries. However, a study summarizing their main conclusions was missing. We only have 
found the review of estimates conducted by Johnson and Nemet (2010). Thus, this chapter 
sheds light about what kind of policies are more preferable for citizens; finding that mitigation 
actions are preferred over adaptation actions. Moreover, policies should encourage the 
prevention of disasters and heat waves to combat climate change in order to be more 
preferable. In addition, the impact of social values and norms on preferences has also been 
taken into account; concluding that preferences towards climate change policies are affected 
by attitudes towards time and social norms. Specifically, countries with a significantly long-
term orientation have a higher WTP for climate change policies. Acknowledging that, other 
lenses and moral aspects should be used in order to understand social preferences for climate 
policies. 
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The following chapters adopt local perspectives to deal with various stakeholders in 
several conservation and management contexts. Specifically, the second chapter is centered in 
the loss of biodiversity suffered in Aragón (Spain). This area has been suffering a decline in 
the number of birds living on the cereal steppe despite of the existence of some measures. For 
example, the European Common Agricultural Policy has tried to remedy this difficult 
situation through the application of agri-environmental schemes (AES). In this chapter, 
farmers’ decisions towards AES have been analyzed. Through a face-to-face survey to 
farmers different contract attributes have been ranked, obtaining their economic valuation. It 
was found that social factors are important in determining farmers’ decisions. In particular, 
the importance of social trust and expectation of compliance by other neighbors encourage 
farmers to sign up to AES. Specifically, and with regards to economic incentives, the 
establishment of a fine (not currently in place) may be a persuasive way of encouraging 
fulfilment of the AES contracts. Moreover, social norms are important in terms of preferences 
towards the contract. Therefore, farmers more involved at a social level and therefore more 
visible are more concerned with a fine. In addition, farmers who follow a social norm of 
compliance value positively the introduction of the penalty as a contract attribute. This may 
be potentially related to the fact that farmers want to make sure that when their neighbors act 
as free riders, they may be penalized as well and, therefore the fine may be perceived as a fair 
or altruistic penalty (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Overall, results indicate that social pressure and 
social networks are important factors that can help to control farmers’ attitudes towards more 
sustainable results. Therefore, results obtained reinforce the idea that social norms are crucial 
in order to understand individuals’ behaviour because they influence the valuation of 
economic incentives (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). Thus, they should be considered in the 
design of environmental policies. 
 
The third chapter deals with the shellfish fisheries sector in Galicia (Spain). In this area of 
study, users face two main problems: the overexploitation of some resources (due to the 
scarcity of some species) and poaching. Thus, through a choice experiment (CE) users’ 
preferences have been analyzed with respect to a proposed conservation management 
program. In this context, the role of time preferences, the effect of co-management through a 
Marine Protected Area (MPA), the effect of social norms and the impact of poaching in 
shellfish fisheries is analyzed. With regards to time preferences, it has been found that current 
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users are quite impatient in their extraction levels, which can be a consequence of the risky 
environment in which they are involved (Ostrom, 1990). In addition, poaching has a double 
negative effect. First, it contributes to the overexploitation of the resource, and second, this 
illegal activity makes that shellfish gatherers become even more impatient in terms of time 
preferences of exploitation of the resource. Therefore, it seems that policymakers should deal 
with the problem of poaching to avoid worst consequences in the future. With respect to 
social norms, when the fulfillment of rules is the norm, the efforts required in the management 
plan are accepted without producing a reduction in fishers´ utility. This case study also 
highlights that besides economic incentives, social norms matter (Fehr and Falk, 2002). 
Another important aspect that should be taken into account in the design of new co-
management strategies in effective environmental policies is the effectiveness of the MPA, 
where the principles proposed by Ostrom (1990) are functioning. In this sense, shellfish 
gatherers involved and participating in a MPA have a more conservative behavior in terms of 
extraction preferences. Nevertheless, it is important to take into account that during this time 
of crisis the enforcement and compliance are important factors to achieve effective results 
from marine reserves (Afflerbach et al. 2014). Thus, the reduction of economic support from 
the public administration could imply the loss of effectiveness from this management system.  
 
The last chapter of this thesis deals also with an important problem for Galicia related to 
the forest sector. Specifically, a public good game (PGG) has been conducted with a sample 
of users of this common pool resource (CPR). In this context, individuals have an endowment 
of money and they have to decide the amount to be allocated into a common fund. As a point 
of difference with previous studies we also include a sanction to be shared out across 
members. The goal has been to analyze the factors that motivate the sharing of money in a 
CPR and the factors that motivate the distribution of a sanction. In addition, the compliance of 
the principles of collective action proposed by Ostrom (1990) have been tested and their 
implications in the PGG have been investigated. It was found that, in line with previous 
literature, individuals share an important amount of the endowment with their neighbors. 
However, and on the contrary, in the case of the sanction, users prefer that the common fund 
pays their corresponding amounts of penalty. With regards to the principles of collective 
action and examining the role they each play in individuals’ decisions, we observe that when 
owners face the sharing of a reward, this does not imply more cooperative results. However, 
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in the case of the punishment, three of the factors: rules, boundaries and monitoring make 
individuals assume higher amounts of the imposed fine. Therefore, these principles help to 
promote cooperation when common owners face costly economic incentives. 
 
III.2 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this dissertation, I have focused my analysis on the role that social norms and 
economic incentives play in the management of environmental and natural resources. The 
unsustainable use and overexploitation of both resources is still a threat to biodiversity 
(European Commission, 2014) and in an analysis conducted by United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP, 2013) of the major global environmental questions reaches the same 
conclusion. It seems that all efforts carried out to promote a sustainable development are 
failing despite of the higher amounts of money invested (Chen et al. 2009). It is important to 
emphasize that the great part of environmental assets and natural resources are public goods 
or common pool resources. Following the traditional economic theory, people will be selfish 
and rational. Therefore, it appears that these hypotheses are true whether we consider the 
current situation. Nevertheless, we can think that the major policies have been designed 
paying attention to economic incentives but little is known about the social behavior of 
people. At this respect, previous literature has argued through different field and lab 
experiments that individuals cooperate when they face public goods and that social aspects are 
very important. Thus, the aim of this dissertation has been to analyze the behavior of 
individuals facing environmental problems and in various exploitation and conservation 
contexts. Specifically, the main objective was to analyze the role that economic incentives and 
social norms play in their decisions.  
 
This work contributes to understand the power of social norms in addition to other social 
farms in human behavior. To do this, different case studies that deal with current problems 
have been analyzed. Specifically, the climate change problem, the loss of biodiversity, the 
shellfish fisheries and the forest sector. The first study has employed a meta-analysis to 
analyze the climate change issue. The rest of case studies were analyzed through stated 
preferences methods and a PGG. It is important to highlight that the various case studies have 
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been conducted with the owners and users of the resources. Thus, the objective has been to 
obtain general conclusions that could be useful to design future management strategies.  
 
Results suggest that social norms are very powerful in management issues. Specifically, 
they indicate that aspects that at first are valued as something negative for individuals (for 
example, fines) become positive when the role of social norms is considered. Moreover and in 
order to deal with an important problem, such as climate change, policies designed should 
consider that this is a worldwide phenomenon and that cultural differences among countries 
matter. Furthermore, to a local level, the importance of social factors is crucial: the 
importance of social pressure or the involvement of users, and trust.  
 
III.3 FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS 
 
In the future, studies conducted with users could provide us with additional information 
to improve the management of resources. Thus, traditional economic games could be adapted 
to the daily situation of users. Moreover, and with regards to first chapter of this dissertation, 
it is important to note that economic conditions definitely play a role in terms of supporting 
efforts to combat climate change. Therefore, it would be interesting to analyze what other 
mechanisms could be used in developing countries despite of economic incentives. Moreover, 
a relevant finding of this work has been that cultural and social dimensions are relevant in 
promoting the acceptability of climate change policies. In this sense, the study of cultural and 
social norm dimensions may be reinforced by promoting informational campaigns in order to 
raise awareness. Thus, it would be interesting to incorporate new indicators about the role 
education and the pressure of social media, to analyze their implications in willingness to pay 
for climate change. 
 
Attending to the second chapter, it will be interesting to analyse the effects of the 
proposed measures. Thus, a point for future research, it could be very interesting to compare 
the cost of establishing a fine (in terms of monitoring and sanctioning) with the social benefits 
derived from its establishment. Moreover, and with the available data, it would be important 
to study the economic valuation of the contract attributes for farmers with previous 
experience. Maybe, those who have already participated in AES show differences with 
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respect to those with no experience. With regards to the third case study, it would be 
important to analyse the behaviour of poachers in order to answer several questions: why they 
conduct this illegal activity? How do they feel? What are they willingness to avoid this 
situation? In addition, and due to in the survey there are questions about the degree of 
compliance of the own shellfishers it would be interesting to analyze what factors affect it. To 
conclude, in the last chapter of study, it will be useful to analyse what factors could improve 
the degree of compliance with the principles of collective action. Will a better degree of 
compliance with these principles imply more generous decisions? These and other questions 
will be analysed in the near future. 
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IV. APPENDICES 
ANNEX IA: Questionnaire for farmers: type A 
ENCUESTA SOBRE MEDIDAS AGROAMBIENTALES 
DE PROTECCIÓN DE AVES ESTEPARIAS 
Tipo A 
BLOQUE I: PARTE INTRODUCTORIA 
 
1 (P/NP) ¿Qué nivel de conocimiento tiene Ud. sobre las medidas agroambientales para la 
conservación de fauna y aves esteparias?    
 
 Las conozco bien    Se  algo de ellas pero no las conozco bien  No las conozco     
 
Por favor, indique las que conoce:………………………… 
 
Si las desconoce, permítame darle una pequeña introducción a las mismas. “En los últimos 
años, como consecuencia de la transformación o abandono de las actividades agrarias 
tradicionales de secano se ha detectado una disminución de las aves que viven en las estepas. 
Algunas medidas agroambientales establecen ayudas para compensar a aquellos agricultores 
que de forma voluntaria se comprometan durante 5 años a realizar una serie de prácticas 
para favorecer la nidificación y alimentación de las aves esteparias en los cultivos herbáceos 
de secano. Dependiendo de la zona y la medida elegida, estas prácticas fomentan el cultivo 
de leguminosas en secano, como la alfalfa y la esparceta, y/o el mantenimiento del rastrojo 
en los campos de cereal. Además, las labores y aprovechamientos están restringidos durante 
los periodos de nidificación de las aves.” 
 
 Si ha marcado un nivel de conocimiento muy bajo, pasar a la pregunta 11 
 
2 (P/NP) En caso de conocerlas, ¿puede indicarnos como las ha conocido? 
 
 Por otros agricultores     En la radio 
 Por la Oficina Comarcal Agraria  Otras: ________ 
A través de la caja rural o banco    Por la cooperativa agraria 
Por organizaciones agrarias (UAGA, UPA, ASAJA, ARAGA) 
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3  (P/NP) En el marco del Programa de Desarrollo Rural 2007-2013 ¿Cuál es su 
experiencia con las siguientes medidas agroambientales? 
MEDIDA ¿Es su 
explotación 
elegible?  
(Si/No/No 
sabe) 
¿ participa? 
(Si/No) 
Superficie  
acogida 
(Has) 
¿qué prima 
percibe? 
€/Ha) 
1.1 Mantenimiento del rastrojo      
1.1 Mantenimiento del rastrojo con 
compromiso adicional de no laboreo 
entre el 1 abril hasta el 30 septiembre  
    
1.2 Cultivo de esparceta para el 
mantenimiento de la fauna esteparia  
    
1.3 Generación de alimento para la 
avifauna 
    
1.8 Creación de corredores biológicos: 
siembra de alfalfa  
    
Nota: Si no ha participado en las medidas 1.1 y/o 1.8  pasar a la pregunta 6, después de 
haber rellenado la tabla.  
 
4 (P) ¿Ha suscrito todos los años el mismo número de hectáreas a las medidas ambientales? 
MEDIDA SI NO ¿Nos podría indicar qué ha cambiado? 
1.1 Mantenimiento del rastrojo con compromiso 
adicional de no laboreo entre el 1 abril hasta el 
30 septiembre  
   
1.8 Creación de corredores biológicos: 
siembra de alfalfa  
   
  
5 (P) ¿Cuáles son los motivos por los que ha solicitado estas medidas? (valorar de 1=’nada 
importante’ a 5=’muy importante’) 
 
Nada 
importante 
Poco 
importante 
Algo 
importante 
Bastante 
importante 
Muy 
importante 
Porque mejora la rentabilidad 
de su explotación   1 2 3 4 5 
Porque es un pago seguro, no 
tiene riesgos 1 2 3 4 5 
Porque es fácil cumplir los 
requisitos 1 2 3 4 5 
Porque se ahorra gasoil 1 2 3 4 5 
Permiten disminuir el tiempo 
dedicado a la actividad agraria 1 2 3 4 5 
Porque mejoran la fertilidad de 
la tierra 1 2 3 4 5 
Porque de no haberlas, hubiera 
abandonado la agricultura 1 2 3 4 5 
Porque estas medidas son 
necesarias desde un punto de 
vista ambiental 1 2 3 4 5 
Por otros motivos 
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6 (NP) En caso de no participar en ninguna de las medidas anteriormente citadas, ¿podría 
indicarnos con una X cuál es el motivo? 
MOTIVOS 
Medida 
1.1 
Medida 
1.8 
No me la han concedido/no se ha vuelto a abrir la convocatoria     
No estoy en zona elegible     
Tenía compromisos del programa anterior     
He preferido acogerme a otra(s) medida(s)     
La prima es muy baja     
La prohibición de labores y/o aprovechamiento durante determinados 
meses es muy restrictiva 
    
Otros motivos (indicar)     
 
7 (P/NP) ¿Podría marcar cuáles son para Ud. los mayores inconvenientes que conllevan 
estas medidas?  
INCONVENIENTES 
Medida 
1.1 
Medida 
1.8 
La prima es muy baja     
Complica las labores de la explotación     
Suponen mucho papeleo     
Tardan mucho en pagar     
Suponen una pérdida de producción importante     
La prohibición de labores/aprovechamiento en determinados meses del 
año 
    
Exigen un compromiso demasiado largo, si quieres darte de baja tienes 
que devolver los pagos recibidos 
    
Inseguridad sobre la continuidad de estas ayudas     
Otros inconvenientes (indicar)     
 
8  (P/NP) ¿Le supone un contratiempo mantener el rastrojo hasta el 31 de diciembre? 
 
Si   No   No sabe  
 
En caso afirmativo ¿Qué fechas límite propondría usted para levantar el rastrojo? 
__________________________________________ 
 
9 (P/NP) ¿Le supone un contratiempo el compromiso adicional voluntario de no laboreo de 
barbechos entre 1 de Abril y 30 de septiembre 
 
Si  No             No sabe  
 
En caso afirmativo ¿Qué fechas límite propondría usted para la restricción de no laborear los 
barbechos? ______________________ 
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10 (P/NP) ¿Le supone dificultades el requisito de  no realizar pastoreo, ni labores de gestión 
de la vegetación adventicia en los meses de marzo, abril, mayo y junio?  
 
Si    No    No sabe  
 
En caso afirmativo ¿qué fechas propondría usted como límites para no realizar pastoreo o 
labores?______________________________ 
 
11 (P/NP) ¿Participa usted actualmente en el Plan Nacional de Rotación de Cultivos 
Extensivos de Secano?     Si   No  
 
En caso afirmativo, ¿desde qué año?_______ ¿Con cuántas hectáreas?____ 
 
12 (P/NP) En el Programa de Desarrollo Rural 2000-2006 ¿había participado Ud en alguna 
medida agroambiental? 
 
Si   No  
 
En caso afirmativo, ¿podría indicarnos en cuáles? 
Nombre de la medida Si/No  Año(s) 
1.1 Barbecho medioambiental   
1.2 Mantenimiento del rastrojo y picado de paja   
8.3 Ayudas para el mantenimiento de cultivos alternativos 
en perímetros de protección prioritaria 
  
Otras   
 En caso de no conocerlas hasta ahora, pasar seguidamente a la pregunta 23  
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ENCUESTA SOBRE MEDIDAS AGROAMBIENTALES 
DE PROTECCIÓN DE AVES ESTEPARIAS 
 
BLOQUE II: CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LOS CONTRATOS AGROAMBIENTALES 
 
13 (P/NP)¿Conoce la modulación de las ayudas, o número de hectáreas a partir del cual se 
reduce la prima por Ha a cobrar?    
 
Si   No  
 
14 (P/NP) De acuerdo con la modulación, la prima que percibe el agricultor disminuye a 
partir de un número de hectáreas. Si se eliminase la modulación, la prima sería la misma con 
independencia del nº de has solicitadas (ver siguiente cuadro): 
 
                                                                                                                         Prima 
Medida 
1.1 
Sin compromiso adicional de no laboreo hasta 31 septiembre 60 €/Ha 
Con compromiso adicional de no laboreo hasta 31 septiembre 72 €/Ha 
Medida 
1.8 
Submedida 1.8.1 90 €/Ha 
Submedida 1.8.2 102 €/Ha 
Submedida 1.8.3 126 €/Ha 
 
En este caso, ¿participaría usted /incluiría más hectáreas?  
Medida 1.1: □Si , ¿Cuántas más?_________  □No  □No sabe 
Medida 1.8: □Si , ¿Cuántas más? _________  □No  □No sabe 
 
15 (P) ¿Conoce Ud el sistema de penalización si reduce o abandona el número de hectáreas 
acogidas?  
 
Si  No   No Sabe  
 
16 (P) Si no existiera penalización, ¿habría Ud. reducido el número de hectáreas suscritas en 
alguno de los años anteriores? 
 
 Si, ¿Cuántas?_________  medida 1.1.  y/o __________ medida 1.8   
No 
 
17 (P) Durante el período vigente de la ayuda que Ud. disfruta en la actualidad, ¿Cuántas 
inspecciones ha pasado?  ____________     (Ej: 0, 1,2…..)       
 
18 (P) ¿Ha sufrido alguna penalización derivada de las inspecciones?  
 
No   Si , Especifique el motivo ____________ 
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19 (P) ¿Cuál cree usted que es la probabilidad de que le detecten y penalicen si usted no 
cumple las medidas? 
 
Muy bajo Bajo Medio Alto Muy alto 
Menor al 5% 
Entre el 
5-10% 
10-25% 25-60% >60 % 
 
20 (P)¿Cuánto cree usted que cumplen sus vecinos con los requisitos solicitados? 
 
Nada Algo Bastante Mucho Las cumplen al 100% 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
21 (P)¿Cuál es su grado de cumplimiento con las medidas? 
 
Nada Algo Bastante Mucho Las cumplo al 100% 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
22 (P) Si todos sus vecinos cumplieran las medidas al 50%, ¿cómo las cumpliría usted? 
 
Nada Algo Bastante Mucho Las cumpliría al 100% 
1 2 3 4 5 
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23  (P/NP) A la hora de escoger entre subvenciones agroambientales de protección de aves, 
díganos, ¿Cuál de los siguientes atributos tiene Ud. más en cuenta a la hora de elegir dichas 
ayudas agroambientales? Enumerar en orden de importancia (1 “no lo tengo nada en cuenta” 
y 5 “es el que más tengo en cuenta”) 
 
Atributos Descripción 
Valoración  
No lo 
tengo 
nada en 
cuenta 
 
No lo 
tengo 
muy en 
cuenta 
 
Lo 
tengo 
algo en 
cuenta 
 
Lo 
tengo 
muy 
en 
cuent
a 
 
Es el 
que 
más 
tengo 
en 
cuenta 
 
Prima 
Cuantía de la ayuda (euros 
por ha de cultivo) 1 2 3 4 5 
Flexibilidad 
Libertad para decidir la 
superficie acogida cada año 
(% admitido de variación 
respecto a la superficie del 
primer año, sin penalización 
alguna).  1 2 3 4 5 
Multa 
Sanción en caso de 
incumplimiento de las 
normas establecidas en la 
ayuda, que además de la 
devolución de la prima 
puede conllevar al pago de 
una cantidad adicional 
(euros/ha)  1 2 3 4 5 
Cultivo de 
leguminosas 
plurianuales 
Obligación de incluir el 
cultivo de alfalfa o esparceta 
en un porcentaje variable de 
la superficie declarada 1 2 3 4 5 
Restricciones 
de calendario 
Prohibición de realizar 
labores en el barbecho 
algunos meses del año  1 2 3 4 5 
 
24. (P/NP) Como Ud. sabe, las medidas agroambientales y la política agraria en general 
cambia de forma constante. Para hacer cambios que sean percibidos como positivos por los 
agricultores, es necesario saber sus preferencias y opiniones ante varias posibles medidas 
agroambientales que están siendo debatidas en la actualidad, especialmente en épocas de 
crisis económica donde existe menos presupuesto disponible. Las medidas que se presentan a 
continuación podrían reemplazar en un futuro próximo las que Ud ha suscrito o que conoce 
por vía de otros agricultores. A continuación le presentamos varias posibles medidas 
agroambientales encaminadas a la protección de aves esteparias, que Ud. podría suscribir 
durante un período de 5 años. Junto con estas medidas, también le describimos las 
características y requisitos de las mismas. Estos son los únicos requisitos que Ud debe 
considerar para elegir aquella que sea más favorable de acuerdo a sus preferencias e 
intereses. No hay otros requisitos adicionales. 
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Por lo tanto, lo que le pedimos a continuación es que elija entre varias medidas 
agroambientales que posiblemente se pondrán en funcionamiento cuando las actuales 
finalicen. Es por ello, que Ud. puede elegir no participar en ninguno de los contratos 
ofrecidos si no le resultan rentables o viables, ya que estamos considerando decisiones 
cercanas pero futuras. Si no eligiera ninguno de los contratos que se le presentan a 
continuación, entre las opciones dadas, entonces no tendría la ayuda de protección de aves 
esteparias, pero podría, dependiendo de la disponibilidad presupuestaria, solicitar otras 
medidas agroambientales y el pago único. 
 
Los siguientes contratos establecen distintos requisitos sobre el cultivo año y vez de 
cereal/barbecho y le proponen incluir un determinado porcentaje de leguminosa (alfalfa o 
esparceta). Además, estos contratos también se diferencian en otras características como la 
prima, la flexibilidad en la superficie acogida, la multa en caso de incumplimiento y la 
restricción de realizar labores o aprovechamiento en la superficie de barbecho y/o alfalfa  en 
un determinado periodo del año ¿Cuál de ellos escogería?  
 
Para todos los contratos ofrecidos la duración establecida es de 5 años y la probabilidad de 
inspección en estos contratos es como en la actualidad. Se deben cumplir determinados 
requisitos: 
 
- Mantener el rastrojo de cereal hasta el 31 de diciembre y dejar la paja en el terreno en al 
menos el 50% de la superficie 
 
- No utilizar productos fitosanitarios en período de no cultivo  
 
- No laboreo o aprovechamiento de leguminosa en abril, mayo y junio. 
 
Pero como ve, otros requisitos varían. Marque al final del cuadro el contrato que más le 
gustaría tener de acuerdo a sus preferencias. 
 
CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL 
CONTRATO 
Contrato tipo 
 A 
Contrato tipo  
B 
No suscribiría 
ningún contrato 
de protección de 
aves 
Prima (*) 30€/ha 60€/ha   
Flexibilidad en la superficie acogida 0% 40%   
Multa adicional por encima de la 
devolución de la prima 
0€/ha 200€/ha   
Cultivar leguminosas (alfalfa o esparceta) 
en un porcentaje de la superficie acogida 
0% 20%   
Prohibición de laboreo o aprovechamiento  
de barbecho durante … 
Ninguna 
restricción 
1 Abril al 1 
Agosto 
  
Indicar 1=más preferido, 2=siguiente, 3= 
menos preferido 
      
(*) La prima se especifica por superficie cultivada, ya sea cereal y/o leguminosa 
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25. (P/NP) ¿Cuántas hectáreas estaría usted dispuesto a suscribir, para el contrato que Ud ha 
señalado como más preferido? _____________ Hectáreas 
 
26. (P/NP)  ¿Y de los siguientes que se presentan a continuación?  
 
CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL 
CONTRATO 
Contrato tipo 
 A 
Contrato tipo  
B 
No suscribiría 
ningún contrato 
de protección de 
aves 
Prima (*) 120€/ha 30€/ha   
Flexibilidad en la superficie acogida 40% 0%   
Multa adicional por encima de la 
devolución de la prima 
0€/ha 200€/ha   
Cultivar leguminosas en un porcentaje de 
la superficie acogida 
0% 20%   
Prohibición de laboreo o 
aprovechamiento  de barbecho durante… 
1 Abril al 1 
Agosto 
Ninguna 
restricción 
  
Indicar 1=más preferido, 2=siguiente, 
3= menos preferido 
      
(*) La prima se especifica por superficie cultivada, ya sea cereal y/o leguminosa 
 
27. (P/NP) Cuántas hectáreas estaría usted dispuesto a suscribir, para el contrato que Ud ha 
señalado como más preferido? _____________ Hectáreas 
 
28.  (P/NP)  ¿Y de los siguientes que se presentan a continuación?  
 
CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL 
CONTRATO 
Contrato tipo 
 A 
Contrato tipo  
B 
No suscribiría 
ningún contrato 
de protección de 
aves 
Prima (*) 90€/ha 120€/ha   
Flexibilidad en la superficie acogida 0% 40%   
Multa adicional por encima de la 
devolución de la prima 
0€/ha 200€/ha   
Cultivar leguminosas en un porcentaje de 
la superficie acogida 
20% 0%   
Prohibición de laboreo o 
aprovechamiento de barbecho durante … 
1 Abril al 1 
Agosto 
Ninguna 
restricción 
  
Indicar 1=más preferido, 2=siguiente, 
3= menos preferido 
      
(*) La prima se especifica por superficie cultivada, ya sea cereal y/o leguminosa 
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29. (P/NP) Cuántas hectáreas estaría usted dispuesto a suscribir, para el contrato que Ud ha 
señalado como más preferido? _____________ Hectáreas 
 
30. (P/NP)  Y ya para finalizar ¿Qué contrato escogería de los siguientes que se presentan a 
continuación? 
 
CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL 
CONTRATO 
Contrato tipo 
 A 
Contrato tipo  
B 
No suscribiría 
ningún contrato 
de protección de 
aves 
Prima (*) 60€/ha 90€/ha   
Flexibilidad en la superficie acogida 40% 0%   
Multa adicional por encima de la 
devolución de la prima 
0€/ha 200€/ha   
Cultivar leguminosas en un porcentaje de 
la superficie acogida 
20% 0%   
Prohibición de laboreo o 
aprovechamiento  de barbecho durante… 
Ninguna 
restricción 
1 Abril al 1 
Agosto 
  
Indicar 1=más preferido, 2=siguiente, 
3= menos preferido 
      
(*) La prima se especifica por superficie cultivada, ya sea cereal y/o leguminosa 
 
31. (P/NP) Cuántas hectáreas estaría usted dispuesto a suscribir, para el contrato que Ud ha 
señalado como más preferido? _____________ Hectáreas 
 
32 (P)  En el caso de que siempre haya elegido como más preferida la opción “Ningún 
contrato”, ¿Cuáles son sus motivos? 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
33 (P) ¿Qué habría hecho en la superficie acogida actual de no existir estas medidas 
agroambientales? 
 
Mantendría el mismo plan de cultivos que el que venía desarrollando. En este caso, 
¿mantendría Usted  el    mismo calendario de labores? 
 
Si    No   
 
Cambiaría el plan de cultivos: Cómo?______________________________ 
Mantendría la tierra arada para cobrar el pago único pero no cultivaría 
 Abandonaría completamente la actividad agraria  
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ENCUESTA SOBRE MEDIDAS AGROAMBIENTALES 
DE PROTECCIÓN DE AVES ESTEPARIAS 
 
BLOQUE III. INDICADORES DE ÉXITO DE LAS AYUDAS 
 
34 (P/NP)¿Conoce algunas de las especies de aves que hay en la zona donde se ubica su 
explotación? 
 
No   Si  , ¿puede nombrarme algunas? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
35 (P/NP) Conoce algún refrán, dicho o canción sobre las aves esteparias? 
Si   No   
 
En caso afirmativo, ¿nos podría indicar cuál conoce? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
36 (P/NP)  Desde el año 2000 ¿Ha observado un cambio en la presencia de aves en sus 
parcelas o colindantes?  
 
Si   No  
 
En caso afirmativo, ¿qué tipo de cambio ha observado? 
 
 He observado un mayor número de aves  
 He observado nuevas especies ¿cuáles? _________________ 
 He observado un menor número de aves 
 Están desapareciendo alguna(s) especie(s) ¿cuál(es)? _______________ 
 Otros cambios (indicar):____________________  
 
37 (P/NP) ¿Cree usted que estas medidas son efectivas para la protección y conservación de 
las aves esteparias? 1=”nada efectivas” a  5=”muy efectivas” 
 
Nada efectivas 
No muy 
efectivas 
Algo 
efectivas 
Muy 
efectivas 
Extremadamente 
efectivas 
No sabe 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
38 (P/NP) Podría describir otros beneficios que a su juicio tienen estas medidas 
agroambientales (Ej. erosión, prevención de incendios, etc) 
___________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________ 
 
39 (P/NP) Por favor, si tiene alguna sugerencia para mejorar estas medidas, indíquelo: 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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ENCUESTA SOBRE MEDIDAS AGROAMBIENTALES 
DE PROTECCIÓN DE AVES ESTEPARIAS 
 
BLOQUE IV: PREGUNTAS SOBRE SU EXPLOTACIÓN 
 
40 (P/NP) Tamaño total de su explotación: __________ Has  
 
41 (P/NP) Puede indicarnos su plan de cultivo de cultivos, incluyendo barbecho: 
 
Cultivos 
herbáceos  
superficie (has)  
Rendimientos 
(kg/ha) 
marcar con X  
si está acogida a: 
Uso   
ganado  
(Si/No) 
secano regadío secano regadío 
Medida 
1.1 
Medida  
1.8 
Otras 
medidas 
  
          
 
      
          
 
      
          
 
      
          
 
      
 
42 (P/NP) ¿Tiene ganado propio en su explotación? Si    No  
 
 Vacuno Ovino - caprino 
N° cabezas   
 
43 (P/NP) ¿Qué porcentaje de las tierras de secano que trabaja es arrendado?_________ 
 
44 (P/NP) Si tiene tierras arrendadas ¿cuál es el precio que paga por ellas? ______ €/ha 
 
45 (P/NP) ¿Podría indicarnos cuál es el número de miembros de su familia, incluido Ud., 
que  trabajan en la explotación? ______________  ¿y el nº total de empleados?____________ 
 
46 (P/NP) ¿Contrata maquinaria para la realización de labores en su explotación? 
 
No    Si , ¿Para que labores? _____________________________ 
 
47  (P/NP) ¿Cuántas personas viven en su hogar?______  
a. ¿Cuántos entre 18-65? _____ 
b. ¿Cuántos menores de 18? ____ 
c. ¿Y mayores de 65?_____ 
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48  (P/NP) ¿Nos podría indicar qué parte de los ingresos de su hogar vienen de las siguientes 
fuentes? 
______  % Venta de la producción y actividad agraria 
______  % Prestación de servicios a otros agricultores 
______  %  Ayudas agroambientales 
______  % Pago único y otras ayudas 
______  % Ingresos de otros trabajos/ocupaciones 
_______% Pensiones  
 
49 (P/NP)¿Nos podría indicar cuál es la renta agraria que obtiene Ud en término medio al 
año de su actividad y producción agraria? 
 
  menos de 10.000 €   entre  30.000 € y 40.000 €  
  entre  10.000 € y 20.000 €  entre  40.000 € y 50.000 € 
 entre  20.000 € y 30.000 €  más de 50.000 € 
 
50 (P/NP)¿Se encuentra parte o toda su explotación incluida en Zona de Especial Protección 
para las Aves (ZEPA)?    
 
Si    No  
 
51 (P/NP) ¿Tiene o ha tenido expectativas de transformación a regadío en sus parcelas de 
secano?  
 
Si    No  
 
52 (P/NP)¿Nos podría indicar en qué municipio está su explotación?  
______________________________ 
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ENCUESTA SOBRE MEDIDAS AGROAMBIENTALES 
DE PROTECCIÓN DE AVES ESTEPARIAS 
 
BLOQUE V: OTRAS PREGUNTAS SOBRE UD 
 
53 (P/NP)  Mujer  Varón  
 
54 (P/NP) ¿Podría indicar cuantos años de experiencia tiene en la agricultura? 
________________________ 
 
55 (P/NP) ¿Podría indicar su nivel de estudios? 
 
Educación Básica     Bachillerato/FP     Universidad     Otras 
 
56 (P/NP) ¿Es usted agricultor a tiempo completo?    Si   No       
 
De no ser agricultor a tiempo completo, ¿con qué actividad combina el trabajo 
agrario?_____________________________________________________________ 
 
57 (P/NP) ¿Recibe la calificación de explotación prioritaria?   
 
Si    No     No sabe   
 
58 (P/NP) ¿Pertenece a algún sindicato, asociación o cooperativa?  
 
No   Si, ¿A cuál? 
 
59 (P/NP) ¿Podría indicarnos cuál es su año de nacimiento? ____________ 
 
60 (P/NP) ¿Dentro de cuantos años cree que va a retirarse de la actividad agraria? 
______________ 
 
61 (P/NP) ¿Qué cree usted que pasará con su explotación cuando usted deje la actividad 
agraria? 
 
 Abandono    Transferencia a un familiar 
 Arrendamiento  Venta 
 No sabe   Otros: _______________________ 
ANNEX IB: Questionnaire for farmers: type B 
ENCUESTA SOBRE MEDIDAS AGROAMBIENTALES 
DE PROTECCIÓN DE AVES ESTEPARIAS 
Tipo B 
 
BLOQUE I: PARTE INTRODUCTORIA 
 
1 (P/NP) ¿Qué nivel de conocimiento tiene Ud. sobre las medidas agroambientales para la 
conservación de fauna y aves esteparias?    
 
 Las conozco bien    Se  algo de ellas pero no las conozco bien  No las conozco     
 
Por favor, indique las que conoce:………………………… 
 
Si las desconoce, permítame darle una pequeña introducción a las mismas. “En los últimos 
años, como consecuencia de la transformación o abandono de las actividades agrarias 
tradicionales de secano se ha detectado una disminución de las aves que viven en las estepas. 
Algunas medidas agroambientales establecen ayudas para compensar a aquellos agricultores 
que de forma voluntaria se comprometan durante 5 años a realizar una serie de prácticas 
para favorecer la nidificación y alimentación de las aves esteparias en los cultivos herbáceos 
de secano. Dependiendo de la zona y la medida elegida, estas prácticas fomentan el cultivo 
de leguminosas en secano, como la alfalfa y la esparceta, y/o el mantenimiento del rastrojo 
en los campos de cereal. Además, las labores y aprovechamientos están restringidos durante 
los periodos de nidificación de las aves.” 
 
Si ha marcado un nivel de conocimiento muy bajo, pasar a la pregunta 11 
 
2 (P/NP) En caso de conocerlas, ¿puede indicarnos como las ha conocido? 
 
 Por otros agricultores     En la radio 
 Por la Oficina Comarcal Agraria Otras: ________ 
A través de la caja rural o banco   Por la cooperativa agraria 
Por organizaciones agrarias (UAGA, UPA, ASAJA, ARAGA) 
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3  (P/NP) En el marco del Programa de Desarrollo Rural 2007-2013 ¿Cuál es su 
experiencia con las siguientes medidas agroambientales? 
MEDIDA ¿Es su 
explotación 
elegible?  
(Si/No/No 
sabe) 
¿ participa? 
(Si/No) 
Superficie  
acogida 
(Has) 
¿qué prima 
percibe? 
€/Ha) 
1.1 Mantenimiento del rastrojo      
1.1 Mantenimiento del rastrojo con 
compromiso adicional de no laboreo 
entre el 1 abril hasta el 30 septiembre  
    
1.2 Cultivo de esparceta para el 
mantenimiento de la fauna esteparia  
    
1.3 Generación de alimento para la 
avifauna 
    
1.8 Creación de corredores biológicos: 
siembra de alfalfa  
    
Nota: Si no ha participado en las medidas 1.1 y/o 1.8  pasar a la pregunta 6, después de 
haber rellenado la tabla.  
 
4 (P) ¿Ha suscrito todos los años el mismo número de hectáreas a las medidas ambientales? 
MEDIDA SI NO ¿Nos podría indicar qué ha cambiado? 
1.1 Mantenimiento del rastrojo con 
compromiso adicional de no laboreo 
entre el 1 abril hasta el 30 septiembre  
   
1.8 Creación de corredores biológicos: 
siembra de alfalfa  
   
 
5  (P) ¿Cuáles son los motivos por los que ha solicitado estas medidas? (valorar de 1=’nada 
importante’ a 5=’muy importante’) 
 
Nada 
importante 
Poco 
importante 
Algo 
importante 
Bastante 
importante 
Muy 
importante 
Porque mejora la rentabilidad de 
su explotación   1 2 3 4 5 
Porque es un pago seguro, no 
tiene riesgos 1 2 3 4 5 
Porque es fácil cumplir los 
requisitos 1 2 3 4 5 
Porque se ahorra gasoil 1 2 3 4 5 
Permiten disminuir el tiempo 
dedicado a la actividad agraria 1 2 3 4 5 
Porque mejoran la fertilidad de la 
tierra 1 2 3 4 5 
Porque de no haberlas, hubiera 
abandonado la agricultura 1 2 3 4 5 
Porque estas medidas son 
necesarias desde un punto de vista 
ambiental 1 2 3 4 5 
Por otros motivos 
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6 (NP) En caso de no participar en ninguna de las medidas anteriormente citadas, ¿podría 
indicarnos con una X cuál es el motivo? 
MOTIVOS 
Medida 
1.1 
Medida 
1.8 
No me la han concedido/no se ha vuelto a abrir la convocatoria     
No estoy en zona elegible     
Tenía compromisos del programa anterior     
He preferido acogerme a otra(s) medida(s)     
La prima es muy baja     
La prohibición de labores y/o aprovechamiento durante determinados 
meses es muy restrictiva 
    
Otros motivos (indicar)     
 
7 (P/NP) ¿Podría marcar cuáles son para Ud. los mayores inconvenientes que conllevan 
estas medidas?   
INCONVENIENTES 
Medida 
1.1 
Medida 
1.8 
La prima es muy baja     
Complica las labores de la explotación     
Suponen mucho papeleo     
Tardan mucho en pagar     
Suponen una pérdida de producción importante     
La prohibición de labores/aprovechamiento en determinados meses del 
año 
    
Exigen un compromiso demasiado largo, si quieres darte de baja tienes 
que devolver los pagos recibidos 
    
Inseguridad sobre la continuidad de estas ayudas     
Otros inconvenientes (indicar)     
 
8  (P/NP) ¿Le supone un contratiempo mantener el rastrojo hasta el 31 de diciembre? 
 
Si   No   No sabe  
 
En caso afirmativo ¿Qué fechas límite propondría usted para levantar el rastrojo? 
__________________________________________ 
 
9 (P/NP) ¿Le supone un contratiempo el compromiso adicional voluntario de no laboreo de 
barbechos entre 1 de Abril y 30 de septiembre 
 
Si  No             No sabe  
 
En caso afirmativo ¿Qué fechas límite propondría usted para la restricción de no laborear los 
barbechos? ______________________ 
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10 (P/NP) ¿Le supone dificultades el requisito de  no realizar pastoreo, ni labores de gestión 
de la vegetación adventicia en los meses de marzo, abril, mayo y junio?  
 
Si    No    No sabe  
 
En caso afirmativo ¿qué fechas propondría usted como límites para no realizar pastoreo o 
labores?______________________________ 
 
11 (P/NP) ¿Participa usted actualmente en el Plan Nacional de Rotación de Cultivos 
Extensivos de Secano?     Si   No  
 
En caso afirmativo, ¿desde qué año?_______ ¿Con cuántas hectáreas?____ 
 
12 (P/NP) En el Programa de Desarrollo Rural 2000-2006 ¿había participado Ud en alguna 
medida agroambiental? 
 
Si   No  
 
En caso afirmativo, ¿podría indicarnos en cuáles? 
Nombre de la medida Si/No  Año(s) 
1.1 Barbecho medioambiental   
1.2 Mantenimiento del rastrojo y picado de paja   
8.3 Ayudas para el mantenimiento de cultivos alternativos 
en perímetros de protección prioritaria 
  
Otras   
 En caso de no conocerlas hasta ahora, pasar seguidamente a la pregunta 23  
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ENCUESTA SOBRE MEDIDAS AGROAMBIENTALES 
DE PROTECCIÓN DE AVES ESTEPARIAS 
 
BLOQUE II: CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LOS CONTRATOS AGROAMBIENTALES 
 
13 (P/NP)¿Conoce la modulación de las ayudas, o número de hectáreas a partir del cual se 
reduce la prima por Ha a cobrar?    
 
Si   No  
 
14 (P/NP) De acuerdo con la modulación, la prima que percibe el agricultor disminuye a 
partir de un número de hectáreas. Si se eliminase la modulación, la prima sería la misma con 
independencia del nº de has solicitadas (ver siguiente cuadro): 
                                                                                                                         Prima 
Medida 
1.1 
Sin compromiso adicional de no laboreo hasta 31 septiembre 60 €/Ha 
Con compromiso adicional de no laboreo hasta 31 septiembre 72 €/Ha 
Medida 
1.8 
Submedida 1.8.1 90 €/Ha 
Submedida 1.8.2 102 €/Ha 
Submedida 1.8.3 126 €/Ha 
 
En este caso, ¿participaría usted /incluiría más hectáreas?  
Medida 1.1: □Si , ¿Cuántas más?_________  □No  □No sabe 
Medida 1.8: □Si , ¿Cuántas más? _________  □No  □No sabe 
 
15 (P) ¿Conoce Ud el sistema de penalización si reduce o abandona el número de hectáreas 
acogidas?  
 
Si  No   No Sabe  
 
16 (P) Si no existiera penalización, ¿habría Ud. reducido el número de hectáreas suscritas en 
alguno de los años anteriores? 
 
 Si, ¿Cuántas?_________  medida 1.1.  y/o __________ medida 1.8   
No 
 
17 (P) Durante el período vigente de la ayuda que Ud. disfruta en la actualidad, ¿Cuántas 
inspecciones ha pasado?  ____________     (Ej: 0, 1,2…..)       
 
18 (P) ¿Ha sufrido alguna penalización derivada de las inspecciones?  
 
No   Si , Especifique el motivo ____________ 
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19 (P) ¿Cuál cree usted que es la probabilidad de que le detecten y penalicen si usted no 
cumple las medidas? 
Muy bajo Bajo Medio Alto Muy alto 
Menor al 5% 
Entre el 
 5-10% 
10-25% 25-60% >60 % 
 
20 (P)¿Cuánto cree usted que cumplen sus vecinos con los requisitos solicitados? 
Nada Algo Bastante Mucho Las cumplen al 100% 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
21 (P)¿Cuál es su grado de cumplimiento con las medidas? 
Nada Algo Bastante Mucho Las cumplo al 100% 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
22 (P) Si todos sus vecinos cumplieran las medidas al 50%, ¿cómo las cumpliría usted? 
Nada Algo Bastante Mucho Las cumpliría al 100% 
1 2 3 4 5 
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23  (P/NP) A la hora de escoger entre subvenciones agroambientales de protección de aves, 
díganos, ¿Cuál de los siguientes atributos tiene Ud. más en cuenta a la hora de elegir dichas 
ayudas agroambientales? Enumerar en orden de importancia (1 “no lo tengo nada en cuenta” 
y 5 “es el que más tengo en cuenta”) 
Atributos Descripción 
Valoración  
No lo 
tengo 
nada en 
cuenta 
 
No lo 
tengo 
muy en 
cuenta 
 
Lo 
tengo 
algo en 
cuenta 
 
Lo 
tengo 
muy 
en 
cuent
a 
 
Es el 
que 
más 
tengo 
en 
cuenta 
 
Prima 
Cuantía de la ayuda (euros 
por ha de cultivo) 1 2 3 4 5 
Flexibilidad 
Libertad para decidir la 
superficie acogida cada año 
(% admitido de variación 
respecto a la superficie del 
primer año, sin penalización 
alguna).  1 2 3 4 5 
Multa 
Sanción en caso de 
incumplimiento de las 
normas establecidas en la 
ayuda, que además de la 
devolución de la prima 
puede conllevar al pago de 
una cantidad adicional 
(euros/ha)  1 2 3 4 5 
Cultivo de 
leguminosas 
plurianuales 
Obligación de incluir el 
cultivo de alfalfa o esparceta 
en un porcentaje variable de 
la superficie declarada 1 2 3 4 5 
Restricciones 
de calendario 
Prohibición de realizar 
labores en el barbecho 
algunos meses del año  1 2 3 4 5 
 
24. (P/NP) Como Ud. sabe, las medidas agroambientales y la política agraria en general 
cambia de forma constante. Para hacer cambios que sean percibidos como positivos por los 
agricultores, es necesario saber sus preferencias y opiniones ante varias posibles medidas 
agroambientales que están siendo debatidas en la actualidad, especialmente en épocas de 
crisis económica donde existe menos presupuesto disponible. Las medidas que se presentan a 
continuación podrían reemplazar en un futuro próximo las que Ud ha suscrito o que conoce 
por vía de otros agricultores. A continuación le presentamos varias posibles medidas 
agroambientales encaminadas a la protección de aves esteparias, que Ud. podría suscribir 
durante un período de 5 años. Junto con estas medidas, también le describimos las 
características y requisitos de las mismas. Estos son los únicos requisitos que Ud debe 
considerar para elegir aquella que sea más favorable de acuerdo a sus preferencias e 
intereses. No hay otros requisitos adicionales. 
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Por lo tanto, lo que le pedimos a continuación es que elija entre varias medidas 
agroambientales que posiblemente se pondrán en funcionamiento cuando las actuales 
finalicen. Es por ello, que Ud. puede elegir no participar en ninguno de los contratos 
ofrecidos si no le resultan rentables o viables, ya que estamos considerando decisiones 
cercanas pero futuras. Si no eligiera ninguno de los contratos que se le presentan a 
continuación, entre las opciones dadas, entonces no tendría la ayuda de protección de aves 
esteparias, pero podría, dependiendo de la disponibilidad presupuestaria, solicitar otras 
medidas agroambientales y el pago único. 
 
Los siguientes contratos establecen distintos requisitos sobre el cultivo año y vez de 
cereal/barbecho y le proponen incluir un determinado porcentaje de leguminosa (alfalfa o 
esparceta). Además, estos contratos también se diferencian en otras características como la 
prima, la flexibilidad en la superficie acogida, la multa en caso de incumplimiento y la 
restricción de realizar labores o aprovechamiento en la superficie de barbecho y/o alfalfa  en 
un determinado periodo del año ¿Cual de ellos escogería?  
 
Para todos los contratos ofrecidos la duración establecida es de 5 años y la probabilidad de 
inspección en estos contratos es como en la actualidad. Se deben cumplir determinados 
requisitos: 
 
- Mantener el rastrojo de cereal hasta el 31 de diciembre y dejar la paja en el terreno en al 
menos el 50% de la superficie 
 
- No utilizar productos fitosanitarios en período de no cultivo  
 
- No laboreo o aprovechamiento de leguminosa en abril, mayo y junio. 
 
Pero como ve, otros requisitos varían. Marque al final del cuadro el contrato que más le 
gustaría tener de acuerdo a sus preferencias. 
CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL 
CONTRATO 
Contrato tipo 
 A 
Contrato tipo  
B 
No suscribiría 
ningún contrato 
de protección de 
aves 
Prima (*) 60€/ha 90€/ha   
Flexibilidad en la superficie acogida 0% 40%   
Multa adicional por encima de la 
devolución de la prima 
200€/ha 0€/ha   
Cultivar leguminosas (alfalfa o esparceta) 
en un porcentaje de la superficie acogida 
0% 20%   
Prohibición de laboreo o aprovechamiento  
de barbecho durante … 
1 Abril al 1 
Agosto  
Ninguna 
restricción 
  
Indicar 1=más preferido, 2=siguiente, 3= 
menos preferido 
      
(*) La prima se especifica por superficie cultivada, ya sea cereal y/o leguminosa  
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25. (P/NP) ¿Cuántas hectáreas estaría usted dispuesto a suscribir, para el contrato que Ud ha 
señalado como más preferido? _____________ Hectáreas 
 
26. (P/NP)  ¿Y de los siguientes que se presentan a continuación?  
CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL 
CONTRATO 
Contrato tipo 
 A 
Contrato tipo  
B 
No suscribiría 
ningún contrato 
de protección de 
aves 
Prima (*) 90€/ha 120€/ha   
Flexibilidad en la superficie acogida 40% 0%   
Multa adicional por encima de la 
devolución de la prima 
200€/ha 0€/ha   
Cultivar leguminosas en un porcentaje de 
la superficie acogida 
0% 20%   
Prohibición de laboreo o 
aprovechamiento  de barbecho durante… 
Ninguna 
restricción 
1 Abril al 1 
Agosto  
  
Indicar 1=más preferido, 2=siguiente, 
3= menos preferido 
      
(*) La prima se especifica por superficie cultivada, ya sea cereal y/o leguminosa 
 
27. (P/NP) Cuántas hectáreas estaría usted dispuesto a suscribir, para el contrato que Ud ha 
señalado como más preferido? _____________ Hectáreas 
 
28.  (P/NP)  ¿Y de los siguientes que se presentan a continuación? 
CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL 
CONTRATO 
Contrato tipo 
 A 
Contrato tipo  
B 
No suscribiría 
ningún contrato 
de protección de 
aves 
Prima (*) 120€/ha 30€/ha   
Flexibilidad en la superficie acogida 0% 40%   
Multa adicional por encima de la 
devolución de la prima 
200€/ha 0€/ha   
Cultivar leguminosas en un porcentaje de 
la superficie acogida 
20% 0%   
Prohibición de laboreo o 
aprovechamiento de barbecho durante … 
Ninguna 
restricción  
1 Abril al 1 
Agosto  
  
Indicar 1=más preferido, 2=siguiente, 
3= menos preferido 
      
(*) La prima se especifica por superficie cultivada, ya sea cereal y/o leguminosa 
 
29. (P/NP) Cuántas hectáreas estaría usted dispuesto a suscribir, para el contrato que Ud ha 
señalado como más preferido? _____________ Hectáreas 
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30. (P/NP)  Y ya para finalizar ¿Qué contrato escogería de los siguientes que se presentan a 
continuación? 
CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL 
CONTRATO 
Contrato tipo 
 A 
Contrato tipo  
B 
No suscribiría 
ningún contrato 
de protección de 
aves 
Prima (*) 30€/ha 60€/ha   
Flexibilidad en la superficie acogida 40% 0%   
Multa adicional por encima de la 
devolución de la prima 
200€/ha 0€/ha   
Cultivar leguminosas en un porcentaje de 
la superficie acogida 
20% 0%   
Prohibición de laboreo o 
aprovechamiento  de barbecho durante… 
1 Abril al 1 
Agosto  
Ninguna 
restricción  
  
Indicar 1=más preferido, 2=siguiente, 
3= menos preferido 
      
(*) La prima se especifica por superficie cultivada, ya sea cereal y/o leguminosa 
 
31. (P/NP) Cuántas hectáreas estaría usted dispuesto a suscribir, para el contrato que Ud ha 
señalado como más preferido? _____________ Hectáreas 
 
32 (P) En el caso de que siempre haya elegido como más preferida la opción “Ningún 
contrato”, ¿Cuáles son sus motivos? 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
33 (P) ¿Qué habría hecho en la superficie acogida actual de no existir estas medidas 
agroambientales?  
 
Mantendría el mismo plan de cultivos que el que venía desarrollando. En este caso, 
¿mantendría Usted  el    mismo calendario de labores? 
 
Si    No   

Cambiaría el plan de cultivos: Cómo?______________________________ 
Mantendría la tierra arada para cobrar el pago único pero no cultivaría 
 Abandonaría completamente la actividad agraria  
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ENCUESTA SOBRE MEDIDAS AGROAMBIENTALES 
DE PROTECCIÓN DE AVES ESTEPARIAS 
 
BLOQUE III. INDICADORES DE ÉXITO DE LAS AYUDAS 
 
34 (P/NP)¿Conoce algunas de las especies de aves que hay en la zona donde se ubica su 
explotación? 
 
No   Si  , ¿puede nombrarme algunas? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
35 (P/NP) Conoce algún refrán, dicho o canción sobre las aves esteparias? 
 
Si   No   
 
En caso afirmativo, ¿nos podría indicar cuál conoce? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
36 (P/NP)  Desde el año 2000 ¿Ha observado un cambio en la presencia de aves en sus 
parcelas o colindantes? 
 
Si   No  
 
En caso afirmativo, ¿qué tipo de cambio ha observado? 
 
 He observado un mayor número de aves  
 He observado nuevas especies ¿cuáles? _________________ 
 He observado un menor número de aves 
 Están desapareciendo alguna(s) especie(s) ¿cuál(es)? _______________ 
 Otros cambios (indicar):____________________  
 
37 (P/NP) ¿Cree usted que estas medidas son efectivas para la protección y conservación de 
las aves esteparias? 1=”nada efectivas” a  5=”muy efectivas” 
Nada efectivas 
No muy 
efectivas 
Algo 
efectivas 
Muy 
efectivas 
Extremadamente 
efectivas No sabe 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
38 (P/NP) Podría describir otros beneficios que a su juicio tienen estas medidas 
agroambientales (Ej. erosión, prevención de incendios, etc) 
___________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________ 
 
39 (P/NP) Por favor, si tiene alguna sugerencia para mejorar estas medidas, indíquelo: 
_______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________   
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ENCUESTA SOBRE MEDIDAS AGROAMBIENTALES 
DE PROTECCIÓN DE AVES ESTEPARIAS 
 
BLOQUE IV: PREGUNTAS SOBRE SU EXPLOTACIÓN 
 
40 (P/NP) Tamaño total de su explotación: __________ Has 
 
41 (P/NP) Puede indicarnos su plan de cultivo de cultivos, incluyendo barbecho: 
Cultivos 
herbáceos  
superficie (has)  
Rendimientos 
(kg/ha) 
marcar con X  
si está acogida a: 
Uso   
ganado  
(Si/No) 
secano regadío secano regadío 
Medida 
1.1 
Medida  
1.8 
Otras 
medidas 
  
          
 
      
          
 
      
          
 
      
          
 
      
 
42 (P/NP) ¿Tiene ganado propio en su explotación? Si    No  
 Vacuno Ovino - caprino 
N° cabezas   
 
43 (P/NP) ¿Qué porcentaje de las tierras de secano que trabaja es arrendado?_________ 
 
44 (P/NP) Si tiene tierras arrendadas ¿cuál es el precio que paga por ellas?______ €/ha 
 
45 (P/NP) ¿Podría indicarnos cuál es el número de miembros de su familia, incluido Ud., 
que  trabajan en la explotación? ______________  ¿y el nº total de empleados?____________ 
 
46 (P/NP) ¿Contrata maquinaria para la realización de labores en su explotación? 
 
No    Si , ¿Para que labores? _____________________________ 
 
47  (P/NP) ¿Cuántas personas viven en su hogar?______  
d. ¿Cuántos entre 18-65? _____ 
e. ¿Cuántos menores de 18? ____ 
f. ¿Y mayores de 65?_____ 
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48  (P/NP) ¿Nos podría indicar qué parte de los ingresos de su hogar vienen de las siguientes 
fuentes? 
 
______  % Venta de la producción y actividad agraria 
______  % Prestación de servicios a otros agricultores 
______  %  Ayudas agroambientales 
______  % Pago único y otras ayudas 
______  % Ingresos de otros trabajos/ocupaciones 
_______% Pensiones  
 
49 (P/NP)¿Nos podría indicar cuál es la renta agraria que obtiene Ud en término medio al 
año de su actividad y producción agraria? 
 
 menos de 10.000 €   entre  30.000 € y 40.000 €  
 entre  10.000 € y 20.000 €  entre  40.000 € y 50.000 € 
 entre  20.000 € y 30.000 €  más de 50.000 € 
 
50 (P/NP)¿Se encuentra parte o toda su explotación incluida en Zona de Especial Protección 
para las Aves (ZEPA)?    
 
Si    No  
 
51 (P/NP) ¿Tiene o ha tenido expectativas de transformación a regadío en sus parcelas de 
secano?  
 
Si    No  
 
52 (P/NP)¿Nos podría indicar en qué municipio está su explotación?  
______________________________ 
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ENCUESTA SOBRE MEDIDAS AGROAMBIENTALES 
DE PROTECCIÓN DE AVES ESTEPARIAS 
 
BLOQUE V: OTRAS PREGUNTAS SOBRE UD 
 
53 (P/NP)  Mujer  Varón  
 
54 (P/NP) ¿Podría indicar cuantos años de experiencia tiene en la agricultura? 
________________________ 
 
55 (P/NP) ¿Podría indicar su nivel de estudios? 
 
Educación Básica     Bachillerato/FP     Universidad     Otras 
 
56 (P/NP) ¿Es usted agricultor a tiempo completo?    Si   No       
 
De no ser agricultor a tiempo completo, ¿con qué actividad combina el trabajo 
agrario?_____________________________________________________________ 
 
57 (P/NP) ¿Recibe la calificación de explotación prioritaria?   
 
Si    No     No sabe   
 
58 (P/NP) ¿Pertenece a algún sindicato, asociación o cooperativa?  
 
No   Si, ¿A cuál? 
 
59 (P/NP) ¿Podría indicarnos cuál es su año de nacimiento? ____________ 
 
60 (P/NP) ¿Dentro de cuantos años cree que va a retirarse de la actividad agraria? 
______________ 
 
61 (P/NP) ¿Qué cree usted que pasará con su explotación cuando usted deje la actividad 
agraria? 
 
 Abandono    Transferencia a un familiar 
 Arrendamiento  Venta 
 No sabe   Otros: _______________________ 
ANNEX II: Questionnaire for shellfish gatherers 
 
Ola. O meu nome é María e esta enquisa vai formar parte da tese que estou a realizar na Universidade 
de Santiago de Compostela co fin de avaliar as súas opinión sobre os problemas que teñen no seu 
sector na actualidade, motivo polo que me gustaría contar coa súa opinión se fose tan amable de 
responderme a unhas preguntas sobre esta tema. Moitas gracias 
 
1. ¿Cómo chegou a ser mariscador/a? 
 Marque cunha X 
Tradición familiar  
Expectativa de conseguir altos beneficios  
Porque non tiña outra opción  
De casualidade  
Outros (especificar)  
 
2. ¿Canto tempo leva dedicándose a este oficio?(nº anos) 
 
 
3. ¿Cre vostede que estarían mellor si fosen menos persoas vivindo do mar na súa zona? 
 
Si    Non    Non sei   
 
4. ¿Cre vostede  que a súa maneira de traballar no mar respeta as crenzas e tradicións locais? 
 
Si    Non    Non sei  
 
5. ¿Qué eventos ou actividades cre vostede que afectan ou están afectando ao entorno natural da súa 
zona? 
 Marque cunha X 
Cambio climático  
Turismo  
Furtivismo  
Contaminación  
Outros (especificar)  
 
6. ¿Cantos días traballa ao mes?(unha aproximación) 
 
 
7. ¿Cantas horas traballa ao día?(unha aproximación) 
 
 
8. ¿Organizase o traballo co resto de mariscadoras da súa zona? 
 
Si    Non    Non sei  
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9. En caso afirmativo, ¿Cree vostede que é vantaxoso organizarse o traballo?  
 
Si    Non    Non sei  
 
10. ¿Qué especies captura e cantos kg medios ao día?  
ESPECIE Nº kg medios que captura por día 
  
  
  
  
 
11. ¿Chega sempre a cubrir os topes máximos establecidos de kg permitidos para cada especie? 
Practicamente 
sempre 
A maioría das 
veces 
Algunhas veces Poucas veces Rara vez 
 
12. ¿Cal é o fin primordial das especies que captura?  
 Marque cunha X 
Consumo no fogar  
Venda directa vía lonxa  
Pasan á depuradora  
Ambas  
Outros (especificar)  
 
13. ¿Cal cre que é a porcentaxe de cumprimento coa normativa do resto de 
pescadores/mariscadoras/percebeiros  dentro de esta confraría na seguinte escala? 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
14. ¿Cal cre que é a porcentaxe de cumprimento coa normativa do resto de 
pescadores/mariscadoras /percebeiros noutras  confrarías veciñas na seguinte escala? 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
15. ¿Cales son os conflitos que existen na súa zona?  
 Marque cunha X 
Furtivismo  
Paro  
Contaminación de empresas  
Outros (especificar)  
 
16. Con respecto ao furtivismo, ¿cree vostede que esta actividade ilegal dana o recurso? 
 
Si    Non    Non sei  
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17. ¿Por qué cree vostede que a xente furtiva? 
 Marque cunha X 
Escasa vixilancia  
Alto nivel de paro na zona  
Escaso coñecemento do dano que causa  
Posibilidade de altos ingresos non 
declarables 
 
Existencia de grupos marxinais na zona  
Baixa penalización  
Non está mal visto pola sociedade  
Outros (especificar cales)  
 
18. ¿Cales cree vostede que son as posibles solucións ao furtivismo?  
 Marque cunha X 
Máis vixilancia  
Multas máis elevadas  
Pena de cárcere  
Traballos voluntarios en favor da 
comunidade 
 
Máis oportunidades de emprego  
Controis ás depuradoras  
Controis aos establecementos hoteleiros  
Outros (especificar)  
 
19. ¿Cree vostede que está mal visto pola sociedade ser furtivo? 
Penso que non está mal visto Penso que á sociedade é lle 
indiferente 
Penso que está mal visto 
 
20. ¿Considera que as normas de capturas ás que están sometidos son sinxelas e fáciles de cumprir? 
 
Si   Non    Non sei  
 
21. ¿Cree que esas normas  son cribles e apropiadas? 
 
Si   Non    Non sei  
22. ¿Cree vostede que as normas con respecto aos topes de extracción e vedas son eficaces? 
 
Si   Non    Non sei  
 
23. ¿Cal cre vostede que o porcentaxe de cumprimento da normativa  referente á extracción do 
recurso? 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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24. ¿Qué tipo de condutas son sancionables e cal é a sanción en caso de que se incumpran as normas? 
 Si/Non Tipo de sanción 
Incumprir días de marisqueo   
Incumprir topes de Kg   
Incumprir tallas   
Outras(especificar)   
 
25. ¿Poderíanos dicir cantas veces son sancionados/as os seus compañeiros/as por termino medio nun 
ano? 
 
 
26. ¿Existe vixilancia na zona para evitar o furtivismo? 
 
Si   Non    Non sei  
 
27. ¿Cal diría vostede que é a súa porcentaxe de cumprimento coa normativa na seguinte escala? 
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
 
28. Se tódolos/as seus compañeiros/as tiveran un porcentaxe de cumprimento coa normativa do 50%, 
¿cambiaría o seu nivel de cumprimento? 
 Marque cunha X 
Si, melloraría o meu nivel de cumprimento  
Si, diminuiría o meu nivel de cumprimento  
Non me importa o nivel de cumprimento dos 
demais, seguiría igual 
 
 
29. A continuación, imaxine que vive nunha zona na que na que as praias están sen traballar e se 
está pensado como organizar o actividade marisqueira. Para iso estanse deseñando uns plans de 
xestión que permitan mellorar temporalmente a abundancia do recurso. Estes plans consistirían no 
seguinte: 
 
- Terían unha duración de 5 anos, nos que cada ano habería un número de meses nos que estaría 
prohibida a súa actividade. Cada mes de veda tería unha subvención de 1200€. 
 
-É importante ter  en conta que os efectos destas políticas non terían porque darse inmediatamente, é 
dicir, vai a pasar un período de tempo ata que se note a maior abundancia de recurso.  
 
-Ademais, no caso de que vostede aceptara unha das políticas e non respectase os tempos de veda 
sería sancionado, tendo que devolver a subvención recibida máis un 20% a maiores desta 
subvención, facéndose público o seu incumprimento ó resto de compañeiros. 
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A continuación móstranselle unha serie de cadros para que elixa en cada un deles o escenario que lle 
pareza máis apropiado e que sexa máis preferido para vostede. 
 
Este sería o primeiro escenario, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 6 2 4   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
10% 15% 25%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
1 ano e medio Medio ano 1 ano   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
40 20 60   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
        
 
 
Este sería o segundo escenario, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 4 2 6   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
10% 15% 15%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
Medio ano 1 ano 1 ano e medio   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
20 40 20   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
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O terceiro escenario correspóndese co cadro seguinte, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 4 6 2   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
10% 15% 25%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
1 ano e medio 1 ano 1 ano e medio   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
20 60 40   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
        
 
 
Agora presentamos o cuarto escenario, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 4 2 2   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
10% 15% 10%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
1 ano Medio ano 1 ano e medio   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
40 60 20   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
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Este sería o quinto escenario, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 4 4 2   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
25% 15% 10%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
1 ano  Medio ano 1 ano   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
20 40 20   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
        
 
 
Este sería o sexto escenario, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 2 6 4   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
15% 10% 10%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
1 ano Medio ano Medio ano   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
20 60 40   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
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O  sétimo escenario correspóndese co cadro seguinte, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 4 6 2   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
10% 15% 25%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
1 ano e medio 1 ano Medio ano   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
60 40 20   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
        
 
 
Agora presentamos o oitavo escenario, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 6 2 4   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
15% 10% 15%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
Medio ano 1 ano Medio ano   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
20 40 60   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
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Este sería o noveno escenario, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 2 4 6   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
15% 10% 25%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
1 ano e medio 1 ano Medio ano   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
40 60 20   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
        
 
 
Agora presentamos o décimo escenario, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 2 6 4   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
15% 10% 25%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
1 ano e medio 1 ano Medio ano   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
60 20 40   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
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O undécimo escenario correspóndese co cadro seguinte, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 6 2 4   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
25% 10% 15%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
1 ano e medio Medio ano 1 ano   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
40 40 20   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
        
 
Finalmente, presentamos o último escenario, por favor, díganos que opción elixiría: 
  
Plan de Xestión A Plan de Xestión B Plan de Xestión C 
Non 
escollería 
ningún 
plan  
Número de meses de veda 2 6 4   
Porcentaxe de melloría na 
abundancia do recurso 
25% 10% 15%   
Anos que van pasar ata 
notar a melloría 
1 ano Medio ano 1 ano e medio   
Número de persoas que se 
poderían acoller 
(imaxinando que o 
número máximo de 
persoas que poderían 
traballar sería 60 e o 
número mínimo de 
persoas serían 20) 
60 40 20   
Elixa o PLAN que lle 
pareza mellor para os 
seus intereses 
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30. Agora gustaríanos coñecer si, ¿realizou cursos formativos para explotar mellor o recurso? 
 
Si   Non    Non sei  
 
En caso afirmativo, díganos o seguinte: 
 
31. ¿Cre vostede que estes cursos foron de utilidade para mellorar o seu coñecemento sobre a forma 
de traballar o mar? 
 
Si   Non    Non sei  
 
32. ¿Forma vostede parte da confraría? 
 
Si   Non    Non sei  
 
33. ¿Cre vostede que existe unha persoa líder na xestión dos recursos da súa zona? 
 
Si   Non    Non sei  
 
34. ¿Cre vostede que a súa familia espera que vostede cumpra a normativa ao 100%? Marque cunha 
X 
Penso que non o esperan en 
absoluto 
Penso que non o teñen en 
conta 
Penso que o pensan 
claramente 
 
35. ¿Cre vostede que os seus veciños esperan que vostede cumpra a normativa ao 100%? Marque 
cunha  X 
Penso que non o esperan en 
absoluto 
Penso que non o teñen en 
conta 
Penso que o pensan 
claramente 
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INDICADORES SOCIOECONÓMICOS 
 
 Ano de nacemento:  |___ |___| ___| ___| 
 
 Lugar de residencia (concello): 
 
 Sexo: 
 
Muller   Home     
 
 Número de persoas no seu fogar (incluíndose vostede): ____ ____ 
 
Nº de persoas no fogar menores de 16 anos: ____  
Nº de persoas no fogar de entre 16 a 30 anos: ____  
Nº de persoas no fogar maiores de 30 anos: ____  
 
 Número de persoas no seu fogar que obteñen ingresos, tanto por traballo como por pensións:___ 
 
 Por favor indique cunha X o seu nivel educativo: 
 Marque cunha X 
Sen estudios  
Estudios primarios(EXB/Bacharelato 
elemental ou similares 
 
FPI/FPII ou similares  
Bacharelato superior/BUP/COU ou similares  
Universitarios   
 
 Por favor indique cunha X  os ingresos brutos mensuais que aproximadamente obtén polo seu 
traballo:  
 Marque cunha X 
Menos de 1.000 €  
1.001 -1.800 €  
1.801- 2.500 €  
2.501- 3.000 €  
Máis de 3.000 €  
 ¿Pertence vostede a algún sindicato, asociación ou cooperativa?  
 
Si   Non     Non sei  
 
¿A cal? 
 
 
 
 ¿Dispón vostede dunha segunda vivenda? 
 
Si   Non     Non sei  
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 No último ano, ¿cantos días puido coller de lecer ou descanso? Marque cunha X 
 Marque cunha X 
Ningún, traballei tódolos días que puiden  
Un mes  
Quince días  
Unha semana  
Outros (especificar)  
 
 ¿A qué dedica o seu tempo libre e de vacacións? 
 Marque cunha X 
Actividades Informáticas  
Cursos varios  
Lectura  
Ver TV/DVD/videos  
Escoitar a radio  
Ir ao cine  
Viaxar por España  
Viaxar por Galicia  
Viaxar ao estranxeiro  
Labores da casa  
 
 No caso de necesitar acudir ao médico, ¿dispón dun seguro médico privado a maiores  da 
Seguridade Social? 
 
Si   Non     Non sei  
 
 ¿Podería por favor indicarnos o nome da rúa onde vive? (o nome unicamente) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX III. A: Questionnaire for forest owners: Punishment 
 
1. Aproximadamente,  ¿cantas hectáreas de monte forman parte da  comunidade de montes en man 
común á que vostede pertence? 
 Marque cunha 
X 
Menos de 30 ha.  
Entre 31 e 50 ha.  
Entre 51 e 70 ha.  
Entre 71 e 100 ha.  
Entre 101 e 150 ha.  
Entre 151 e 250 ha.  
Entre 251 e 300 ha.  
Máis de 300 ha.  
 
2. ¿Naceu no lugar onde están os montes da comunidade? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei  
 
3. ¿Os montes da comunidade encóntranse onde vive actualmente ou están onde ten a súa segunda 
vivenda? 
 Marque cunha X 
Os montes da comunidade encóntranse onde vivo actualmente  
Os montes da comunidade encóntranse onde teño a miña segunda 
vivenda 
 
 
4. Cando foi a última vez que venderon madeira? 
 
 
 
 
5. Na súa opinión, a conservación dos montes na súa comunidade é …  
Moi mala Bastante mala Normal Bastante boa Moi boa 
     
 
6. Na súa opinión e no caso de que teña montes propios, a conservación dos seus montes é … 
Moi mala Bastante mala Normal Bastante boa Moi boa 
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7. ¿Cal é a principal actividade económica que se leva a cabo no  monte da comunidade? 
 Marque  
cunha X 
Gandería  
Madeira  
Actividades agrícolas  
Recolección de froitas, setas..  
Caza  
Produción de biomasa  
Enerxía eólica  
Produción de mel  
Outras actividades, diga cales   
Ningunha  
 
8. Dende un punto de vista económico, vostede diría que os montes da súa zona son: 
NON COMPETITIVOS 
(o monte non crea traballo nin 
riqueza) 
MODERADAMENTE 
COMPETITIVOS 
 ( o monte xera algunhas fontes de 
ingresos adicionais, pero non é 
unha fonte estable de ingresos) 
COMPETITIVOS 
(o monte é o sustento de moitas 
familias) 
   
 
9. ¿Cómo cre vostede que a administración (Xunta de Galicia) xestiona os problemas dos montes? 
Moi mal 
Bastante 
mal 
Nin ben nin mal Bastante ben Moi ben 
     
 
10. Na súa opinión, ¿cál é o principal problema ao que se enfronta o sector forestal na súa zona? 
Escolla unicamente unha opción. 
Neglixencia (os montes non están ben coidados)  
Incendios  
Sobre-aproveitamento ou deforestación  
Baixa rendibilidade económica  
Despoboamento nas zonas rurais  
Talas ilegais  
Invasión de especies non nativas  
Enfermidades e pestes dos árbores  
Outros (dicir cales)  
 
11. No caso de que na pregunta anterior escollese como problema principal os incendios, indique en 
qué ano foi o último incendio na súa zona: 
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12. ¿Cómo cre van estar os montes da súa zona dentro de 50 anos? 
 
 
 
13. Os traballos que se fan no monte da comunidade son encargados ao exterior ou son feitos polos 
propios membros? 
_____________________ 
 
 En caso de que sexa feitos polos propios membros, ¿Canto colabora cos demais comuneiros? 
Moito Bastante  Normal Máis ben pouco Pouco 
     
 
14.  Na súa opinión, ¿Existe unha persoa líder dentro da súa zona á hora de ocuparse dos temas 
forestais? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
15. ¿Cómo considera a relación que ten cos demais comuneiros? 
Moi boa Bastante boa Normal Máis ben mala Mala 
     
 
16. ¿Cantas veces se pode chegar a reunir cos comuneiros cada ano para tratar temas do monte? 
 
 
 
17. A decisión que vostede toma nas asembleas, ¿ Cómo a toma? 
 Marque cunha X 
As decisións son cousa miña aínda que o 
monte é de meus pais 
 
As decisións tómanse entre toda a familia 
porque aínda non se repartiu 
 
As decisións tómoas unicamente eu posto 
que o monte é meu 
 
As decisións tómoas en conxunto cos meus 
fillos posto que eu xa son maior 
 
 
18. ¿Cantos membros forman parte da comunidade de montes á que vostede pertence? 
 
 
19. ¿Cantos anos fai que vostede é o encargado/a de tomar as decisións (votar nas asembleas) con 
respecto aos temas da comunidade de montes? 
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20. ¿Cre vostede que na súa comunidade están ben claros os límites acerca de quen forma parte da 
comunidade de montes e quen non? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
21. ¿Cre que tódolos comuneiros e os veciños próximos coñecen estes límites? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
22. ¿Cre que na practica estes límites se respectan? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
23. ¿Cre que as normas de aproveitamento forestal  que teñen que cumprir  son apropiadas para 
conservar o recurso? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
24. ¿Cre que estas normas son apropiadas para que a comunidade poida aproveitar dun xeito correcto 
o recurso? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
25. ¿ Cre son eficaces? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
26. ¿E cre que respectan as  crenzas e tradicións locais? 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
27. ¿Diría vostede que se poden mellorar as normas existentes? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
28. En caso afirmativo, ¿En qué se poderían mellorar? 
 
 
 
 
 
29. As decisións en torno a temas forestais ¿tómanse de forma colectiva, entre todos e igualmente 
representados? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
30. ¿Existen controles para asegurar o cumprimento das normas forestais por parte da comunidade? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
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31. ¿Existen controles para asegurar que os veciños que  NON forman parte da comunidade respeten 
os montes en man común? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
32. ¿Existen sancións para as persoas que non cumpran as obrigacións establecidas na lei? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
33. No caso de que existan sancións, ¿son variables dependendo da infracción cometida? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
34. ¿Existen mecanismos rápidos para solucionar os conflitos que poidan xurdir? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
35. ¿Qué é  o que se fai para resolvelos conflitos? 
 
 
 
 
 
36. ¿Cre que os seus dereitos, as súas decisións son respectadas por outros que non sexan membros 
da comunidade e pola administración? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
37. ¿Asiste a tódalas reunións que se organizan na comunidade por diferentes temas? 
Sempre Case sempre A veces Case nunca Nunca 
     
 
38. ¿Qué actividades se propoñen ou promoven dende a propia comunidade para mellorar o estado do 
monte ou contribuír ao benestar do pobo? 
 
 
 
 
39. ¿Canto participa vostede nestas actividades? 
Sempre Case sempre A veces Case nunca Nunca 
     
 
40. ¿Pensa que tódolos comuneiros realizan as tarefas necesarias para manter o monte en bo estado? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
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41. ¿Forma vostede parte da xunta directiva da comunidade de montes? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei  
 
 En caso afirmativo, ¿dende cando?_______________________ 
 
42. Podería indicarnos o nome da comunidade de monte en man común á que pertenza: 
_______________________ 
 
43. ¿Cre vostede que, con respecto ás tarefas que son necesarias levar a cabo na comunidade, vostede 
se esforza máis que o resto de membros? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei  
 
44. ¿Considera que o grado de esforzo dos demais comuneiros é suficiente? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei  
 
45. ¿É o seu grado de esforzo? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei  
 
46. ¿Cantos días lle dedica ao ano para manter o monte en bo estado? 
 
 
 
47. ¿Qué diría vostede acerca das seguintes afirmacións? Valore marcando cunha X: 
 
 Na maior parte dos comuneiros da miña zona  pódese confiar 
Estou moi de 
acordo 
Estou de acordo 
Nin de 
acordo nin 
en 
desacordo 
Estou bastante en 
desacordo 
Estou moi en 
desacordo 
 
 A xestión do monte tiña que facerse pensando máis nas xeracións presentes que futuras 
Estou moi de 
acordo 
Estou de acordo 
Nin de 
acordo nin 
en 
desacordo 
Estou bastante en 
desacordo 
Estou moi en 
desacordo 
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48. Agora imaxine que vostede pertence a unha comunidade de montes que está formada por 50 
veciños. A súa comunidade acaba de recibir unha sanción en virtude da nova Lei de Incendios polo 
mal estado do monte  como consecuencia do pouco esforzo realizado polos propietarios en termos de 
limpeza e por tanto alto perigo de incendios. Entón, agora vostede ten que tomar unha decisión acerca 
de cómo repartir esta sanción entre os membros. É dicir, ten que indicar canto diñeiro paga vostede e 
canto diñeiro ten que pagar a comunidade. Pero ten que ter en conta, que  a comunidade ten un fondo 
que pode cubrir o pago desta multa. Entón, este pago pode facelo vostede directamente, ou facer que o 
fondo que hai dispoñible na comunidade se faga cargo da súa parte, independentemente do que 
decidan facer os outros. 
 
A continuación, móstraselle unha táboa na que ten que indicar a súa decisión de pago: 
Importe da  
sanción 
A ser 50, se repartimos  
a partes iguais, a cada 
 veciño corresponderíalle: 
O que  
pago  eu  
 
 O que paga o  
fondo da comunidade  
Se a sanción fose de 500 € 10 € …. …. 
Se a sanción fose de 5.000 € 100 € …. …. 
Se a sanción fose 50.000 € 1000 € .....  .... 
 
 
49. A continuación preséntanselles unhas afirmacións para que vostede valore. Só ten que indicar 
cunha X o que vostede pensa: 
 
Nunca 
Máis 
dunha vez 
A miúdo 
Moi a 
miúdo 
Axudo a alguén que ten problemas co 
coche ou tractor (cambiar unha roda, 
chamar a un mecánico, etc.) 
    
Prestei un obxecto de valor a un veciño 
que non coñecía demasiado 
    
Axudo aos meus veciños cos seus 
traballos 
    
Sen que ninguén me diga nada, aviso a 
un veciño se vexo que o seu ganado, os 
seus animais se escapan ou corren perigo 
    
Dalgún xeito, a veces penso que non é 
xusto que algunhas persoas traballen 
menos e teñan os mesmos dereitos ca 
min 
    
Moitas veces dou cousas e non espero 
nada a cambio 
    
Eu colaboro nas tarefas do monte en 
todo o que podo se os demais tamén 
colaboran 
    
Eu colaboro nas tarefas do monte polo 
meu propio ben 
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INDICADORES SOCIOECONÓMICOS 
 
 Ano de nacemento:  |___ |___| ___| ___| 
 
 Lugar de residencia (concello): 
 
 
 
 Código Postal: |___ |___| ___| ___| 
 
 Sexo: 
 
Muller   Home     
 
 Número de persoas no seu fogar (incluíndose vostede): ____ ____ 
 
Nº de persoas no fogar menores de 16 anos: ____  
Nº de persoas no fogar de entre 16 a 30 anos: ____  
Nº de persoas no fogar maiores de 30 anos: ____  
 
 Por favor indique cunha X o seu nivel educativo: 
 
Marque cunha X 
Sen estudios 
 
Estudios primarios(EXB/Bacharelato elemental ou 
similares 
 
FPI/FPII ou similares 
 
Bacharelato superior/BUP/COU ou similares 
 
Estudios Universitarios  
 
 
 ¿Cal é a súa profesión? 
______________________________________ 
 
 Por favor indique cunha X  os ingresos brutos mensuais do seu fogar:  
 Marque cunha X 
Menos de 500 €  
501 - 1000 €  
1.001 -1.500 €  
1.501- 1.800 €  
1.801- 2.500 €  
2.501- 3.000 €  
3.001- 3.500 €  
Máis de 3.500 €  
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 ¿Cal é actualmente a súa situación laboral? 
 Marque cunha X 
Asalariado  
Autónomo  
Desempregado, busca 1er emprego  
Desempregado, traballei antes  
Estudante  
Labores do fogar  
Xubilado / pensionista  
Outros (ESPECIFICAR): 
 
 
 
 ¿Pertence vostede a algún sindicato, asociación ou cooperativa?  
 
Si   Non     Non sei   
 
¿A cal? 
 
 
 
 ¿Tivo ou ten vostede algún cargo de responsabilidade na zona onde vive? 
 
Si   Non     Non sei  
 
¿Cal? 
 
 
 Pregunta optativa: Se vostede tivera que clasificarse dentro dunha determinada tendencia 
política, diría que é: 
o De esquerdas 
o De dereitas 
o De centro 
o Non ten ideoloxía política 
o Outro: 
  
ANNEX III.B: Questionnaire for forest owners: Reward 
 
1. Aproximadamente,  ¿cantas hectáreas de monte forman parte da  comunidade de montes en man 
común á que vostede pertence? 
 Marque cunha 
X 
Menos de 30 ha.  
Entre 31 e 50 ha.  
Entre 51 e 70 ha.  
Entre 71 e 100 ha.  
Entre 101 e 150 ha.  
Entre 151 e 250 ha.  
Entre 251 e 300 ha.  
Máis de 300 ha.  
 
2. ¿Naceu no lugar onde están os montes da comunidade? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei  
 
3 ¿Os montes da comunidade encóntranse onde vive actualmente ou están onde ten a súa segunda 
vivenda? 
 Marque cunha X 
Os montes da comunidade encóntranse onde vivo actualmente  
Os montes da comunidade encóntranse onde teño a miña segunda 
vivenda 
 
 
3. Cando foi a última vez que venderon madeira? 
 
 
 
4. Na súa opinión, a conservación dos montes na súa comunidade é …  
Moi mala Bastante mala Normal Bastante boa Moi boa 
     
 
5. Na súa opinión e no caso de que teña montes propios, a conservación dos seus montes é …  
Moi mala Bastante mala Normal Bastante boa Moi boa 
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6. ¿Cales son as actividades económicas que se levan a cabo no  monte da comunidade? 
 Marque  
cunha X 
Gandería  
Madeira  
Actividades agrícolas  
Recolección de froitas, setas..  
Caza  
Produción de biomasa  
Enerxía eólica  
Produción de mel  
Outras actividades, diga cales   
Ningunha  
 
7. Dende un punto de vista económico, vostede diría que os montes da súa zona son: 
NON COMPETITIVOS 
(o monte non crea traballo nin 
riqueza) 
MODERADAMENTE 
COMPETITIVOS 
 ( o monte xera algunhas fontes de 
ingresos adicionais, pero non é 
unha fonte estable de ingresos) 
COMPETITIVOS 
(o monte é o sustento de moitas 
familias) 
   
 
8. ¿Cómo cre vostede que a administración (Xunta de Galicia) xestiona os problemas dos montes? 
Moi mal 
Bastante 
mal 
Nin ben nin mal Bastante ben Moi ben 
     
 
9. Na súa opinión, ¿cál é o principal problema ao que se enfronta o sector forestal na súa zona? 
Escolla unicamente unha opción. 
Neglixencia (os montes non están ben coidados)  
Incendios  
Sobre-aproveitamento ou deforestación  
Baixa rendibilidade económica  
Despoboamento nas zonas rurais  
Talas ilegais  
Invasión de especies non nativas  
Enfermidades e pestes dos árbores  
Outros (dicir cales)  
 
10. Por favor, indique en qué ano foi o último incendio na súa zona: 
 
 
11. ¿Cómo cre que van estar os montes da súa zona dentro de 50 anos? 
 
 
12. Os traballos que se fan no monte da comunidade son encargados ao exterior ou son feitos polos 
propios membros? 
_____________________ 
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 En caso de que sexa feitos polos propios membros, ¿Canto colabora cos demais comuneiros? 
Moito Bastante  Normal Máis ben pouco Pouco 
     
 
13.  Na súa opinión, ¿Existe unha persoa líder dentro da súa zona á hora de ocuparse dos temas 
forestais? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
14. ¿Cómo considera a relación que ten cos demais comuneiros? 
Moi boa Bastante boa Normal Máis ben mala Mala 
     
 
15. ¿Cantas veces se pode chegar a reunir cos comuneiros cada ano para tratar temas do monte? 
 
 
 
 
16. A decisión que vostede toma nas asembleas, ¿ Cómo a toma? 
 Marque cunha X 
As decisións son cousa miña posto que o 
comuneiro son eu 
 
Nas miñas decisións sempre teño en conta o 
que pensa a  familia 
 
 
17. ¿Cantos membros forman parte da comunidade de montes á que vostede pertence? 
 
 
 
18. ¿Cantos anos fai que vostede é o encargado/a de tomar as decisións (votar nas asembleas) con 
respecto aos temas da comunidade de montes? 
 
 
19. ¿Cre vostede que na súa comunidade tódolos comuneiros se coñecen? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
20. ¿Cre vostede que os veciños que non son comuneiros teñen claro que non forman parte da 
comunidade? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei    
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21. ¿Cre que na practica os veciños non comuneiros respectan á comunidade? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
22. ¿Cre que as normas de aproveitamento forestal  que teñen que cumprir  son apropiadas para 
conservar o recurso? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
23. ¿Cre que estas normas son apropiadas para que a comunidade poida aproveitar dun xeito correcto 
o recurso? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
24. ¿ Cre son eficaces? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
25. ¿E cre que respectan as  crenzas e tradicións locais? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
26. ¿Diría vostede que se poden mellorar as normas existentes? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
27. En caso afirmativo, ¿En qué se poderían mellorar? 
 
 
 
 
 
28. As decisións en torno a temas forestais ¿tómanse de forma colectiva, entre todos e igualmente 
representados? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
29. ¿Existen controles para asegurar o cumprimento das normas forestais por parte da comunidade? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
30. ¿Existen controles para asegurar que os veciños que  NON forman parte da comunidade respeten 
os montes en man común? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
31. ¿Existen sancións para as persoas que non cumpran as obrigacións establecidas na lei? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei    
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32. No caso de que existan sancións, ¿son variables dependendo da infracción cometida? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
33. ¿Existen mecanismos rápidos para solucionar os conflitos que poidan xurdir? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
34. ¿Qué é  o que se fai para resolvelos conflitos? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35. ¿Cre que os seus dereitos, as súas decisións son respectadas por outros que non sexan membros 
da comunidade e pola administración? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
36. ¿Asiste a tódalas reunións que se organizan na comunidade por diferentes temas? 
Sempre Case sempre A veces Case nunca Nunca 
     
 
37. ¿Qué actividades se propoñen ou promoven dende a propia comunidade para mellorar o estado do 
monte ou contribuír ao benestar do pobo? 
 
 
 
 
 
38. ¿Canto participa vostede nestas actividades? 
Sempre Case sempre A veces Case nunca Nunca 
     
 
39. ¿Pensa que tódolos comuneiros realizan as tarefas necesarias para manter o monte en bo estado? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei   
 
40. ¿Forma vostede parte da xunta directiva da comunidade de montes? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei  
 
 En caso afirmativo, ¿dende cando?_______________________  
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41. Podería indicarnos o nome da comunidade de monte en man común á que pertenza: 
_______________________ 
 
42. ¿Cre vostede que, con respecto ás tarefas que son necesarias levar a cabo na comunidade, vostede 
se esforza máis que o resto de membros? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei  
 
43. ¿Considera que o grado de esforzo dos demais comuneiros é suficiente? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei  
 
44. ¿É o seu grado de esforzo? 
 
Si    Non   Non sei  
 
 
 
 
45.  ¿Cantos días dedica ao ano para temas relacionados co monte?  
 
 
 
46. ¿Qué diría vostede acerca das seguintes afirmacións? Valore marcando cunha X: 
 
 Na maior parte dos comuneiros da miña zona  pódese confiar 
Estou moi de 
acordo 
Estou de acordo 
Nin de 
acordo nin 
en 
desacordo 
Estou bastante en 
desacordo 
Estou moi en 
desacordo 
 
 A xestión do monte tiña que facerse pensando máis nas xeracións presentes que futuras 
Estou moi de 
acordo 
Estou de acordo 
Nin de 
acordo nin 
en 
desacordo 
Estou bastante en 
desacordo 
Estou moi en 
desacordo 
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47. Agora imaxine que vostede pertence a unha comunidade de montes que está formada por 50 
veciños. A súa comunidade acaba de recibir unha subvención declarable  en virtude da Lei de 
prevención e defensa contra incendios polo bo estado do monte  como consecuencia do esforzo 
realizado polos propietarios.  Estes cartos poden ser empregados libremente por vostedes, é dicir, 
poden  cobralos de xeito individual pero tamén poden reinvestilos na Comunidade de Montes. Da 
parte que lle corresponde a vostede, ten que decidir libremente canto diñeiro garda no seu peto e canto 
deixaría (de ser o caso) para un fondo da comunidade de montes. A cantidade que vostede deixe no 
fondo será empregada en realizar traballos de mantemento do monte co cal se prevé obter uns 
beneficios que lle reportarán o 40% do total que vostede deixou para ese fondo ( ou investiu) no 
fondo. 
 
A continuación, móstraselle unha táboa na que ten que indicar a súa decisión de reparto: 
Importe da  
subvención 
A ser 50, se repartimos  
a partes iguais, a cada 
 veciño corresponderíalle: 
Para  
min 
 No fondo  
reinvestiría  
Se a subvención fose de 500 € 10 € …. …. 
Se a subvención fose de 5.000 € 100 € …. …. 
Se a subvención fose 50.000 € 1000 € .....  .... 
 
48. A continuación preséntanselles unhas afirmacións para que vostede valore. Só ten que indicar 
cunha X o que vostede pensa: 
 
Nunca 
Máis 
dunha vez 
A miúdo 
Moi a 
miúdo 
Axudo a alguén que ten problemas co 
coche ou tractor (cambiar unha roda, 
chamar a un mecánico, etc.) 
    
Prestei un obxecto de valor a un veciño 
que non coñecía demasiado 
    
Axudo aos meus veciños cos seus 
traballos 
    
Sen que ninguén me diga nada, aviso a 
un veciño se vexo que o seu ganado, os 
seus animais se escapan ou corren perigo 
    
Dalgún xeito, a veces penso que non é 
xusto que algunhas persoas traballen 
menos e teñan os mesmos dereitos ca 
min 
    
Moitas veces dou cousas e non espero 
nada a cambio 
    
Eu colaboro nas tarefas do monte en 
todo o que podo se os demais tamén 
colaboran 
    
Eu colaboro nas tarefas do monte polo 
meu propio ben 
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INDICADORES SOCIOECONÓMICOS 
 
 Ano de nacemento:  |___ |___| ___| ___| 
 
 Lugar de residencia (concello): 
 
 
 
 Código Postal: |___ |___| ___| ___| 
 
 Sexo: 
 
Muller   Home     
 
 Número de persoas no seu fogar (incluíndose vostede): ____ ____ 
 
Nº de persoas no fogar menores de 16 anos: ____  
Nº de persoas no fogar de entre 16 a 30 anos: ____  
Nº de persoas no fogar maiores de 30 anos: ____  
 
 Por favor indique cunha X o seu nivel educativo: 
 
Marque cunha X 
Sen estudios 
 
Estudios primarios(EXB/Bacharelato elemental ou 
similares 
 
FPI/FPII ou similares 
 
Bacharelato superior/BUP/COU ou similares 
 
Estudios Universitarios  
 
 
 ¿Cal é a súa profesión? 
 
______________________________________ 
 
 Por favor indique cunha X  os ingresos brutos mensuais do seu fogar:  
 Marque cunha X 
Menos de 500 €  
501 - 1000 €  
1.001 -1.500 €  
1.501- 1.800 €  
1.801- 2.500 €  
2.501- 3.000 €  
3.001- 3.500 €  
Máis de 3.500 €  
  
229 
 
 ¿Cal é actualmente a súa situación laboral? 
 Marque cunha X 
Asalariado  
Autónomo  
Desempregado, busca 1er emprego  
Desempregado, traballei antes  
Estudante  
Labores do fogar  
Xubilado / pensionista  
Outros (ESPECIFICAR): 
 
 
 
 ¿Pertence vostede a algún sindicato, asociación ou cooperativa?  
 
Si   Non     Non sei   
 
¿A cal? 
 
 
 
 ¿Tivo ou ten vostede algún cargo de responsabilidade na zona onde vive? 
 
Si   Non     Non sei  
 
¿Cal? 
 
 
 
 Pregunta optativa: Se vostede tivera que clasificarse dentro dunha determinada tendencia política, 
diría que é: 
 
o De esquerdas 
o De dereitas 
o De centro 
o Non ten ideoloxía política 
o Outro: 
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to understand the acceptability of climate change policies at a worldwide level.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The consequences of climate change are numerous and wide-
ranging. Changes in temperatures and climate variability impact
the environment and human health (United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, UNFCC, 2012)1 and have signiﬁcant
economic impacts around the world (The Nature Conservancy,
2013). A number of recent, severe episodes related to climate
change with clear economic implications were hurricane Sandy,
which affected USA in 2012, and the typhoon Haiyan that caused
more than 6000 deaths in 2013 in the Philippines, as well as the
cold wave sweeping the USA in 2014, with temperatures below 501.
In general terms, the economic sectors that are most affected by this
global climate change process are agriculture, forestry, energy and
tourism (European Commission, 2012). Recent research has also
shown that while no clear action is taken to curb global carbon
emissions, climate change impacts could cost between 5% and 20%
of the annual global gross domestic product of many countries
(Hallegatte and Corfee-Morlot, 2011).
Due to these important economic and social consequences of
climate change, a large number of policies have been developed
around the world aimed at reducing the impact of such an
important phenomenon. The most signiﬁcant international agree-
ment was the Kyoto Protocol, which came into effect in 2005. This
treaty encouraged industrialized countries to stabilize emissions of
greenhouse gases (GHG). However, and according to Schiermeier
(2012), despite the existence of this protocol, global emissions
have increased worldwide by 50% since 1990, a trend that has
mainly been driven by the economic growth of China and other
parts of Asia, South America and Africa. One of the main criticisms
is that the Kyoto Protocol has not controlled for the free-rider
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problem, at the same time as having very few enforcement
mechanisms (Helm, 2012).
Based on these considerations, climate change policies have
become one of the major concerns and priorities around the
world. However, and after many experimental policies and appli-
cations, one question remains unsolved: how should effective
climate change policies be designed and articulated? This paper
sheds light on the role of social norms on preferences (reﬂected by
the willingness to pay [WTP]) for different types of climate control
policies. These social factors are generally ignored in the architec-
tural design of effective mitigation and adaptation strategies
worldwide. In the following analysis, these factors have a strong
explanatory power in terms of understanding acceptability and
preferences towards climate change policies.
It should be acknowledged that in order for most climate
change policies to be effective, behavioral changes have to take
place, including a reduction of energy consumption, awareness of
the issues, and a willingness to adopt (and pay) for newer and
cleaner technologies. These strategies would go hand in hand with
other mechanisms suggested by the UNEP (2009), such as promot-
ing the construction of energy efﬁcient buildings, sustainable
transport, renewable energies, and the re-use of industrial and
household wastes, among others. Therefore, understanding the
role of social norms and the preferences of decision-makers and
end-users is crucial in the process of promoting acceptability for
control policies (Pollit and Shaorshadze, 2011).
Given the need to articulate policies to combat the global
climate change process, and based on the fact that most require
a change in consumption or production technologies, our goal is to
identify the type of actions that are most preferred and accepted
by citizens, assessing how the public's support for these policies
(expressed by willingness to pay (WTP) estimates) is affected by
multiple causing factors, including the country's degree of devel-
opment, the cultural importance of compliance with obligations
and rules, time preferences and other social norms. The identiﬁca-
tion of these factors may allow us to provide policy recommenda-
tions to guide future actions in order to improve policy design and
increase the public's acceptability of climate control policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides
background information on the relationship between behavioral
economics and climate change. Section 3 presents the data sources
used to create the meta-data set; Section 4 presents the econo-
metric models and research hypotheses. Section 5 presents the
results, and the paper concludes with the discussion and policy
recommendations presented in Section 6.
2. Behavioral economics and climate change
Brekke and Johansson-Stenman (2008a, 2008b) highlighted the
idea that climate change policies can be interpreted as a global
public good, given that everyone can obtain beneﬁts from them,
while it is not possible to hinder or exclude others from enjoying
their beneﬁts. Traditional economic models consider that indivi-
duals are purely selﬁsh in terms of consumption of public goods.
However, Ostrom (2000) offered a theory against the selﬁshness
hypothesis, concluding that there is a propensity to cooperate due
to the growth of shared social norms. Bernheim and Rangel (2007)
also support the idea of cooperation with the common goal,
providing different views on human motivations. More recently,
the ﬁeld of behavioral economics has provided different explana-
tions for speciﬁcally linking people's attitudes to the provision of
public goods, showing the cognitive limitations of the traditional
economic theory. In summary, studies from behavioral economics
have shown that environmental justice and social norms also
affect individual decisions, and therefore should be taken into
account in traditional economic models. Furthermore, it is useful
to understand that people act in a social context.
In this sense, when dealing with an issue as important as
climate change, individuals are inﬂuenced by values and beliefs
shared in groups for which they feel a sense of belonging
(Hoffman, 2011). Brekke and Johansson-Stenman (2008a, 2008b)
suggested that what may be rational for a single country (or
individual) in isolation is globally suboptimal. In this social setting,
one of the problems that can appear is the free-rider problem, and
based on this aspect, important concepts such as conditional
cooperation, reciprocity, altruism and norms shared by groups
come to the fore in the climate debate.
Also, Grothmann and Patt (2005) concluded that in the analysis
of adaptation policies, issues such as vulnerability and indicators of
the perceived adaptive capacity are crucial when making predic-
tions in terms of climate. They also point out the importance of the
perception of risk, giving special attention to whether policies
solely communicate risks, without giving adaptation options. This
can lead towards people simply denying the risk, instead of taking
actions that lead towards change.
Therefore, in order to improve the effectiveness of policies, it is
very important to take into account social factors that can affect public
opinion. Adger et al. (2009) indicate that some limits to adaptation
policies are “endogenous to society” and that ethics, knowledge, risk
and culture are important issues. More recently, Adger et al. (2013)
highlighted that cultural dimensions are quite important, while it is
likely that when cultural dimensions are ignored, policies will fail to be
effective. For this reason, and due the importance of knowing how
individuals assess the application of different programs and policies to
combat climate change, we collected multiple valuation studies of
preferences around the world and analyzed their results using a meta-
regression analysis. We controlled for relevant factors such as tradi-
tional economic factors, as well as social norms and cultural values
that have been often ignored.
3. Data description and data treatment
In this study we used a meta-analysis, a technique involving
the statistical analysis of a large number of results from individual
studies with the aim of combining the main conclusions (Glass
et al., 1981; Barrio and Loureiro, 2010). According to Brouwer et al.
(1999) this allows us to explain differences in outcomes found in
single studies, taking into account the possible differences accord-
ing to their characteristics, including factors such as the format of
the questions or the measurements used. The beneﬁts of this
technique compared to qualitative analyses are that it does not
prejudge the research results, and that it avoids a subjective
weighting of studies in the interpretation of the ﬁndings
(Brouwer et al. 1999). The potential disadvantages are a potential
risk of bias selection of studies, and the possible existence of intra-
study correlations between different observations from the same
study (Wolf, 1986).
The data collection process and further analysis followed the
recommendations of Nelson and Kennedy (2009) and Stanley et al.
(2013). Due to the important heterogeneity of the climate control
policies and programs in place, we classiﬁed them into three main
types of actions: mitigation, adaptation or a mixture of both. For
this purpose, we grouped the studies using the deﬁnitions used by
the IPCC2. As a result, mitigation programs contain “anthropogenic
interventions to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of green-
house gases;” while adaptation programs are deﬁned as “adjust-
ment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected
2 This information can be found in Klein et al. (2007).
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climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits
beneﬁcial opportunities.” Finally, the third type of programs is a
mixture of both, containing mitigation and adaptation strategies.
Our data come from an intensive search of studies in different
databases, including SCIENCEDIRECT, ECONLIT, and AGECONSEARCH.
Speciﬁcally, we searched for studies that deal with climate change
policies and report WTP estimates for the actions or policies
analyzed. The keywords used in the search contained combinations
of the terms “climate change,” “mitigation”, “willingness to pay”, and
“adaptation.” Speciﬁcally, we analyzed studies that promote actions
to combat climate change3. We reviewed a total of 79 studies that
estimate WTP to combat climate change through renewable ener-
gies, the reduction of emissions of different types of transportation
(such as motor vehicles or aircraft), new cleaner products, reduction
of energy dependency, support for the Kyoto protocol and deforesta-
tion programs, among others, since the 1990s. From these studies, 21
reported incomplete information or did not report WTP in compar-
able ways, and as a result were dropped from the ﬁnal data set due to
their large number of missing values4. It should be noted that in this
application, the WTP analyzed were the average WTP estimates for
climate change policies provided by each study for a sample of a
given country. As a result, the ﬁnal dataset used for this meta-
analysis contained 58 studies from different countries5. In general,
we found that most research on preferences towards climate change
policies was carried out in America, representing more than 52.18% of
the observations obtained, followed by Europe (34.15%), Asia (9.03%)
and Oceania (4.64%). Moreover, it is important to take into account
that most of the studies were from developed countries and higher
income groups, as stated by Balderas et al. (2013), and as such, our
results should not be directly generalized to the developing world. In
some cases, we obtained multiple observations from a single study,
with an average of 6.1 observations per study. The collected studies
reported their results in different currencies ($US, €, etc.) and at
different times. In order to homogenize all this information, valua-
tions were converted to a standard currency, a monthly payment
(expressed in Purchasing Power Parity Index (PPP)6, $US 2012). We
used the mean WTP instead of the median estimate as the depen-
dent variable, as used in previous meta-analyses, due to the fact that
only a few studies report mean and median estimates (Loomis and
White, 1996; Smith and Osborne, 1996; Horowitz and McConnell,
2002). Table 1 summarizes the articles and papers from which the
observations were collected.
A regression technique outlined in the following section was used.
Three different groups of explanatory variables were included in
order to model preferences towards climate change adaptation and
mitigation policies. First, we assessed the effect of the geo-physical
conditions and site characteristics of the countries where the indivi-
dual studies were conducted. To do so, we used the number of
climatic disasters (climatic disasters) that occurred in each country
when the study was conducted (The International Disaster Database,
2012). This database contains statistical information on extreme
temperatures, droughts and wildﬁres. We expected that this variable
would have a positive coefﬁcient as it represents the accumulated
experience with respect to risky weather events. We also expected
that this variable could be a proxy for the vulnerability that citizens
may experience, something that has proved to be very relevant in
other studies (Grothmann and Patt, 2005).
The characteristics of the study are also important in order to
explain differences in WTP related to methodological procedures.
In this sense, we included the variable face to face, identifying
studies where the survey was conducted in person. We also
considered whether the survey was conducted by telephone
instead of over the Internet, or by using a combination of different
methods (indirect). Bowling (2005) states that survey modes can
have different effects on the data collected. We also identiﬁed
whether the respondents were households (households) or indivi-
duals. In a contingent valuation survey, Lindhjem and Navrud
(2009) found that households provided higher WTP estimates
than individuals. An additional important explanatory variable is
the temporal length of the required payment to support the
program or public policy valued. Therefore, we included an
indicator reﬂecting whether the proposed payment was a one-
time payment (one-time) or a monthly payment (monthly), instead
of an annual payment. In the previous literature, shorter time
periods have shown a positive effect on the acceptance of the
proposed policies (Loomis and White, 1996; Aldy et al., 2012).
As previously stated, we speciﬁcally account for whether the
program or action proposed was a mitigation program (mitigation)
with respect to adaptation or a potential mix of both. Due to the
wide variety of programs analyzed and in order to group the
scattered observations, four categories were created that provide
additional information. In particular, we included one variable
reﬂecting whether the aim of the climate actions was to prevent
disasters or to prevent heat waves (disasters and heat wave
prevention). A second category contains all of the studies assessing
preferences to reduce GHG emissions through green energies or
promoting high efﬁciency products as fuels or appliances (green
energy and high efﬁciency). An additional category contains studies
assessing the protection of forests or animals and the use of forest
resources as a measure to combat climate change (ecosystem based
programs). Finally, we also included studies that proposed GHG
emissions or the ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto Protocol (other programs).
In our analysis, we speciﬁcally identiﬁed the issue of the payment
vehicle. Brouwer et al. (1999) identiﬁed the effect of higher prices
or taxes (higher prices/taxes), the establishment of a new tax or a
voluntary contribution as payment mechanisms. Following pre-
vious meta-analyses, we also considered the effect of the year of
publication (following Loomis and White (1996), Ojea and Loureiro
(2011), among others). For this reason, we used a dummy variable
to identify the studies published before 2009 (before2009), and
also included the sample size of the studies. Speciﬁcally, we added
a variable that identiﬁes surveys conducted with less than 1000
individuals (small sample). Noonan (2003) also studied the effect of
sample size, ﬁnding that the higher the number of respondents,
the lower the WTP obtained. In addition, we considered the effect
of the impact factor of the journal where the study was published
(impact factor) in order to control for quality differences across
estimates (Gallet, 2010). In this case, and in order to retain
observations in our empirical analysis, we established a zero
impact factor for studies that have not yet been published. Finally,
we included an indicator denoting whether the purpose of the
proposed program had a national or a local-regional scope (local-
regional). Similar indicators were employed by Noonan (2003).
With the aim of identifying the effects of the different valuation
methods, we included two indicator variables controlling for
whether choice experiments or other methodologies (ﬁeld
3 It is important to highlight that many studies value the replacement of
traditional energy sources for green energy. However, we only took into account
those that valued green energy as a means to combat climate change; or those that
directly indicated the beneﬁts of green energy in combating climate change to the
respondents.
4 The eliminated studies are Batley et al. (2001), Carlsson et al. (2013), Diedrich
and Goeschl (2011), Farhar and Houston (1996), Jensen et al. (2010), Li et al. (2009),
Li et al. (2004), Liao et al. (2010a), Markantonis and Bithas (2010), Mackerron et al.
(2009), Mozumder et al. (2011), Oliver et al. (2011), Petrolia et al. (2010), Scarpa and
Willis (2010), Strazzera et al. (2012), Willis et al. (2011), Wiser (2007), Zografakis
et al. (2010), Zoric and Hrovatin (2012). Cameron and Gerdes (2007) and Cai et al.
(2010) were also eliminated due to the lack of data for certain relevant variables.
5 We have included all the WTP estimates provided for each paper with the
aim not to bias the results.
6 WTP estimates are ﬁrst converted to dollars with the Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) published by the OECD (2012), and then converted to $2012 currency with
the Consumer Price Index obtained from the US Department of Labor (2012).
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experiments, direct market prices, among others) were employed
(choice experiment, other methodology), with the omitted category
being the contingent valuation category. Florax et al. (2005) found
that choice experiments provide lower estimates than contingent
valuation.
Another group of variables included consists of the socio-
economic characteristics of each speciﬁc country. We included a
dummy variable identifying the degree of development of differ-
ent countries. We expected that developing countries would have
a lower ability to pay due to income restrictions, in comparison to
developed countries. It is nevertheless important to take into
account that due to income restrictions, these countries may have
a higher willingness to regulate climate change externalities. This
variable was collected from World Bank data (World Bank, 2013).
In this meta-regression we also considered additional context-
type variables, as there are other important factors that should be
taken into account in order to understand individual behavior,
including personal and social norms (Viscusi et al., 2011). In order
to consider these effects, we included the societal political views,
using a variable denoting whether the political party in power in
each country at the time when each study was conducted was
right wing (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2012) (right wing).
Table 1
Studies included in the meta-analysis.
References N1 obs Type of program Type of policy Country
Berk and Fovell (1998) 8 Disaster and heat wave prevention Mitigation USA
Layton and Brown (2000) 12 Ecosystem base programs Adaptation USA
Roe et al. (2001) 1 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation USA
Berrens et al. (2004) 13 Other programs Mitigation USA
Nomura and Akai (2004) 3 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Japan
Cameron (2005) 6 Disaster and heat wave prevention Mitigation USA
Bergmann et al. (2006) 4 Ecosystem base programs Mitigation UK
Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2006) 2 Disaster and heat wave prevention Adaptation USA
Zhai et al. (2006) 7 Disaster and heat wave prevention Adaptation Japan
Bigerna and Polinori (2007) 3 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Italy
Borchers et al. (2007) 19 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation USA
Duffy et al. (2007) 2 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation USA
Hidano and Kato (2007) 9 Other programs Both Japan
Whitehead and Cherry (2007) 24 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation USA
Brouwer et al. (2008) 1 Ecosystem base programs Both USA
Lee and Cameron (2008) 4 Other programs Mitigation USA
Longo et al. (2008) 5 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation UK
Tseng and Chen (2008) 3 Ecosystem base programs Adaptation China
Arigoni et al. (2009) 12 Disaster and heat wave prevention Adaptation Brazil
Bollino (2009) 9 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Italy
Cole and Brännlund (2009) 3 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Sweden
Koundouri et al. (2009) 1 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Greece
Rajmis et al. (2009) 3 Ecosystem base programs Both Germany
Soliño et al. (2009) 6 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Spain
Solomon and Johnson (2009) 4 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation USA
Tseng et al. (2009) 2 Disaster and heat wave prevention Adaptation China
Yoo and Kwak (2009) 2 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Korea
Brännlund and Persson (2010) 10 Other programs Mitigation Sweden
Carlsson et al. (2010) 9 Other programs Mitigation China, Sweden, USA
Glenk and Fischer (2010) 5 Disaster and heat wave prevention Adaptation UK
Hanemann et al. (2010) 2 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Spain
Kaczan et al. (2010) 12 Disaster and heat wave prevention Mitigation Australia
Liao et al. (2010b) 2 Disaster and heat wave prevention Adaptation China
Adaman et al. (2011) 1 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Turkey
Akter and Bennett (2011) 4 Other programs Mitigation Australia
Chawla et al. (2011), 8 Disaster and heat wave prevention Adaptation Switzerland
Chuen et al. (2011) 1 Disaster and heat wave prevention Adaptation Malaysia
Hanemann et al. (2011) 1 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Spain
Hidrue et al. (2011) 9 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation USA
Komarek et al. (2011) 24 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation USA
Layton and Levine (2011) 6 Ecosystem base programs Both USA
Shih and Chou (2011) 4 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation USA
Susaeta et al. (2011) 5 Green energy and high efﬁciency Both USA
Ward et al. (2011) 4 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation USA
Achtnicht (2012) 16 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Germany
Aldy et al. 2012 1 Other programs Mitigation USA
Botzen and van der Bergh (2012) 3 Disaster and heat wave prevention Adaptation Netherlands
Araña and León (2012) 3 Other programs Mitigation Spain
Cicia et al. (2012) 7 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Italy
Gracia et al. (2012) 5 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Spain
Kraeusel and Möst (2012) 4 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Germany
Longo et al. (2012) 9 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Spain
Soliño et al. (2012) 8 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation Spain
Zhang and Wu (2012) 2 Green energy and high efﬁciency Mitigation China
Botzen et al. (2013) 2 Disaster and heat wave prevention Adaptation Netherlands
Brouwer and Schaafsma (2013) 4 Disaster and heat wave prevention Adaptation Netherlands
Kotchen et al. (2013) 6 Other programs Mitigation USA
Mueller (2013) 21 Other programs Mitigation USA
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This political orientation variable has been employed by several
authors in order to evaluate climate policies,7 concluding that
people with left-wing tendencies have a higher WTP for environ-
mental programs than those who have a more conservative view
(Carlsson et al., 2010; Solomon and Johnson, 2009; Wiser, 2007;
Berrens et al., 2004, among others). Furthermore, we included the
percentage of individuals who do not consider it justiﬁable to
cheat on personal taxes (not cheating) from the World Values
Survey (2012). Using this variable, we expected to represent the
relative importance of social trust and cooperation versus free-
riding behavior on the contribution to public policies. We also
used this database to analyze the role of citizens who afﬁrm to be
individualistic. This variable reﬂects the percentage of individuals
in a country that agree with the following sentence “I see myself as
an autonomous individual”. Therefore, these people feel that they
are not related to the society (individualism).
We also analyzed the effect of other cultural social norms, in
the sense of values shared by society (Mc Breen et al., 2011). In
particular, the inﬂuence of culture is crucial in terms of climate
change (Adger et al., 2013). With the aim of analyzing the impact
of these cultural effects, we used the indexes developed by
Hofstede (2001) that measure the dimensions of national cultures
in a globally comparable manner8. For this study, we only analyzed
the effect of four of Hofstede's indexes. Speciﬁcally, the “uncer-
tainty avoidance” index that represents “the degree to which the
members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and
ambiguity”. In addition, the “long term versus short term orienta-
tion” index. Hofstede (2001) deﬁnes societies with long term
orientation as those that “show an ability to adapt traditions to
changed conditions, a strong propensity to save and invest, thriftiness,
and perseverance in achieving results.”
The last two of Hofstede's indexes included are the “masculi-
nity versus femininity” and “indulgence versus restraint” indexes.
The ﬁrst of them represents a “preference in society for achieve-
ment, heroism, assertiveness and material reward for success”,
while the “indulgence versus restraint” identiﬁes an indulgence
society as one “that allows relatively free gratiﬁcation of basic and
natural human drives related to enjoying life and having fun.
Restraint stands for a society that suppresses gratiﬁcation of needs
and regulates it by means of strict social norms.”
We did not control for the rest of the indicators provided by
Hofstede due to multicollinearity problems among those indexes.
Speciﬁcally, we detected the presence of high correlation between
the indicator developing and the “power distance” and “individual-
ism versus collectivism” indexes, with a correlation coefﬁcient
higher than 0.75. Furthermore, with respect to the index “prag-
matic versus normative” we detected a higher correlation with the
he “indulgence versus restraint” index, with a coefﬁcient of 0.78.
Table 2 shows the description of the variables that were used and
the respective summary statistics, and Fig. 1 represents the
distribution of these indexes across continents.9
4. Model speciﬁcation and research hypotheses
With the dataset described above, and in order to provide
robust results, we estimated different meta-regression models.
Our estimation strategy relied on ﬁrst presenting a number of
reduced form models or baseline models. These were then
extended by including additional relevant variables, such as the
role of social factors. First, we estimated an Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) and then a Robust OLS, with the aim of controlling for
possible inﬂuential observations. Using the Szroeter (1978) test,
we assessed the presence of heteroskedasticity, ﬁnding that the
test carries a value of 1.79 for a Chi-squared with 1 degree of
freedom and an associated p-value of 0.181. Therefore, we con-
cluded that there is no evidence of this problem existing in our
dataset. However, and due to the possible correlation between the
variables of our dataset, and with the aim to check the robustness
of our results, we also estimated a Generalized Least Squares (GLS)
as well as a Random Effects model (RE) assuming the existence of
both sampling error variability, and variability for each study
included, in other words that intra-study variability and variability
exists between the studies.
The dependent variable in our model is a vector of monetary
values representing the preferences for the various programs
proposed to correct climate change effects, labeled as log(WTP).
The independent variables are grouped into the three previously-
described categories that include the type of policy characteristics
in Xci; the study characteristics in Xsi and the socio-economic
characteristics of the study sample in Xei. The model corresponds
to the following equation:
log ðWTPiÞ ¼ αþβcXciþβsXsiþβeXeiþεi; ð1Þ
where α is the constant term, the β vector contains the coefﬁcients
associated with the respective independent variables and ε is the
vector of the error term for the OLS.
In order to test for the correct empirical speciﬁcation used, we
tested for the presence of multicollinearity through the Variance
Inﬂation Factor (VIF) Indicator. Its corresponding mean value
of 5.11 shows that there is no serious concern about multicolli-
nearity. Furthermore, we looked at the functional form of our
model, conducting a Box–Cox test. This test allowed us to assess
the best empirical speciﬁcation form through the transformation
of the data to make the residual sum squares comparable.
Speciﬁcally, we ﬁt the model with the transformed dependent
variable:
gðyiθÞ  yθi =θ¼ x0iβþμi ð2Þ
where β and θ are estimated on the assumption that residuals
follow a normal distribution. In this way, when the estimated θ is
near 1, we should choose the linear speciﬁcation, whereas if this
value is near 0, the selected functional form should be a log
speciﬁcation. With our data, we obtained a value for
_
θ ¼ 0:04 (p-
value¼0.003). Therefore, we employed a semi-log speciﬁcation for
the dependent variable10. We also conducted a Grubbs test with
the aim of assessing whether there are outliers, concluding that in
our sample there is no presence of extreme values in the
dependent variable.
4.1. Research hypotheses
One of the interesting aspects of this paper is that it tests a set
of hypotheses on the factors that can affect the WTP for climate
7 More information on studies that consider these aspects can be found in
Johnson and Nemet (2010).
8 Hofstede conducted a study between 1967 and 1973 for IBM about cultural
dimensions. Initially, this study contains four indexes: power distance, individual-
ism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity and uncertainty avoidance.
Then, in 1991 a new dimension was added, the long-term orientation, and in 2010 a
sixth and seventh indexes were created, indulgence versus restraint and pragmatic
versus normative. These indexes were built on a scale from 0 to 100. Each of these
indexes only takes one value per country, not varying over time. In this regard the
author indicates that “These relative scores have been proven to be quite stable
over time.”( http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html).
9 We do not include an income indicator in our regression due to the high
correlation between this indicator and the Hofstede indexes. However, we include
the indicator variable developing, which reﬂects income and vulnerability differ-
ences across countries.
10 When taking the log transformation of the dependent variable, we ﬁnd some
missing values (due to the present of zero values), but this question does not affect
our analysis due to the small number of cases, and moreover, this procedure
reduces the existence of outliers.
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Table 2
Variable description and summary statistics.
Variable Description Mean Std.
Dev.
Logwtp Logarithm of the willingness to pay 1.410 0.817
Country characteristics
Climatic disasters Number of climatic disasters per country and year studied 2.930 3.224
Study characteristics
Face to face 1, if the survey method was face- to-face; 0 otherwise 0.235 0.424
Telephone 1, if the survey method was by telephone; 0 otherwise 0.134 0.341
Indirecta 1, if the survey method was on-line or a combination of different methods; 0 otherwise 0.631 0.483
Households 1, if the respondent was a household; 0 otherwise 0.593 0.492
Individualsa 1, if the respondent was an individual; 0 otherwise 0.407 0.492
Mitigation 1, if the program proposed was a mitigation program; 0 otherwise 0.762 0.426
Adaptationa 1, if the program proposed was an adaptation program; 0 otherwise 0.172 0.378
Botha 1, if the program proposed was a mixture of adaptation and mitigation program; 0 otherwise 0.065 0.248
One-time 1, if the payment was a one-time payment; 0 otherwise 0.095 0.294
Monthly 1, if the payment was a monthly payment; 0 otherwise 0.598 0.491
Annuala 1, if the payment was an annual payment; 0 otherwise 0.306 0.461
Impact factor Impact factor of journal 1.878 2.124
Local-regional 1, if the program proposed to the population had a local or regional objective; 0 otherwise 0.423 0.495
Nationala 1, if the program proposed to the population had a national objective; 0 otherwise 0. 0.576 0.494
Higher prices/taxes 1, if the payment vehicle was higher prices or taxes; 0 otherwise 0.462 0.499
Voluntary 1, if the payment vehicle was a voluntary payment or a donation; 0 otherwise 0.098 0.298
New tax 1, if the payment vehicle was a tax; 0 otherwise 0.120 0.325
Premiuma 1, if the payment vehicle was a premium; 0 otherwise 0.049 0.216
Feea 1, if the payment vehicle was a fee; 0 otherwise 0.065 0.248
Other type of paymenta 1, if the payment vehicle was not speciﬁed or it was another type; 0 otherwise 0.139 0.347
Small sample 1, if the size of sample analyzed was less than 1000 surveys; 0 otherwise 0.669 0.471
Sample size-biga 1, if the size of sample analyzed was higher than 1000 surveys; 0 otherwise 0.331 0.471
Before 2009 1, if the study was published before 2009; 0 otherwise 0.462 0.499
Choice experiment 1, if the methodology employed was a choice experiment; 0 otherwise 0.450 0.498
Contingent valuationa 1, if the methodology employed was contingent valuation; 0 otherwise 0.494 0.501
Other methodology 1, if the methodology employed was market values, ﬁeld experiments, among others; 0 otherwise 0.056 0.229
Disasters and heat wave
prevention
1, if the program proposed had as objective to reduce the risk of disasters and to control climate variability; 0 otherwise 0.202 0.402
Ecosystem based programs 1, if the program proposed an ecosystem based approach; 0 otherwise 0.090 0.286
Green energy and high
efﬁciencya
1, if the program proposed had as objective to reduce GHG emissions through green energy or fuels and appliances with
high efﬁciency; 0 otherwise
0.519 0.500
Other programs 1, if the program proposed had as to reduce GHG emissions or to ratify the Kyoto Protocol; 0 otherwise 0.210 0.408
Socio-economic characteristics
Developing countries 1, if the country studied was include in the developing countries classiﬁcation; 0 otherwise 0.079 0.270
Right wind 1, if the country studied was governed by a right-wing political party in the year studied 0.497 0.501
Left winda 1, if the country studied was governed by a left-wing political party in the year studied 0.502 0.500
Individualism The % of people that agree with this sentence “I see myself as an autonomous individual” 67.407 16.288
Uncertainty avoidanceb “The uncertainty avoidance dimension expresses the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with
uncertainty and ambiguity. The fundamental issue here is how a society deals with the fact that the future can never be
known: should we try to control the future or just let it happen? Countries exhibiting strong UAI maintain rigid codes of
belief and behavior and are intolerant of unorthodox behavior and ideas. Weak UAI societies maintain a more relaxed
attitude in which practice counts more than principles”
55.224 18.052
Masculinity versus
femininity
“The masculinity side of this dimension represents a preference in society for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and
material rewards for success. Society at large is more competitive. Its opposite, femininity, stands for a preference for
cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life. Society at large is more consensus-oriented”
58.357 17.189
Indulgence versus restraint “Indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free gratiﬁcation of basic and natural human drives related to
enjoying life and having fun. Restraint stands for a society that suppresses gratiﬁcation of needs and regulates it by
means of strict social norms”
59.169 14.73
Individualism versus
collectivism
“The high side of this dimension, called individualism, can be deﬁned as a preference for a loosely-knit social framework
in which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families. Its opposite, collectivism,
represents a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in which individuals can expect their relatives or
members of a particular in-group to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. A society’s position on this
dimension is reﬂected in whether people's self-image is deﬁned in terms of “I” or “we””
75.951 20.569
Power distancea “This dimension expresses the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is
distributed unequally. The fundamental issue here is how a society handles inequalities among people. People in
societies exhibiting a large degree of power distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and
which needs no further justiﬁcation. In societies with low power distance, people strive to equalize the distribution of
power and demand justiﬁcation for inequalities of power”
44.243 11.338
Long term versus short
term orientation
The extent to which a society shows a pragmatic future-oriented perspective rather than a conventional historical short-
term point of view
35.603 20.813
Pragmatic versus
normativea
“This dimension describes how people in the past, as well as today, relate to the fact that so much that happens around
us cannot be explained”
39.398 22.612
Not cheating The percentage of citizens that do not justify cheating on taxes 50.715 24.972
a These are the omitted variables.
b These deﬁnitions are available at The Hofstede Centre (2012): http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html.
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change policies. Speciﬁcally, we focused our attention on two
elements related to behavioral economics. The ﬁrst issue concerns
the question of individualism. We expected that individuals who
feel like an autonomous individual (instead of an individual
included in a society) would have a lower WTP for a social
environmental policy. As previously mentioned, in the literature
on climate change it is important to take into account that we are
dealing with individuals, but also with groups. In this sense,
members of a group are under greater pressure to do the “right
thing” than those who think that they are autonomous. Cialdini
and Goldstein (2004) stated “if we engage in behaviors of which
others approve, others will approve of us, too”. Otherwise, as
previously indicated, climate change can be seen as a global public
good and two types of behaviors can arise when facing public
policies: free-rider and conditional cooperation. According to
Gächter (2006), we should consider that an agent can obtain
beneﬁts from a public good, even if this agent has not contributed
to the public good in question, and that therefore, everyone has an
incentive to hope that others would contribute towards the
public good.
In order to assess this expected effect, we tested the
following hypothesis, with βindividualism as the coefﬁcient asso-
ciated with the individualism variable. We expected this vari-
able to have a negative impact on WTP:
H0 : βindividualismZ0
H1 : βindividualismo0 ð3Þ
Next, we studied the effect of the degree of compliance with
taxes on societal policies. Speciﬁcally, by using the indicator
not cheating we identify the percentage of individuals in a
given country that do not justify cheating on taxes. We
identiﬁed this indicator as a measure of the honesty of
individuals. Lusk et al. (2007) concluded that more honest
individuals are unlikely to give untruthful responses. There-
fore, we focused on testing whether their WTP is lower than
those who do justify this behavior. We identiﬁed the variable
“not cheating” with the coefﬁcient βnot cheating .
H0 : βnot cheatingr0
H1 : βnot cheating40
ð4Þ
5. Empirical results
Following Eq. (1), and dropping the individual i subscripts for
convenience, the empirical estimated model is
InðWTPÞ ¼ αþβ1 climatic disastersþβ2 face to face
þβ3 telephoneþβ4 households
þβ5 one timeþβ6 monthlyþβ7 mitigation
þβ8 disasters and heat wave prevention
þβ9 ecoystems based programs
þβ10 other programsþβ11 higher prices=taxes
þβ12 new taxþβ13 voluntaryþβ14 small sample
þβ15 before 2009þβ16 impact fact
þβ17 local regionalþβ18 choice experiment
þβ19 other methodologyþβ20 developing countries
þβ21 right windþβ22 not cheating
þβ23 uncertainty avoidance
þβ24 long term versus short term orientation
þβ25 masculinity versus femininty
þβ26 indulgence versus restraintþβ27 individualismþε;
ð5Þ
With regard to the results, Table 3 shows the output of the
baseline models, while Table 4 shows the results from the
extended models. Overall, the models ﬁt the data quite well with
a R2 of more than 50% for the baseline models and more than 60%
for the extended models.
With respect to the results obtained, we will ﬁrst examine in
greater detail the results presented in Table 3 that correspond to
the baseline models. In the case of the geo-physical conditions, we
found that citizens that have more accumulated experience with
respect to risky weather events have a greater WTP. In terms of the
study characteristics, we found that surveys conducted via tele-
phone or face-to-face provide lower WTP estimates than those
conducted via the Internet or using a combination of different
methods (except in Robust OLS). With respect to the payment
periodicity, citizens prefer a one-time payment instead of annual
payments, meaning they prefer short payments in time. This result
is in line with the ﬁndings obtained by Loomis and White (1996).
Another common result refers to the mode of payment: the results
Power distance
Individualism vs. collectivism
Masculinity vs.feminity
Uncertainty avoidance
Indulgence vs. restraint
Long term vs. short term orientation
Pragmatic vs. normative
Not cheating(%)
65.00
34.59
80.15
68.06
35.32
91.97
87.44
41.75
36.00
90.00
61.00
51.00
71.00
31.00
22.00
63.90
43.35
67.50
47.78
63.49
51.51
27.50
53.88
40.60
41.82
87.67
61.18
47.88
67.43
31.26
22.82
57.29
America Europe Oceania Asia
Fig. 1. Social norms and cultural values per continent.
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show that people prefer higher prices/taxes or the establishment of
a new tax instead of other type of payments, such as donations,
trust funds, etc. This result may be justiﬁed, given that the former are
universal and avoid the free-rider problem. Brouwer et al. (1999) also
found a positive coefﬁcient for income taxes. With respect to the
journal impact factor, we found that journals with higher impact
factors tend to present lower WTP estimates. In addition, attending
to the effect of the different methodologies used, we concluded that a
choice experiment or other methodology provides lower estimates
than the omitted variable (contingent valuation) (the same result was
obtained by Florax et al. (2005)). Focusing our attention on the type
of programs proposed with the aim of combating climate change, we
concluded that mitigation programs are preferred over adaptation
programs, or even over a policy mix. As observable in Tables 3 and 4,
the indicator corresponding with themitigation policy is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant over the omitted variable. These ﬁndings may
be considered in the future in terms of policy design. Furthermore,
people are more likely to pay for programs and policies designed
to avoid disasters or to reduce heat waves (disasters and heat
waves prevention) instead of supporting programs to promote green
energies.
We reached similar conclusions when considering the
extended models (Table 4), although we did observe that the face
to face and new tax indicators are not statistically signiﬁcant. In
addition, we found that the monthly indicator is signiﬁcant at the
10% conﬁdence level depending on the estimated model. More-
over, we also concluded that ecosystem based programs are
statistically signiﬁcant, and so individuals also prefer programs
that assess the protection of forests or animals and the use of
forest resources as a measure to combat climate change.
However, depending on the estimated models, our results
varied slightly with respect to the effect of some variables.
Speciﬁcally, in the extended models we analyzed the role played
by the socio-economic variables, ﬁnding that the developing
countries indicator had a negative and statistically signiﬁcant
effect on WTP. As expected, this suggests that people in these
countries are less willing to pay to combat climate change,
probably due to their income restrictions. It is important to
highlight that this result does not mean that poor countries value
less the problem of climate change, rather they do not have a
purchasing power comparable to developed countries. We also
observed that studies conducted in countries with a right-wing
political orientation result in lower WTPs than those from coun-
tries with a left-wing government, as indicated in previous studies
(Carlsson et al., 2010).
Finally, considering the Hofstede indexes, we concluded that
the indicator of long term vs. short term orientation is statistically
signiﬁcant, and always has a positive coefﬁcient. This result may
be explained by the fact that countries that plan more on a long-
term basis have a larger WTP to ﬁght climate change. Finally, the
masculinity vs. feminity index is statistically signiﬁcant, showing
that societies in which masculinity is high are less willing to pay
than their counterparts. In this case, some previous studies found
that women are usually more egalitarian than men (Eckel and
Grossman, 1998; List, 2004, among others).
In conclusion, and with respect to the research hypotheses, the
individualism indicator carries a negative coefﬁcient, as would be
expected. Therefore, countries with more individualistic indivi-
duals have a lower WTP for public climate control policies. This
can be a consequence of these citizens not feeling any pressure to
Table 3
Baseline meta-regression results.
LogWTP OLS Robust OLS Random Effects GLS
Coefﬁcient Std. Err. P4 |t| Coefﬁcient Std. Err. P4 |t| Coefﬁcient Std. Err. P4 |t| Coefﬁcient Std. Err. P4 |t|
Geo-physical conditions
Climatic disasters 0.114 0.014 0.000 0.114 0.014 0.000 0.114 0.014 0.000 0.114 0.013 0.000
Characteristics of study
Face to face 0.170 0.092 0.066 0.170 0.113 0.136 0.170 0.092 0.065 0.170 0.089 0.058
Telephone 0.455 0.133 0.001 0.455 0.133 0.001 0.455 0.133 0.001 0.455 0.129 0.000
Households 0.002 0.086 0.978 0.002 0.103 0.982 0.002 0.086 0.978 0.002 0.083 0.977
One time 1.011 0.143 0.000 1.011 0.141 0.000 1.011 0.143 0.000 1.011 0.139 0.000
Monthly 0.093 0.087 0.289 0.093 0.115 0.421 0.093 0.087 0.288 0.093 0.085 0.275
Mitigation 0.418 0.119 0.001 0.418 0.127 0.001 0.418 0.119 0.000 0.418 0.116 0.000
Disasters and heat wave prevention 0.837 0.111 0.000 0.837 0.108 0.000 0.837 0.111 0.000 0.837 0.108 0.000
Other programs 0.040 0.103 0.698 0.040 0.101 0.691 0.040 0.103 0.697 0.040 0.100 0.689
Ecosystem based programs 0.222 0.153 0.149 0.222 0.165 0.181 0.222 0.153 0.148 0.222 0.149 0.137
Higher prices/taxes 0.729 0.090 0.000 0.729 0.118 0.000 0.729 0.090 0.000 0.729 0.088 0.000
New tax 0.346 0.132 0.009 0.346 0.144 0.017 0.346 0.132 0.009 0.346 0.128 0.007
Voluntary 0.141 0.145 0.332 0.141 0.122 0.250 0.141 0.145 0.331 0.141 0.141 0.317
Small sample 0.091 0.087 0.296 0.091 0.086 0.291 0.091 0.087 0.296 0.091 0.084 0.282
Before 2009 0.400 0.080 0.000 0.400 0.089 0.000 0.400 0.080 0.000 0.400 0.078 0.000
Impact factor 0.051 0.014 0.000 0.051 0.016 0.001 0.051 0.014 0.000 0.051 0.014 0.000
Local-regional 0.056 0.074 0.446 0.056 0.078 0.473 0.056 0.074 0.445 0.056 0.072 0.433
Choice experiment 0.524 0.080 0.000 0.524 0.082 0.000 0.524 0.080 0.000 0.524 0.078 0.000
Other methodology 0.652 0.155 0.000 0.652 0.130 0.000 0.652 0.155 0.000 0.652 0.151 0.000
Constant 0.619 0.169 0.000 0.619 0.174 0.000 0.619 0.169 0.000 0.619 0.164 0.000
σμ 0.000
σε 0.502
ρ 0.000
N 366 366 366 366
F 23.120 41.380
Prob4F 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.535 0.559
Root MSE 0.557 0.557
Log restricted likelihood 294.719
Wald 439.350 464.750
Prob4χ2 0.000 0.000
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behave as members of a group, and that as a result they are not
conditioned by other individuals will think of them. In addition,
and with respect to the second hypothesis, we found a negative
relationship between the percentages of citizens who do not
justify cheating on taxes (not cheating) with the reported WTP
for climate change. This may be an indication of the fact that
honest individuals (or those with strong personal norms) are more
likely to respond in a sincere way to surveys, providing
lower WTPs.
6. Conclusions
The present study has provided an analysis of existing litera-
ture on preferences and of WTP for climate change mitigation and
adaptation policies through a meta-regression, offering a summary
of the most important results. We acknowledge, however, that
other lenses and moral aspects could be used in order to under-
stand social preferences for climate policies.
The main aim of this paper is to contribute towards identifying
the main determining factors of climate change policies. We
collected information from 58 studies around the world, ﬁnding
results that can be useful in terms of policy design in order to
increase the acceptance and compliance of public climate control
policies. We acknowledge that the vast majority of our study
sample is skewed toward the developed world, and have con-
trolled for this issue in the estimated models.
There are important lessons from this previous analysis that
should be taken into account when designing effective policies to
control climate change. Overall, our results show that mitigation
actions are preferred over adaptation actions. In addition, policies
should encourage the prevention of disasters and heat waves to
combat climate change (disasters and heat wave prevention) in
order to be more preferable. It is also important to note that
economic conditions deﬁnitely play a role in terms of supporting
efforts to combat climate change, and that in developing countries,
there is less willingness to pay for climate control policies,
however, this does not mean that poor countries value less the
climate change problem. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
this may imply that these societies may be more willing to
regulate by using other mechanisms that do not require higher
prices to be paid for goods or services. Also, in terms of time
Table 4
Extended meta-regression results.
LogWTP OLS Robust OLS Random effects GLS
Coefﬁcient Std. Err. P4 |t| Coefﬁcient Std. Err. P4 |t| Coefﬁcient Std. Err. P4 |t| Coefﬁcient Std. Err. P4 |t|
Geo-physical conditions
Climatic disasters 0.105 0.022 0.000 0.105 0.024 0.000 0.105 0.022 0.000 0.105 0.021 0.000
Characteristics of study
Face to face 0.122 0.095 0.200 0.122 0.112 0.279 0.122 0.095 0.199 0.122 0.091 0.180
Telephone 0.704 0.138 0.000 0.704 0.149 0.000 0.704 0.138 0.000 0.704 0.132 0.000
Households 0.045 0.096 0.639 0.045 0.095 0.635 0.045 0.096 0.639 0.045 0.092 0.624
One time 1.193 0.140 0.000 1.193 0.155 0.000 1.193 0.140 0.000 1.193 0.135 0.000
Monthly 0.165 0.097 0.090 0.165 0.122 0.176 0.165 0.097 0.089 0.165 0.093 0.076
Mitigation 0.299 0.147 0.042 0.299 0.131 0.023 0.299 0.147 0.041 0.299 0.141 0.033
Disasters and heat wave prevention 0.844 0.126 0.000 0.844 0.130 0.000 0.844 0.126 0.000 0.844 0.121 0.000
Other programs 0.121 0.103 0.243 0.121 0.119 0.310 0.121 0.103 0.242 0.121 0.099 0.222
Ecosystem based programs 0.379 0.182 0.038 0.379 0.186 0.042 0.379 0.182 0.037 0.379 0.175 0.030
Higher prices/taxes 0.479 0.098 0.000 0.479 0.147 0.001 0.479 0.098 0.000 0.479 0.094 0.000
New tax 0.167 0.139 0.233 0.167 0.195 0.393 0.167 0.139 0.232 0.167 0.134 0.212
Voluntary 0.156 0.167 0.349 0.156 0.179 0.383 0.156 0.167 0.348 0.156 0.160 0.327
Small sample 0.005 0.097 0.956 0.005 0.119 0.965 0.005 0.097 0.956 0.005 0.093 0.955
Before 2009 0.246 0.113 0.030 0.246 0.159 0.123 0.246 0.113 0.029 0.246 0.108 0.023
Impact factor 0.036 0.013 0.007 0.036 0.008 0.000 0.036 0.013 0.006 0.036 0.013 0.004
Local-regional 0.012 0.079 0.883 0.012 0.093 0.901 0.012 0.079 0.883 0.012 0.076 0.878
Choice experiment 0.538 0.092 0.000 0.538 0.075 0.000 0.538 0.092 0.000 0.538 0.088 0.000
Other methodology 0.627 0.176 0.000 0.627 0.213 0.003 0.627 0.176 0.000 0.627 0.168 0.000
Socio-economic characteristics
Developing countries 1.497 0.432 0.001 1.497 0.407 0.000 1.497 0.432 0.001 1.497 0.414 0.000
Right wing 0.387 0.098 0.000 0.387 0.124 0.002 0.387 0.098 0.000 0.387 0.094 0.000
Not cheating 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.032 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.001
Uncertainty avoidance 0.000 0.003 0.962 0.000 0.004 0.973 0.000 0.003 0.962 0.000 0.003 0.960
Long-term versus short-term orientation 0.011 0.006 0.041 0.011 0.005 0.019 0.011 0.006 0.040 0.011 0.005 0.032
Masculinity versus femininity 0.015 0.005 0.003 0.015 0.004 0.000 0.015 0.005 0.002 0.015 0.005 0.002
Indulgence versus restraint 0.002 0.004 0.654 0.002 0.005 0.666 0.002 0.004 0.654 0.002 0.004 0.640
Individualism 0.012 0.004 0.002 0.012 0.004 0.003 0.012 0.004 0.002 0.012 0.004 0.001
Constant 2.586 0.654 0.000 2.586 0.839 0.002 2.586 0.654 0.000 2.586 0.627 0.000
OLS Robust OLS Random Effects GLS
σμ 0.000
σε 0.423
ρ 0.000
N 342 342 342 342
F 24.400 40.910
Prob4F 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R2 0.650 0.677
Root MSE 0.479 0.479
Log restricted-likelihood 219.056
Wald 658.870 717.620
Prob4χ2 0.000 0.000
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preferences, studies conducted in countries with a signiﬁcantly
long-term orientation have a higher WTP for climate change
policies. These policies may be perceived as insurance towards
future catastrophic events.
We therefore believe that future studies should consider this
set of initial ﬁndings in order to articulate more acceptable policies
around the world in terms of climate change control. In this sense,
particularly important factors are the roles of social norms and
perceived risks, ceteris paribus. It is important to take into account
that there are other mechanisms to combat climate change, such
as improved efﬁciency and infrastructures, which are not evalu-
ated in the current set of studies. Here we have analyzed the
acceptability in terms of willingness to pay for programs that
require an economic sacriﬁce by consumers.
In conclusion, a relevant ﬁnding of our work is that cultural and
social dimensions are relevant in promoting the acceptability of
climate change policies, as shown in the present analysis. We believe
that these cultural and social norm dimensions may be reinforced by
promoting informational campaigns in order to raise awareness
amongst the public. This would make it possible to generate a solid
body of knowledge that would be useful in increasing resilience
towards extreme events, and a better use and management of energy
and resources in general. Unfortunately, statistical data are very limited
in order to reﬂect and empirically test the importance of environ-
mental awareness at international levels. Future efforts should focus
on collecting comparable data at international level in order to better
understand the social norms and cultural backgrounds of societies.
These data may become very useful and relevant in understanding
support towards certain public policies and cooperative behaviors.
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